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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the international narcotics trade from 1909-1961. The 
focus is on the United States’ role in shaping the international drug machinery at 
both the League of Nations and United Nations. 
Its original contribution is threefold. First, it uses critical geopolitical theory to 
provide a diplomatic history that does not solely rely on the accounts of 
important diplomats. It expands the focus to include American discourses about 
narcotics, and how these helped the US develop a geonarcotic subjectivity of a 
victim of, and warrior against, the opium evil. Second, it supplements this 
traditional geopolitical analysis with a materialist analysis of the narcotics 
themselves. It uses assemblage theory to circumvent the problematic 
conceptualisation of narcotics as either legal or illegal and highlight the 
capacities of narcotics, specifically their diplomatic uses. Third, it offers an 
original empirical account of the heretofore unexamined Opium Determination 
Programme that the United Nations and the US ran from the mid-1940s to 
1960s. Finally, it provides a novel methodological way of studying historical, 
geopolitical objects by focussing on the technical documents that were 
produced about them. 
Ultimately, it provides geographers with conceptual and methodological tools 
that shift the focus from studying high ranking, plenipotentiary delegates to the 
objects that they try to regulate. By defining objects by their capacities and 
interactions in assemblages, rather than as legal or illegal commodities, we can 
appreciate the multiple ways they help or hinder diplomatic progress. 
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Key measurements  
Opium measurement Equal to weight in 
grains 
Equal to weight in Kg 
1 grain 1  0.00006479891  
1 tael 1 0.00171429 0.0377994 
1-pound avoirdupois 2 7,000 0.4535924 
1 chest of raw opium 1120000 72.57478 
  
                                                          
1 The tael was a measurement of silver (from the Hindu word tola). The problem with the tael was its 
inability to be applied uniformly across China. There were 43 different exchange rates listed for the tael 
by 1923. 
2 Since 1959, the avoirdupois pound has been officially defined in most English-speaking countries as 
0.45359237 kg. 
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Introduction 
The United States Bullion Depository, or Fort Knox, did not just hold gold 
bullion. Built in 1936, Fort Knox was also a sanctuary for precious items during 
wartime. It was home to the Declaration of Independence, the US Constitution, 
the Magna Carta, and the Crown of Saint Stephen, part of the Hungarian Crown 
Jewels, during the Second World War. Apart from one group of journalists in 
1974, no member of the public has ever entered the vaults. Nor would they be 
able to without permission; Apache helicopters and the United States Army and 
Mint Police are just two of the obstacles awaiting trespassers. 
If one were to somehow slip into Fort Knox, prior to 1993, among the racks of 
glinting gold bars they would stumble across treasures of a chemical nature: 
narcotics. Narcotics were so vital to the security of the United States that they 
were stored with some of the most hallowed treasures of the Western World, in 
the world’s most secure vault. While no official figure has even been disclosed,1 
chests of processed opium and morphine were held in the vaults throughout the 
Second World War and Cold War. There were also supplies in the Treasury 
Department’s vaults in Washington DC. These narcotics safeguarded the 
United States lest it was cut off from the international legal market.2 
What made these chemicals so important that they were kept alongside bullion 
and the world’s most important artefacts? A traditional answer is that these 
narcotics ensured that American civilians and troops could access pain relief 
when they needed it. During wartime, these medicaments were of vital value 
because of their palliative properties: they dulled pain and saved lives.  
11 
 
But therein lies a problem. In Fort Knox, there were far too many narcotics for 
the needs of American troops and citizens. Even more perplexing is that 
officials knew of this surplus and actively encouraged it. At the start of World 
War Two, the US Commissioner of Narcotics was boasting that the US could 
supply Canada, Mexico, and many European nations with the narcotics they 
held. 
To understand why the Commissioner celebrated this surplus we cannot just 
think of narcotics in terms of their analgesic properties, but also their capacities 
as commodities. By this, I refer to their ability to become more than simple 
painkillers. As they sat in Fort Knox, inert and unused, they influenced the 
diplomatic relations between the US and its allies. By stockpiling most of the 
world’s legal narcotics, the US became the world’s biggest legal drug dealer. It 
used narcotics to leverage other nations towards stricter policies that tackled 
the illicit – at least by American standards – trade in opium.3  
Context of study 
This vignette demonstrates a critical point for this thesis: narcotics are complex 
and varied substances that can be used for a variety of purposes. Coole and 
Frost contend that ‘thinking anew about the fundamental structure of matter has 
far-reaching normative and existential implications’.4 What might these far-
reaching implications be for critical geopolitics and drug diplomacy? 
In this thesis, I elucidate the variety of ways that narcotics became ‘geopolitical’, 
whether through their value as material bargaining chips around the conference 
table in Geneva, or as discursive weapons of war used by enemies of the US. I 
also show how the materiality of opium and its derivatives contributed to the 
geopolitical subjectivity of the United States as both a champion of prohibition 
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and deft international procurer of medicines. I pay more attention to the 
substances themselves rather than those who policed and legislated them. The 
few studies linking narcotics to diplomacy have focussed on the negotiations 
between high ranking diplomats involved in establishing twentieth-century 
legislation.5 Other studies have been directed entirely towards these individuals 
and their egos.6 We know much about the ‘grand old men’ of drug control and 
how they squabbled and connived their way to sit atop the Poppy Throne (the 
head of the League of Nations’ Permanent Central Opium Board/ United 
Nations Drug Supervisory Body), but less about the role of the substances.  
Anyone who has been hospitalised for severe pain knows that opioids are the 
most effective treatment against intense, short-term suffering. But they can do 
much more than this, depending on who is using them and for what purpose. 
Much of the geographical literature on narcotics is on their illicit and illegal uses. 
In the discipline of political geography, critical work on drugs has tended 
towards the geography and agriculture of illegal drug crops.7 This is also true of 
historical geography; most research has focussed on times after the watershed 
date of 1971 when Richard Nixon famously declared a ‘War on Drugs’. Most of 
our understanding of the history of narcotics and international relations comes 
from the battles diplomats waged against drug abuse and illegal drug 
production.  
For historians studying the early twentieth-century, however, it proves 
impossible to distinguish between licit and illicit substances, defined here as 
what is culturally, morally and in this case, geopolitically acceptable. In the first 
half of the twentieth-century, the proponents of drug prohibition had to establish 
cultural taboos around certain types of drug use before they could be formally 
designated as illegal under American or international law.  
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These laws worked well. Historians have shown that global narcotic production 
decreased from 1909-1961.8 But early diplomats did not wish for a ‘drug-free 
world’, to use the language of the 1998 United Nations Special Session on 
Narcotic Drugs. While reduction was the over-arching goal, the legal production 
and trade in opium, opiates and opioids was invaluable and often in jeopardy 
during wartime. Because of their value, narcotics travelled. They had 
geographies that spanned international borders. As vital war materials, nations 
tried to rigorously control their production. In the early years of drug diplomacy, 
delegations wrestled for control of the legal market, as this was often more 
important than suppressing the illegal market.  
This geographical component, particularly the source nation of the narcotic and 
the country which it was consumed or seized within, contributed to the 
geopolitical subjectivity of the nations that grew, traded, manufactured, seized, 
stockpiled, and consumed narcotics. It is only recently that scholars have 
developed theoretical and analytical tools that allow us to scrutinise the role that 
materials – the narcotics themselves – play in making a country a producer, 
consumer, or manufacturing nation. 
Today, geopolitical subjectivities based on drugs matter just as much as they 
did in the early twentieth-century. In 2008, The Guardian newspaper declared 
Guinea-Bissau Africa’s first narco-state due to its role in the trafficking of 
cocaine into Europe.9 While we know much about how the press characterises 
countries through their illegal drug trades, we know much less about how 
countries develop geopolitical subjectivities based on their role in the legal 
trade. 
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Statement of problem 
Consider for a moment why the Commissioner of Narcotics kept those chests of 
morphine in Fort Knox rather than drugstore safes across the United States. 
One reason resides in the capacities of these medicines to become illegal if 
placed in the wrong hands. During the first half of the twentieth-century, those 
pushing for drug prohibition worried just as much about companies who might 
divert medicines into the black-market as farmers who grew narcotics 
specifically for it. Another reason for strict security is the economic value of 
narcotics. The value of the stored opium in Fort Knox rose from $5 million in 
1960 to $17 million in 1978.10 But they also had geopolitical value: narcotics 
were tools of diplomacy, particularly during conflict, and the US government did 
much to maintain a firm grasp on their supply.  
Ultimately, I suggest that the problem with current histories of drug control is 
that they conceptualise narcotics as inert substances. When we think about 
what narcotics could do, as opposed to what they were, a whole new approach 
to the history of drug diplomacy emerges. The few studies of the history of drug 
control before 1961 have shown that narcotics were valuable, but they have not 
adequately theorised how their value affected and altered the decisions of 
delegates and diplomats. Much of our understanding of drug diplomacy rests on 
the people who brought about the laws that controlled them, rather than the 
geography and materiality of these substances as both contraband and 
commodities. The trouble with this approach is that it focuses on individual 
moments of policy change rather than gradual shifts towards new configurations 
of public attitude, legislation, and material changes in substances. My 
contribution is to use assemblage theory and critical geopolitics to think through 
narcotics as becoming and relational.  
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When using the term theory to describe assemblage, I do not refer to a well-
defined, coherent body of work, nor a sound set of methodological principles for 
those looking to apply assemblage. I use the term to describe the variety of 
approaches – the toolbox of concepts – that scholars who are inspired by 
Deleuze and Guattari’s work have adopted.11 In combining these two theories, I 
argue the legal trade in narcotics was equally, if not more, important to the 
American diplomats than their efforts to stamp out illegal smuggling and 
trafficking.  
Studies in critical geopolitics are concerned with the ways that nations come to 
understand one another through popular culture (popular geopolitics), their 
statecraft (practical geopolitics), and academic and professional tracts (formal 
geopolitics). Recently, feminist scholars have sought to shift geopolitics away 
from the study of high-ranking (predominantly male) diplomats and world 
leaders who have shaped the course of history. In doing so, they have focussed 
on other actors who contribute to geopolitical discourse, problematising the idea 
of the ‘national interest’. This is an emergent, changing set of values rather than 
an ideal articulated and pursued by a president, diplomat, or department 
charged with foreign affairs. What’s more, this national interest emerges from 
the circulation of objects, practices, and affects. The number of actors involved 
in geopolitics can be expanded further to include non-human actants. Scholars 
have started to interrogate the role that seemingly inert and benign materials 
play in international events.12 They conceptualise materials as multiple and 
characterised by their capacities to be ‘plugged into’ new situations that lead to 
new configurations of diplomacy. These approaches have not yet made their 
way into the history of drug control, which is still dominated by ‘diplomatic 
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heavies’ who clashed at the League of Nations and United Nations 
headquarters in Geneva and New York. 
I focus on two under-examined areas of drug control to explore how the 
American push for prohibition can be reconceptualised as emergent. These 
areas are the discourses concerning the geography of narcotic markets, and the 
technical governance of narcotics in international settings. These areas yield 
new insights into diplomatic practice and wider geopolitics. For example, 
regulating the medicinal capacities of narcotics was far more successful 
enterprise and an example of international coordination than any attempt to 
stifle their illicit uses. Today, ensuring hospitals are fully stocked with morphine 
(at least in the Western World is a principle that is so readily agreed upon that it 
is barely worth comment. Progress has, however, faltered miserably in the 
developing world where a ‘tragedy of needless pain’ persists.13 Excruciating and 
needless pain is, as Taylor suggests, an area where there has been no 
scholarly consideration of how ‘the global drug regulatory environment, … 
international law and international institutions either interfere with or can 
contribute to national efforts to strengthen pain management’.14 Legal drugs, 
particularly analgesics, have been neglected by geographers and historians in 
favour of their sexier, illegal counterparts. 
Research questions: aim and scope 
My project consists of three research questions.  
A. What is the relationship between geonarcotic discourses and geopolitical 
agendas from 1909-1961? 
B. How did the materiality of narcotics shape American attempts to create 
international narcotic legislation? 
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C. How did the same materiality confound attempts to know and determine 
narcotics?  
The first question analyses how a division between licit and illicit drugs was 
crafted and popularised. From 1909, it took the world 52 years to agree on the 
simple principle that the legitimate and legal uses of narcotics should for 
scientific research and genuine pain only. The US pushed for the prohibition of 
every type of drug use that was not for medical or scientific purposes. Narcotics 
had to become illicit before the United Nations could enshrine this principle in 
international law. Wider geopolitical concerns, particularly the Second World 
War and the Cold War, enhanced this desire. By examining the geographical 
dimensions of the discourse of the opium evil, I show how certain uses of drugs 
became illicit and then illegal. 
The second question examines the American attempts to repress the 
international flows of illicit drugs (prohibition) while ensuring the adequate 
circulation of narcotics like those stored in Fort Knox (provision). My aim is to 
show how American drug diplomacy was also shaped by legal narcotics as well 
as by discourses about foreign dope and domestic drug abuse. I show that 
narcotics, through their changing chemistry (opium to opiates to opioids), played 
significant roles at the League of Nations and UN. 
The third question explores how the biogeographical chemistry of narcotics 
hampered the desires of American diplomats who pushed for international drug 
law that promoted deterrence and supply control at the source of production. 
The three examples used to tell this story are the international schedules of 
drug control, the so-called ‘Poppy Rebellion’ of 1942, and the scientific tests 
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designed by chemists in US and UN to prove the geographic origin of illegal 
narcotics.  
At the heart of this study are two presuppositions. First is that geopolitics played 
a central role in the development of illicit/licit narcotic discourse. When using the 
term ‘geopolitical’, I refer traditional understandings of geopolitics in an 
international arena where nations are sovereign, alliances are contingent and 
dissolvable, and enemies are shifting and emergent. I then subject this to a 
critical understanding, exploring how geopolitical subjectivities developed in 
relation to foreign policy, political agendas, international relations, and 
technological changes in the production of narcotics. Drawing on other scholars, 
I describe the discourses that are based on the origin of narcotics as 
geonarcotic. 
Second, is that studying the relations between human and non-human actors 
helps scholars understand how geopolitical ‘subjects’ emerge. This moves away 
from explaining the US’ diplomatic actions by recourse to structural forces or 
individual agency. Of course, in international fora, countries send delegates with 
powers plenipotentiary to represent their country, but it is from the assemblage 
of both human and non-human elements that the twentieth-century identities 
emerged: producer, manufacturing, and consumer nations. In drug diplomacy, 
geopolitical subjectivities are the performative identities that a nation adopts. 
They are constituted by the relationship a nation has with other nations, but also 
the drug crops it cultivates, or drugs it manufactures and consumes. Most 
importantly, geopolitical subjectivities are not fixed. My focus is on how changes 
in the drugs, or technologies of drug production lead to changes in the 
geopolitical subjectivity, and diplomatic decisions, of a particular country. 
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An analogy from the medical sciences will demonstrate the point. Research into 
the science of addiction has shown that the way a drug affects an individual is 
often dependent upon the ‘set and setting’ within which drugs are consumed.15 
A substance will tend to cause a predictable, pharmacological effect, but this 
effect is enhanced or diminished by set and setting. Set refers to the immediate 
environment of the user: a nightclub, an alleyway, or a hospital. Setting refers to 
the wider contextual factors: an individual’s happiness, previous history of 
addiction, and outlook on life. This research states that an individual’s unique 
set and setting influence the experience and effects of consuming drugs just as 
much as the substance itself. A pre-determined subjectivity of an addict, 
recreational user, or patient cannot capture this nuance. An individual can be all 
three.  
I examine the geopolitical ‘set and setting’ of narcotic drugs and how they 
affected the international system and US. The geopolitical set is the immediate 
international relations at a specific point in time, and the wider foreign policy 
agendas are the geopolitical setting. Changes in these variables affected the 
geopolitical subjectivity of a nation. I use the framework of assemblage theory to 
conceptualise this ability to be affected. Assemblages are open, dynamic 
systems that are only ever provisionally stable. They are defined not by the 
things (people, ideas, materials, and affects) that make (or assemble) them, but 
rather by the relationships, or capacities that elements have with one another. 
New elements may come and go, giving the assemblage more stability 
(territorialisation) or less stability that leads to an entirely new configuration or 
set of behaviours (deterritorialisation). Changes to an assemblage may also 
make it more coherent (coded) and less coherent (decoded). Most importantly, 
assemblages are never fixed, but continually becoming. The geopolitical 
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subjectivity in question, (the United States and its vision of strict, supply-based 
drug control) is conceptualised as an assemblage to reveal the many forces 
(both human and non-human) that constituted it. I conceive of the international 
system in the same way, and the relationship between these two assemblages 
is of critical interest. While my project does not dispense with the ‘grand old 
men’ (and occasionally, women) of drug control, it avoids inscribing them with 
too much agency or construing them as the ultimate arbiters of drug diplomacy. 
Where I do focus on individuals, it is on a small cadre of individuals who 
engaged with narcotics in creative ways to further their vision of drug control. At 
times, this was at odds with the international system, or even their own 
government.  
In Dittmer’s study of geopolitical assemblages, diplomats are multivalent; they 
work between their government position and the international system.16 I extend 
this idea to the narcotics. Narcotics were also multivalent. They were 
simultaneously vices to be eradicated and vital commodities to be stockpiled. 
Attending to these multiple materialities requires a supplementary approach that 
is sensitive to the connections narcotics make with the policies, chemists, and 
diplomats that regulated them. I do not view narcotics as functioning parts of a 
larger whole of drug development, but instead, see them as ‘particulars’ 
involved with partial totalities.17 To do this, I nuance assemblage theory with 
insights from Andrew Barry’s work on informed materials and technological 
zones. His work focuses on processes that try to close down debates and 
manage disputes about materials. This is useful for thinking through the 
technical governance of narcotics.  
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Significance of study 
Putting narcotics at the centre of my study yields empirical and theoretical 
significance for geographers in four different ways. First, I undertake a 
traditional ‘critical geopolitical’ analysis of American diplomats and portrayal of 
the international system and trade. This has not yet been undertaken by 
scholars of critical geopolitics. The geography of early-mid twentieth-century 
drug control remains underexamined, as does the conceptualisation of 
narcotics. I show how US print media portrayed narcotics as biochemical 
weapons of war that were thrust upon hapless populations by foreign foes that 
rendered them vulnerable to imperial conquest. I argue that the opium evil 
discourse discursively shaped the geopolitical subjectivities of producer, 
consumer, and manufacturing nations. In this way, narcotics became 
geopolitical, and their addictive tendencies overshadowed their uses as critical 
medicines in the popular press.  
Second, I introduce the term ‘diplomatic opium’. This term defines licit opium 
and morphine as critical war materials that were stockpiled and traded in 
exchange for support for American-style drug policies; it shows how geopolitics 
became narcoticised. By showing how the US developed a geopolitical 
subjectivity that was plural – as stockpilers of medicines and as champions of 
prohibition, I demonstrate how assemblage theory can be used to explain how 
the US orientated itself vis-à-vis the international system. As the century 
progressed, more nations agreed to the US-authored approach to control at the 
source of crop production rather than on high demand and consumption. 
Diplomatic opium was central to this task, yet the role of substances, 
technologies, and advances in the new science of chemistry remain under-
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theorised. The concept is useful for geographers who study drugs but struggle 
to theorise substances beyond their legality. 
Third, I show how chemists, politicians, and United Nations staff placed their 
faith in chemical analyses of seized opium. By the 1950s, a range of scientists 
were working on what I term the ‘Opium Determination Program (ODP).18 They 
developed a set of tests to determine the origin of seized narcotics. While 
American chemists, scientists, and bureaucrats never indicated that these 
experiments would be used to accuse other nations falling afoul of their 
international obligations,19 there was an unspoken hope they might provide 
concrete proof for this purpose. For American diplomats and prohibition 
mavens, the ODP represented the quest for the ultimate control at the source of 
drug production: irrefutable chemical evidence of a nation’s failure to block 
leakages from its borders. I show how a misunderstanding of the materiality of 
narcotics caused this programme to fail. The technical governance of objects is 
often overlooked in political and historical geography. This contribution is both 
theoretical and empirical. To my knowledge, this part of drug control has never 
been written about before. 
Fourth, I show how assemblage theory can be applied to archival research to 
better understand geopolitical commodities and subjectivities. This framework 
leads to an alternative methodological approach to archival data. I argue 
technical documents and obscure diplomatic debates about the chemistry of 
narcotics reveal much about the actual practice of drug diplomacy.  
Ultimately, I hope to open drug diplomacy to scholars in critical geopolitics, 
encouraging researchers to forgo a narrow focus on the illegality of substances 
and instead use materialist approaches to analyse how substances are 
23 
 
controlled, regulated, and tested for specific diplomatic purposes. As Dittmer 
reminds us, ‘it remains for future researchers to look at completely 
deterritorialised geopolitical assemblages of the past’.20 It is this challenge I take 
up in this thesis. 
Chapter structure 
The literature review begins by examining geographical work on illegal 
substances. It highlights shortcomings, specifically the predominant focus on 
illegal drug use and production. It then outlines how critical geopolitics and 
assemblage theory help conceptualise the history of drug diplomacy.  
The first empirical chapter provides a traditional history of drug diplomacy from 
1900-1961. It documents the historical progression of drug diplomacy and the 
actions of key players. This can be read as a contextual control chapter. Each 
subsequent chapter adds a theoretical contribution that goes beyond the 
actions of diplomats wielding plenipotentiary powers.  
The second chapter, drawing on the work of Kyle Grayson, develops the term 
‘geonarcotic discourse’ to better understand how the opium evil influenced and 
shaped the geopolitical subjectivity of the US. It subjects drug diplomacy to a 
critical geopolitical perspective that emphasises the importance of popular 
geopolitics to diplomacy, and the US as a champion of prohibition. 
Chapter three focuses on the narcotics and technologies of narcotic production, 
namely the invention of synthetic narcotic substances and the tactic of 
stockpiling narcotics (diplomatic opium). I show how diplomatic opium 
influenced both the decisions and strategies of diplomats, as well as 
international legislation. I also show the geopolitical subjectivity the US 
developed: that of a nation concerned with narcotic provision.  
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Finally, chapter four discusses American attempts to geographically determine 
the origin of opium seized at the US border through advances in organic 
chemistry. I also examine how the political technologies of drug scheduling and 
the US 1942 Opium Poppy Control Act tried to regulate the properties of 
narcotics. I pay attention to the way that uncertainty over what a narcotic ‘was’ 
influenced legislation and attempts to define and determine narcotics in the US. 
Taken together, chapters two, three, and four include a broad range of actors 
and events that are not usually considered in international drug control (the 
pharmaceutical industry, Californian farmers, and various global conflicts). 
These chapters present agency as distributed, not limited to individual human 
actors, but achieved by the connections made by different actants (human and 
non-human) in specific places and times. Each takes a different set of actants 
as its focus, showing how they deterritorialised and influenced the American 
and international drug control assemblages. The term actant stems from 
Aristotle, who, in his Poetics, tried to foreground events rather than the actions 
of individual characters.21 The corollary of this approach is that I conceptualise 
drug control as a provisional and emergent achievement. This is as true today 
as it was one hundred years ago. Recent changes in efforts to decriminalise 
and legalise marijuana (now itself a material multiplicity that includes joints, 
edibles, medicines, and even beef-jerky) in the US show drug control is 
vulnerable to deterritorialisation when new ideas, objects, and humans 
assemble.  
To surmise, my study is the material history of narcotic regulation, referring to 
opium and its derivatives in both semi-synthetic and synthetic forms, from 1909-
1961. My country of focus is the United States, where much of the drive towards 
prohibitory drug policy began, and where I undertook most of my fieldwork. I 
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examine international legislation rather than domestic US law, only mentioning 
this where relevant. My assessment is not limited to the national or international 
sphere, but instead examines the interplay between the US and the League of 
Nations and the UN. This means focusing on the discursive and material 
elements of drug control as they emerged in the US and then influenced 
international proceedings. This leads me to areas of diplomacy that have been 
neglected by others, what Dittmer calls the ‘small, the irregular, and the 
baroque’.22 In my study, these are the new cultivation techniques, technological 
advances in the chemical sciences, and efforts to unlock the chemical codes 
that might divulge the geographical origin of smuggled opium. 
I re-tell the history of drug diplomacy by adding a much needed ‘flat ontology’ to 
the topic. Sometimes changes in the assemblage led to the creation of unique 
events and entities, but more often than not, they regressed to relatively 
‘redundant orders and practices’.23 I show how narcotics helped concretise the 
desires of American drug diplomats at the League of Nations and United 
Nations. Occasionally, I show how they hindered them. I do not examine how 
diplomats and politicians hammered out new paths for drug regulation, but 
rather how medicines, through their capacities and potentials to enrol new 
actors and organisations, territorialised and, infrequently, deterritorialised the 
world drug system towards new configurations. 
Unlike Herbert May, the President of the League of Nation’s Permanent Central 
Opium Board, I do not view narcotic control as an exemplary model of 
international cooperation. Nor do I view it as American drug diplomats in the 
1930s did: as a sluggish puppet show run by the colonial powers. Each label is 
far too certain of the stability of the international system. Instead, I see it as 
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contingent, messy, and becoming. In other words, I show how geopolitics 
became narcoticised, and narcotics became geopolitical. 
I conclude that thinking through the geopolitics of international drug control with 
assemblage theory helps to foreground a dynamic, emergent, and relational 
understanding of diplomatic progress. It also helps us think of narcotics as 
multiple, defined by their capacities rather than their properties. Narcotics were 
simultaneously medical, criminal, diplomatic, and scientific, depending upon 
who is interacting with them. Those who ordered the stockpiling at Fort Knox 
knew this. 
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Literature Review  
In this literature review, I do three things. First, I examine the relationship 
between geography and psychoactive substances, showing how 
geographers have provided useful but limited contributions that tend towards 
illegal substances. Second, I outline the theoretical blind spots in the 
literature on the history of narcotics, showing where it is anthropocentric. 
Third, I show how work already undertaken in critical geopolitics that draws 
on new materialism has built a new theoretical approach to diplomatic affairs. 
This approach is particularly useful for thinking through the importance of 
objects.  
For each section, I provide a short summary paragraph (see below 
paragraph). 
Geographers on drugs: an overview  
Geographers have made contributions to the field of drug studies, but they 
almost exclusively view substances through a narrow lens of legality. This 
has led to a disproportionate number of studies that focus on prohibition, 
trafficking, and the ‘War on Drugs’. This ignores the importance of legal 
substances and has led to a focus on narcotic prohibition over the equally 
important issue of narcotic provision. When focusing on narcotic provision, 
we gain theoretical and empirical insights into the geopolitics of drug control. 
A researcher taking a cursory glance at the field of drug studies could not 
help but feel intimidated. The literature on drugs abounds. Theories of 
addiction are endlessly debated1 as are the changing public attitudes 
towards illegal substances.2 Ethnographic insights range from the rank-and-
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file conscripts of the drug war3 to the corridors of the UN.4 The field tracks 
some of the momentous changes occurring globally: the legalisation of coca 
leaves and marijuana in parts of North and South America and seismic 
changes in how drugs are researched and manufactured. The promise of 
new synthetic substances enthralls researchers5 while simultaneously 
panicking law enforcement establishments. Activists, scientists, and medics 
alike discuss new policy approaches and the political opposition to them.6  
Paul Gootenberg, in two review articles on different approaches to drug 
studies, brilliantly captured the interdisciplinary contributions made by the 
social sciences.7 At the same time, he lamented the geographer as an 
‘endangered university species’.8 While noting our limited contributions, 
Gootenberg did credit an explicitly geographical text, the edited collection 
Dangerous Harvest.9 This book discusses why drug trafficking and cultivation 
happens in the interstices of the global capitalist system. It analyses the 
hinterlands, mountainous and remote regions of drug production, and links 
them to economic and social deprivation and the opium poppy and coca 
leaf’s abilities to flourish in difficult geographical environments. It is 
classically geographical, combining human and physical interactions, to 
render a picture of why drug production occurs where it does. 
Notwithstanding Gootenberg’s warning about our meagre offerings, 
geographers have made other inroads into the study of drugs. Like 
Steinberg’s volume and Gootenberg’s reviews, their focus is almost 
exclusively on illegal substances. Recent tomes apply spatial models derived 
from studying multinational firms to drug cartels and street-level crime.10 
Others use GIS to map addiction, mental health and care provision for those 
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abusing illegal drugs.11 For example, Punch examines the problems of heroin 
consumption in Dublin in an era of urban change. He looks at how drug use 
influences housing, urban development, and stigmatisation.12 Marcia 
England looks at drug using populations in Seattle and how they are 
segregated through city ordinance.13  
Work on illegal supply and production is widespread, ranging from the role of 
narcotics in connecting Afghanistan to the globalised world to the relationship 
between drugs and communities in Brazil.14 Pierre Chouvy’s ‘Opium’ 
documents opium markets in China (1949-1960), Iran (1955-1979), Turkey 
(1972), Pakistan (1979), and Afghanistan, Burma, and Laos in the late 
1990s.15 His sophisticated appraisal of supply reduction methods, from crop 
bans, crop spraying, and funding for alternative livelihoods highlights their 
mixed successes. Chouvy emphasises a geographical and historical fluidity 
to the production of illegal drug crops, explained by the subsistence lifestyles 
of growers and the lucrative crops they sell. Cohen develops this argument, 
citing the patchwork implementation of crop suppression policies and their 
limited funding. For Cohen, supply reduction results in a temporary reduction 
in one area, only to increase elsewhere, resulting in the mobile opium 
geographies of the last 50 years.16 Gootenberg terms this the balloon effect, 
showing how it has forced cocaine north through South America.17 Other 
geographers have concentrated on the failures of supply reduction chemicals 
in combatting cocaine’s march north. Vargas explores how policymakers 
support the continued usage of Roundup™ to poison coca leaf.18 
Within political geography, illegal drugs are factors in studies of 
borderlands,19 migrant crossings at the Mexican-American border,20 and 
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conflict resources.21 Dominic Corva shows how policing drugs was militarised 
during the Reagan administration. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of 
biopolitics, he explains how the police and military roles have been blurred 
by drug law. Corva argues neoliberal governance and bi-lateral aid has 
‘expanded police power and firepower’ in Latin America.22 The militarised 
police, funded by the American-led ‘Plan Colombia’, seeks to eradicate drug 
crops in Colombia. In doing so, police forces blur their domestic remit with 
wider, international goals of stopping transnational narcotic flows. Kyle 
Evered also links international relations to the domestic sphere via drug 
policy. He notes the American influence on Turkish drug prohibition in the 
1970s. He describes the perspective of Anatolian poppy farmers and their 
response to a poppy crop ban that the Nixon administration encouraged in 
Turkey in the early 1970s.23 Kyle Grayson uses the TV show Breaking Bad 
(a show about a chemistry teacher turned crystal methamphetamine dealer) 
to explore the aesthetic subject of homo resilio, or the resilient American who 
does not make demands upon the state.24 
These studies demonstrate the value of geographical insights that explain 
how drugs (and the policies that suppress them) impact the trade. I argue 
that despite this work, there are two broad problem areas, one theoretical 
and one empirical, which continue to hamper the depth and breadth of 
research geographers undertake. 
The theoretical problems 
The illegal trade dominates geographical work on drugs in geography. In a 
2013 review piece, Taylor et al., concluded that geography’s contributions to 
the trade in psychoactive substances were scattershot.25 They suggested 
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that researchers from across the discipline with diverse agendas worked past 
one another on similar topics. I agree with Taylor et al., but cite different 
reasons for lack of cohesion. Taylor et al., exclude legal psychoactive 
substances from their review. They justify this by defining drugs as illicit, 
‘neither socially nor legally sanctioned by societies’.26 They believe this is 
helpful for scholars studying drugs, as it brings their scope of study in line 
with popular understandings. 
I do not believe this is true. In the United States, where I conducted my 
research, a citizen with a headache will not visit a pharmacy. They will visit a 
drug store. In that same country, legal drug abuse is itself a massive public 
health problem, often inextricably intertwined with the black-market. Taylor et 
al., are right to point to cultural forces that conflate illicitness with illegality, 
but by focussing on drugs as illicit and illegal, our understanding of what a 
substance can do is limited. The regulation of narcotics for medicinal 
purposes, as well as their wider diplomatic uses, remains woefully under-
theorised. We do not yet have a conceptual framework that can adequately 
account for the ways drugs become licit, illicit, medical, dangerous, and, for 
my purposes, diplomatically useful. 
For Reinarman, dividing drugs by their legality leads to pharmacological 
determinism.27 This term explains how illegal substances become a common 
denominator for all things unsavoury and dangerous to normal, ‘drug-free’ 
individuals. His case study is the crack epidemic in the 1980’s, and others 
have done the same with marijuana in the 1930s.28 In both cases, the 
illegality of the substances was tied to their use in specific ethnic populations, 
leading to racist drug discourse. Others have shown how fear of the illegality 
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of a substance may obscure its health benefits. The ‘English System’ was a 
government-sanctioned policy of prescribing medical heroin to habitual users 
in the 1920s. While the UK no longer prescribes medical heroin for drug 
users, it prescribes diacetylmorphine, the active ingredient in heroin, to those 
in pain. In the United States, recreational and medical uses of heroin were 
banned in 1924. The substance was deemed too dangerous. Today, 
researcher use randomised control trials to compare diacetylmorphine with 
methadone treatments for opioid addiction.29 In the UK, health professionals 
rightly panic when the supply of diacetylmorphine is threatened by 
shortages.30  
A substance is therefore more flexible than the legal or illegal uses than 
researchers study. Forgetting the materiality of substances in favour of 
cultural definitions of legality or illicitness can encourage an unswerving faith 
in the infallibility of legal drugs, itself deemed a huge factor in the American 
opioid crisis.31 ‘When Good Drugs Go Bad’ is the title of a recent exhibit at 
the Drug Enforcement Agency’s museum headquarters in Virginia. It 
demonstrates this problem precisely. Historian Dan Malleck’s book of the 
same name makes a similar, compelling argument. ‘Opium is awesome … 
opium is awe-inspiring…opium is terrifying’ are the first three sentences of 
the first three paragraphs of his book.32 In 2012 the USA prescribed enough 
legal opioids for every adult in the country to have a full bottle.33 As the legal 
opioid epidemic and subsequent legislation cracked down on availability, 
there was a resurgence in the illegal opioids such as fentanyl and heroin 
being imported from Mexico. By focussing on illegality, geographers have 
neglected this issue. Outside of geography, examining where legal and 
34 
 
illegal substance abuse overlaps has become a critical area of research. 
Researchers in the health sciences undertake spatial analyses of the opioid 
epidemic that do not discriminate by legality.34 
The problem, as I see it, is that substances are defined by legality rather than 
their pharmacology and capacity to enter into new associations with different 
actors. As the definition of the term ‘drug’ tends to conjure up specific illegal 
substances rather than those that cause harm, substances that may qualify 
as a dangerous drug (for example, sugar) often escape regulation and 
scholarly focus the same way traditional drugs do. Since considering sugar 
as a dangerous, addictive substance that has a neurochemical impact on the 
brain, we have gained new insights into the substance’s impact on public 
health.35 For Malleck, a lack of nuance on the multiple registers within which 
opium is encountered leads to simplistic conclusions about current and 
historical drug control. He wrote When Good Drugs go Bad in response to 
activists who used historical arguments to argue early Canadian drug laws 
were racist from their inception. His study examines opium through racialised 
use and threats to the nation, through addiction in asylums, and most 
importantly for my project, through the proprietary use of narcotics. As he 
shows, there are many ‘realms of understanding in which opium existed’ 
during the 1800s.36 This means he broadens his scope beyond traditional 
drug histories. He focuses on the changes in medicines themselves, but also 
the role of the pharmaceutical companies and local pharmacists. I transpose 
his approach into the US in the twentieth-century, but add two new realms: 
the laboratory and debating chambers in Geneva and New York.  
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A focus on central political figures at the expense of other (non)human actors 
Histories of drug diplomacy deal with the international wrangling, big egos, 
and attitudes of key diplomats. Drug Diplomacy in the Twentieth-century, by 
historian William McAllister, is an exhaustive history of the squabbles, 
synergies, and sabre-rattling of various nations from the earliest days of 
international drug control from 1912 to 2000.37 He draws attention to the 
cunning and deftness of American diplomats and their desire to regulate the 
licit drug trade at the source. He notes that disagreement between the 
Department of State and Federal Bureau of Narcotics revealed uncertainty 
over the extent to which complete prohibition was desirable among the US 
foreign policy community. He expertly navigates the archives to reveal 
corridor deals, secret cables, and telegrams that contributed to the American 
quest for global regulation of the legal trade and total repression of its illegal 
counterpart. In doing so, McAllister highlights the importance of diplomatic 
minutiae that geographers have only recently attended.38 He also references 
global events, crediting both World Wars and the Cold War as having a 
substantial influence on drug diplomacy. Most usefully, he establishes a 
typology for the geopolitical subjectivities of countries. These subjectivities 
are based on the way drugs are used or made in in the international system. 
Producer nations cultivated raw opium, manufacturing nations who turned 
these into opiates (semi-synthetic), and opioids (synthetic), and consumer 
nations that imported them.  
McAllister rightly argues that ‘studying the history of drug regulation in the 
global arena provides a frame through which one catches an illuminating 
glimpse of the modern world’.39 His nod to the importance of these different 
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geopolitical subjectivities, however, pays little attention to the substances 
themselves, nor does he examine how the geopolitical subjectivities he 
identifies were created and performed. He refers to the role of public opinion, 
but does not expound upon how the US press decried narcotics as terrible 
chemical weapons of war visited upon the Chinese by the imperial Japanese 
army. Nor does he explore how supply-focussed policies enjoyed public 
support from the Hearst newspapers, the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union, and lobbying organisations located in Vienna at the League of 
Nations. Such factors, I believe, are critical in understanding how drugs 
became foreign threats and how countries performed their geopolitical 
subjectivities. 
David Musto provides more detail on the American context in which drug 
prohibition was encouraged in the American Disease: Origins of Narcotic 
Control.40 Here, Musto offers a substantive history of domestic narcotic 
legislation. While Musto devotes some pages to the threat of foreign 
narcotics, his focus on an American disease means he omits overseas and 
international developments at the League of Nations and United Nations. 
Like McAllister, his focus is on the heavyweight political players such as 
Congressman Hale Boggs and America’s drug czar Harry Anslinger. He 
does mention people who are commonly considered fringe figures of drug 
control. An example of the latter is Richmond Pearson Hobson, an anti-
narcotics campaigner. Musto is not the only scholar to note the role of these 
people.41 Academics are right to mention these individuals, but fringe figures 
are often considered as unimportant in the formal, diplomatic processes of 
drug control. While they made a lot of noise and whipped up anti-narcotic 
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hysteria, they are not treated as important players in the formal world of 
diplomacy, perhaps because they lacked plenipotentiary powers. I argue 
they did much to shape public attitude towards foreign narcotics and provide 
support for the American diplomats at the League of Nations and United 
Nations.  
I believe examining how foreign drugs were reported in the domestic 
American press – especially when compared with the knowledge diplomats 
had of their medicinal value – is essential for understanding their geopolitical 
significance. The importance of wider contexts within which these individuals 
operate has been touched on by Kyle Grayson. He draws on the work of 
Foucault and suggests there is little to be gained from analysing the actions 
of drugs czars. Instead, he recommends looking at the ‘grid of intelligibility’ 
that not only made possible certain understandings, problematiques and 
policies possible but also legitimated them.42 Grayson has examined the 
emergence of drugs as a security threat in the US post-1960,43 but there is 
little work that examines the American geonarcotic discourses that supported 
narcotic regulation before 1961. By examining the domestic discourses of 
prohibition, I show how American hostility to foreign drugs galvanised the 
regulatory, prohibition-based models at the League of Nations and United 
Nations. 
Materiality 
The development of drug policy from 1909 onwards did not smoothly glide 
towards consensual prohibition. It was characterised by bitter struggles over 
the value and danger of opium and its derivatives. These struggles form the 
basis of the second problem. The term prohibition, if used carelessly, masks 
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a complex and disputed set of approaches to supply-based regulation. 
Regulation is thus better for capturing the nuances of early drug diplomacy. 
For the US, prohibition meant an unswerving commitment to tightly regulated 
international markets where medicinal and scientific uses were permitted, but 
all others were prohibited. Grayson has outlined the values of US prohibition 
into a useful typology. These are  
• Drug use is inherently bad as it is medically unsafe and morally 
corrupt. 
• Real Americans do not use drugs. 
• Foreigners and other deviants use, traffic in, and produce drugs. 
• Prohibition is the natural condition for drugs. 
• Drugs are the major source of criminal activity. 
• Drugs are a major killer of Americans. 
• Drugs have the potential to destroy the current international 
system.44 
The third point is key. John Collins argues the US faith in prohibition, and its 
unwavering advocacy for it at both the League of Nations and UN, stemmed 
from a belief ‘that the cause of drug ‘abuse’ was excess and unregulated 
supplies of addictive drugs’, rather than the demand for drugs stimulating 
supply.45 For the US, the geography of the world drug problem did not 
include its own demand for narcotics.  
When we factor out a strict definition of drugs based on legality, we 
appreciate the history of narcotic control in more detail. Other nations were 
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unwilling to end the lucrative trade in narcotics and argued for milder regimes 
of regulation. In 1924, the Permanent Central Opium Board, the body 
charged with regulating world production, developed a system for estimating 
the global requirements for raw poppy crops and opiates. When an estimate 
of the world’s total narcotic budget was created, diplomats struggled to slice 
up the narcotic pie. They argued about who would produce raw poppy crops, 
who would manufacture them into opioids or smoking opium, and who would 
be able to sell them.  
The world eventually agreed upon a US-style model of prohibition with the 
passage of a Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs in 1961, yet this control 
was not as stringent as the United States would have liked. Collins suggests 
that the ‘1961 Single Convention ultimately represented a victory for the UK 
and the regulatory strand over the US and the prohibitionist strand’46 due to 
its gentler focus on suppression rather than outright abolition of the illegal 
trade and growth of opium and opiates.  
We can, as Collins has, trace the history of supply-based regulation back 
through time. I depart from Collins by suggesting the materiality of narcotics 
heavily impacted decisions about the international regulatory system. Raw 
opium, smoking opium, and the various alkaloid derivatives of opium 
(including morphine, papaverine and codeine), were geographically and 
culturally striated in their uses. New technologies for cultivating, synthesising, 
and identifying narcotics influenced international proceedings and national 
policy positions. Diplomats disagreed about which drugs should be 
prescribed by doctors and pharmacists, which should remain uncontrolled, 
and which should be banned altogether. For Japan, Hong Kong, and Iran, 
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regulation meant adopting opium monopolies, with varying degrees of state 
regulation. In British India, many quasi-medical and traditional uses of opium 
were etched into the national cultures and openly accepted as licit cultural 
activities. British India also produced legal opium for the manufacturing 
market and looked to protect this industry. 
Narcotics were clearly more than just illegal substances to be suppressed on 
the path to prohibition: they were a vital part of the diplomatic process. As 
synthetic narcotics, substances created from materials which did not rely on 
raw opium, became popular, the balance of power shifted as manufacturing 
nations grew in clout and producing nations (those that grew raw opium) 
found their revenues decreasing. I argue that these materials were just as 
important to drug diplomacy as the decisions made by the League of Nations 
and the United Nations.  
We need more research into legal and illegal definitions of drugs, and how 
these definitions aided those advocating specific drug agendas. Departing 
from the studies of Collins, Musto and McAllister, I believe that considering 
narcotics as multiple, both legal and illegal (depending on who was using 
them and for what purpose), allows us to conceptualise their geopolitical 
value. We can conceptualise them as referential objects for narcotic 
discourses, as diplomatic bargaining chips, and as objects of scientific 
analysis. Before 1961, legality was a contested term that was tactically 
deployed by different nations to influence the trade of narcotics. 
To find work that is primed to deal with this fuzziness, we must look outside 
of political geography. Garmany has shown how illegal drugs alter both 
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bodies and urban socio-spatial dynamics in Brazil.47 His work deftly re-
positions drugs as actors in the way people experience space, sometimes 
binding communities as well as destroying them. Other materialist 
approaches to narcotics from outside of geography focus on what the drug-
using body can do. Malins et al., discuss a drug user who enters an 
assemblage of drugs, their immediate environment and wider prevention 
policies.48 Bourne’s actor-network theory-inspired approach shows the many 
ways that crack, powder, and mixed cocaine were legislated differentially and 
unequally through various prohibitory and punitive networks.49 A relational 
approach to a substance appreciates their capacities to engender wider 
change.  
So far, I have argued that the legal/illegal division leads to a focus on political 
figures and a simplistic account of the materiality of narcotics. Where Taylor 
et al., disavow pharmacological definitions of narcotics in favour of neatly 
demarcated legality,50 I embrace them. But there is a second, equally 
important division that accompanies the legal/illegal schism: an abundance 
of studies on prohibition at the expense of provision. 
The empirical problems 
The focus on illegal substances has meant that geopolitical studies on licit 
and legal drug consumption/production are sparse. Most are undertaken in 
medical geography. For example, Rapport et al., examined the pharmacy as 
a place of professional practice that divides customers and pharmacists.51 
Work in medical geography has often drawn on Foucauldian approaches to 
the body and its hidden spaces.52 While useful, these studies do not analyse 
the relations substances make with various actors.  
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Unlike their illegal counterparts, legal psycho-active substances are 
understood to be reliable, safe (when used appropriately), inert and most 
problematically, chemically homogenous. That is, a legally produced narcotic 
is standardised and uniform. The obvious exception is alcohol, a dangerous 
psycho-active substance that has a cadre of devoted geographers. This work 
focuses on the circulation of branding53 and the contemporary54 and 
historical55 consumption and production of beer.56 Tim Unwin’s study of wine 
and viticulture traces its historical geographies, whereas Wilton & Moreno 
show how rural and urban spaces are demarcated by alcohol consumption.57 
Others analyse how policies are designed to manage the practices and 
prosaic spaces of drinking,58 or document the relationship between 
embodiment and affect while drinking.59 There is plenty of research on the 
production of alcohol60 and alcohol consumption before the alcohol unit was 
created. Kneale and French provide a fascinating insight into historical 
regulation through physician Francis Anstie’s efforts to establish limits for 
moderate drinking.61 When it comes to the historical geographies of legal 
drug production, the literature is almost non-existent. If geographers do not 
give licit narcotics their due focus, they will remain conceptually 
unproblematic and uninteresting. While studies abound on the production of 
opium destined for the heroin trade in Afghanistan, Laos, and Burma,62 there 
are no studies on the Oxfordshire poppies grown for the UK codeine market. 
A lack of focus on historical drug geographies is not always the fault of 
scholars. Archives of production are sparse, particularly in the unregulated 
(and thus undocumented) nineteenth century. This is not the case with 
twentieth and twenty-first-century narcotic medicine. The few studies 
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undertaken on early narcotics convincingly demonstrate that legal narcotic 
regulation was just as crucial as illegal regulation.63  
This problem is not just limited academic geography. Today, the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the INCB (The International 
Narcotics Control Board), and the CND (Commission on Narcotic Drugs) 
comprise the international organs of drug control. The UNODC is the 
administrative office that runs, researches and manages UN projects on drug 
control. The INCB is a twelve-member expert panel based at the UN, 
monitors the extent to which signatory nations are conforming with the 
international treaties. The INCB is the successor to the Permanent Central 
Opium Board (PCOB) and Drug Supervisory Body (DSB) of the League of 
Nations (LoN). The CND is the political arm of the UN that deals with 
debates and legislation. Together, these organisations have two mandates. 
The first is to repress the illegal international trade by coordinating national 
efforts. Many people know this. Less well-known is their other mandate of 
regulating the legal market for controlled substances for medical and 
scientific purposes.  
These two mandates are clearly defined by three international drug control 
treaties. The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs became the first 
treaty to regulate the trade in cannabis and other drugs such as methadone 
and peptides. This treaty simplified nine previous international agreements 
into one coherent document. The 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances was created to accommodate a range of new synthetic drugs 
which entered the global traffic. Finally, the 1998 United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances had a 
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strong focus on the trade in precursor substances for synthetic drugs. 
Forthwith, I will refer to these treaties as the Global Drugs Treaty Regime 
(GDTR). 
Much like Taylor et al’s., review of the geographical literature, the scholarly 
focus on the GDTR’s work on prohibition blinkers public knowledge of the 
actual scope of the global treaties in academic work. Internationally, 
diplomats are acutely aware that the prohibitory model of drug control does 
not refer to absolute eradication; it will always entail a degree of provision for 
medical and scientific needs. Prohibition and provision are two sides of the 
same coin, but in popular parlance, prohibition is often understood to mean 
the eradication of all drugs, since the term ‘drug’ is equated with illegal and 
illicit uses of substances. This confusion over a substance and its uses is 
understandable. The slogan for the 1997 Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly was ‘a drug-free world; we can do it!’.  
Forgetting the provision-based principles in the GDTR has cost us dearly in 
both theory and humanitarian efforts. The global shortage of legal opioids in 
the developing world has only recently become academically significant.64 
Jelsma and Metaal suggest ‘while most countries have established drug 
policy coordinating structures that carefully balance responsibilities between 
the health, justice, internal and foreign affairs departments, attention to drug-
related issues within the UN system threatens to become more 
unbalanced’.65 For some, this imbalance is the fault of the policy-making arm 
of the GDTR, the CND. They argue it encourages bureaucratic prescriptive 
practices that make painkillers too difficult to access.66 For Taylor, the 
problem is systemic. She identifies three reasons for the woeful access to 
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opiate-based painkillers in the developing world: cultural factors, where 
individuals are not encouraged to share their pain; economic factors, such as 
the profit incentive which encourages companies to sell expensive synthetic 
painkillers rather than cheap morphine, and a widespread fear of opioid 
addiction, even if used for legitimate purposes (known as opiophobia).67  
I would like to deepen our understanding of these shortages by focusing on 
the issue of opiophobia in two ways. First, by explaining its geopolitical roots. 
As Rhodin suggests ‘the fear of inducing addiction and for causing severe 
side effects, such as respiratory depression, has inhibited physicians’ opioid-
prescribing for a substantial part of the twentieth-century’.68 I suggest that 
suspicions of opioid addiction, from both doctors and the populace, can be 
traced back to bombastic geopolitical discourse that transformed opiates 
from medicines into weapons and from a public health crisis into a 
consequence of war. This caused drug policy to merge with foreign policy 
and national security at the expense of public health policy. It meant that the 
foreign supply, rather than the domestic demand of drug control, dominated 
the American agenda. 
Second, I explore how historical geopolitics contributed towards the 
prohibition/provision imbalance. It is well-known that foreign and narcotic 
policy overlap. In 1999, Antonio Maria Costa, head of the UNODC, outlined 
the links between terrorism, drugs, and crime as the ‘evils of our time’.69 In 
drawing attention to the role of drugs as a means of funding terrorism, Costa 
was echoing a prevailing sentiment from the first days of drug control: drugs 
can become weapons or malevolent tools when placed in the wrong hands. 
The issue of narco-terrorism has been scrutinised in the literature, 
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particularly the extent to which terrorists and drug dealers are integrated 
around the world.70 I do not contribute to these debates directly. Instead, I 
trace the history of conflict, war, and using drugs as a weapon back to the 
mid-1930s. In doing so, I show how prohibition, in popular discourse, came 
to overshadow provision. 
Other scholars have examined the historical relationship between narcotics 
and warfare.71 Where they focused on how narcotics have aided those in the 
front lines of conflict, I look at how they were ostensibly used to weaken 
enemies. There has been no research that traces the link between 
opiophobia (or a fear of the addictive capacities of narcotics) and 
narcotisation (using narcotics as a weapon of war). I contend that in the early 
twentieth-century United States, this geopolitical focus diverted the public’s 
attention from narcotic provision to prohibition. 
I also explore the flipside of opiophobia to introduce a new term: opiophilia. 
Whereas the term opiophile usually refers to a narcotic user, we can 
transpose it into diplomatic settings. This helps conceptualise the importance 
of the licit trade; something geographers have not yet done. Geopolitical 
opiophiles knew that narcotics had strategic uses and hoarded them 
accordingly. There were times when powerful policymakers worried about a 
lack of narcotics, rather than their abundance. Perhaps naively, some 
experts believed that a perfectly regulated market (one that was entirely 
devoid of diversion into the illegal trade) would simultaneously end drug 
smuggling around the world while providing access to critical medicines. 
Even as drug addiction rose and the illegal trade in narcotics flourished, 
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there were shortages of legal opiates. Throughout the first half of the 
twentieth-century, procuring painkillers was a critical geopolitical strategy.  
The Opium Determination Programme 
The final gap in the literature I identify is empirical. There is a lack of work on 
a crucial aspect of drug control: identification. What I am calling the Opium 
Determination Programme (ODP) – a series of experiments and methods 
designed to determine the origin of seized opium from 1945-1961 – has not 
yet been examined by any scholar of international drug law, yet it is central in 
thinking through the relationship between materiality and geopolitics. 
The origins of the ODP run back to the beginning of the twentieth-century. As 
soon as Congress introduced laws that required checks, licenses, and bans 
on certain substances, a veritable smuggling industry arose to thwart this 
system. By the end of World War One, US officials were regularly seizing 
large quantities of opium at the border. The US developed a kind of siege 
mentality; it had to protect itself from criminals and the recalcitrant nations 
that refused to make opium smoking illegal. Those in charge of regulating 
and policing narcotics extended their search beyond US borders to the 
source of the seizure. This supply-orientated prohibition is outward looking, 
and blurred the boundary between domestic (police) and foreign (military) 
roles.72 
Initially, the origins of seizures were inferred from proxies (ship registration, 
departure port, the nationality of smugglers, and branding of seized product). 
Methods of determining opium became more sophisticated with advances in 
the science of organic chemistry. It was believed that determining and 
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cataloguing the chemical signatures of opium from around the world would 
allow the US to apportion irrefutable, evidence-backed blame to source 
countries. In my research, I found nothing but passing references to the ODP 
in the literature, despite a wealth of archival material that attests to its 
importance. I contribute to the literature by describing and situating the ODP 
in a wider geopolitical context. I also show how the ODP failed to provide the 
incontrovertible evidence desired. The varying chemistry of opium seizures 
complicated attempts to conclusively pinpoint an origin. 
In summary, the geopolitical story I tell seeks to plug two gaps in the 
literature: a lack of focus on legal narcotics and a lack of focus on their 
materiality. Experts and diplomats worried about provision as much as 
prohibition, whereas the public and press, goaded by anti-narcotic 
campaigners, were concerned about smuggling, foreign dope, and narcotic 
warfare. This alternative geopolitical history of narcotic control remains 
under-researched. I do not re-tell the story of the American-led ‘War on 
Drugs’, and only make passing reference to domestic laws about opioid 
subscription and treatment of drug addicts. These topics keep many 
academics, from across the social and physical sciences, united in their 
quest for progressive drug policies for illicit drug users and abusers.73 My 
task requires that I examine how countries battled over what types of drugs 
and drug use were allowable under the League of Nations and United 
Nation’s legislation. This meant defining drugs not just by their legality, but by 
how accepted, or licit, they were. While this project’s scope is historical, its 
theoretical contributions are almost exclusively to the disciplines of political 
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geography and drug studies. Fortunately, political geography has developed 
multiple conceptual tools for re-telling the history of drug diplomacy.  
The relevance of political geography: re-telling the history of drug 
diplomacy  
Critical geopolitics is concerned with how declarative and imperative 
statements about the international order are made real and ‘objective’.74 
Scholars have not yet used its insights to explore the history of drug control. 
It is possible to examine the first sixty years of drug diplomacy by bringing 
together geonarcotic discourse and materiality through an assemblage 
analysis. The theoretical turn towards materials in critical geopolitics and 
political geography sidesteps the trap of a provision/prohibition and 
legal/illegal framework. While assemblage studies are growing, they are 
almost non-existent when it comes to drugs. 
This next section uses different theories to build a framework for my research 
questions that address the shortcomings in the established literature. The 
first research question seeks to scrutinise the geopolitical concerns that 
prohibitionists invoked in support of drug prohibition in the early-mid 
twentieth-century. It is apt to use critical geopolitics to analyse this question.  
The earliest scholars of critical geopolitics divided the field into formal, 
practical, and popular geopolitics.75 Formal geopolitics pertained to the 
formal interventions on international relations by expert sources (including 
academics). Practical geopolitics referred to the actual process of doing 
geopolitics, or the actions of generals, statesmen and women, terrorists, and 
troops. The final branch is popular geopolitics. This describes how global 
space and international relations are reproduced in popular media. 
50 
 
Those working in critical geopolitics focused on individual branches and did 
so, as Martin Müller has pointed out, by focussing on the grand, global scale 
of analysis and actions of statesmen.76 Many studies were informed by 
discourse analysis, the deconstruction of early geopolitical texts, and post-
structuralist theories of knowledge, showing how and where geopolitical 
agendas became important in society at large.77 This meant focussing on 
speeches, policy documents, and the thoughts and plans of those in charge. 
Recent scholars have departed from this analytical framework. 
Contemporary work in critical geopolitics has sought to show how these 
three branches interact with each other. Discourses are analysed in 
newspapers, magazines and television.78 Work on video games shows how 
digitised representations of our world are re-appropriated. The is the case 
with America’s Army, a computer game that the US military uses to recruit 
excellent players into the military.79 Cultural media are thus seen as 
important in conveying dominant geopolitical agendas to the wider public. 
By placing my project astride all three branches, I do not seek to do away 
with O ‘Tuathail’s conceptual framework. I use contemporary geopolitical 
theory to assess how narcotic discourse emerges from the interplay of the 
popular, practical, and formal elements of historical drug control. Publics, 
politicians, and expert knowledge enhanced the drive towards punitive 
narcotic control. While there is plenty of literature on the link between opium 
and narcotic policy,80 I examine expert reports, diplomatic decisions, 
newspapers, pamphlets, books, telegrams, diplomatic faux pas, and radio 
addresses to conceptualise the discourse of the opium evil. I draw inspiration 
from the work of Matthew Pembleton, who explores how the FBN provided 
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journalist Frederic Sondhern with exclusive access to their files. In return, 
Sondhern helped craft a tale of a drug war in the 1940s were the enemy was 
the shadowy, international mafia through his New York Times best-selling 
Brotherhood of Evil.81 Pembleton’s focus on specific FBN agents, traffickers, 
and the mafia (what he terms ‘Kingpin imagery’) neglects how the narcotic 
trade was spatialised as foreign-born. He also does not mention how the US 
constructed its position as a victim of the international trade. My study turns 
back the clock further than 1940. Here, we find discourses of foreign nations 
that used narcotics as weapons in geopolitical struggle. A more appropriate 
term for this type of discourse is geonarcotics. 
Geonarcotic discourse 
Kyle Grayson, in his 2008 Chasing Dragons: Security, Identity and Illicit 
Drugs in Canada, suggests ‘civilisation, gender, sexuality, race, and moral 
superiority are inscribed into Canadian national identity via discourses on 
illicit drugs’.82 He explores how Canadians came to understand drugs as 
dangerous, but he also shows how Canadian drug policy was portrayed as 
superior to American policy due to their more liberal approach to drug users. 
Grayson introduces the term ‘geonarcotic discourse’ to show how a country 
identified itself by reference to other nations and the flows and consumption 
of drugs. Drug use was not just located in specific ethnic identities, but 
specific geographical places and had imagined geographies. His work 
examines the management of rave culture, khat use, and medical marijuana 
in Canada. 
Grayson defines geonarcotics as emergent from the US ‘War on Drugs’.83 He 
notes that Canadian geonarcotics can be dated to 1982 when the 
52 
 
securitisation of illegal drugs was reflected in American security doctrines. A 
second, broader definition from Griffith states that geonarcotics ‘captures 
three factors besides drugs: geography, power, and politics’.84 For both 
authors, geonarcotics is born in the late twentieth-century, where the world 
order was threatened by the foreign drug flows from transnational criminals. 
It is a discourse that justifies the US attempt to stem drug control by taking 
extra-territorial and extra-legal action. The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act was 
overridden by the Reagan administration in 1983, allowing military powers to 
operate inside of the USA, militarising the domestic war on drugs. The US 
currently certifies countries for foreign aid based on their adherence to 
international drug law. There has been no study which applies the term to the 
first half of the twentieth-century, a challenge which this thesis undertakes. 
I develop Grayson’s work by showing how the popular American press 
created a geonarcotic discourse that was superior (based on a moral 
repugnance of, and ability to resist, narcotics). The flip side of this is that the 
US, due to its policies of domestic prohibition and a ban on the growth of 
narcotics, also developed a geopolitical subjectivity as a victim. In American 
geonarcotics, the end-user was much less important than in Canadian 
geonarcotics. The US approach to managing drug use was focussed on 
stopping flows entering the country. This victim status legitimised American 
intervention in the form of military aid, and provided countries that trafficked 
and produced illegal drugs with specific types of American assistance that 
focused on control at the source. I also differ from Grayson by exploring how 
the geonarcotic discourse of the opium evil contributed to an emergent, 
American geopolitical subjectivity that was both material and discursive. 
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Conceptualising geonarcotic discourse 
I suggest we can trace geonarcotic discourse back to 1909. It is essential 
that we understand how security and narcotic legitimacy blended in earlier 
years. By this time, narcotics had already become part of colonial power 
dynamics due to the Opium Wars of 1839-1842 and 1856-1860.85 Grayson 
argues that ‘the security discourse surrounding illicit drugs defines what can 
be considered legitimate approaches to illicit drugs and drug users’.86 
Geonarcotics underpinned the American argument for stricter controls at the 
League of Nations and came to fruition as geopolitics became an academic 
discipline. When Halford Mackinder gave his 1904 address on the 
‘geographical pivot of history’ to the Royal Geographical Society, he urged 
the British Empire to expand into Eurasia. At the same time, a 27-year 
struggle to create the 1906 US Pure Food and Drug Act was nearing its 
resolution. For the first time in history, the Act mandated that medicines and 
foods should have their ingredients included on the labels for public 
consumption. Although initially unrelated, drug control and classical 
geopolitics would become increasingly intertwined as the century progressed 
and the definition of a ‘drug’ developed.  
As Grayson suggests, it is insufficient to reduce the history of drug control to 
a series of moral panics.87 Such a move presupposes a morality that was 
accepted by politicians and the populous alike. Rather, we must understand 
how morality, race, and notions of good and evil were imbued into narcotic 
discourse. For Grayson, the genealogy of geonarcotics can be traced to the 
Canadian Opium and Drug Act of 1911, a law that was enacted due to the 
dire influence narcotics had on white Canadians. His argument is that 
54 
 
geonarcotics should bring our attention to more than the practical posturing 
of diplomats; it should include the way a country understood its role in the 
international system, through its stance on, and use of, narcotics.88 It should 
also show how narcotic use was reflected understandings of Self and Other. 
I focus on specific geographical regions where the opium evil was located – 
particularly Northern China and Japan – as areas that were repeatedly 
discussed at the League of Nations and in American media. I trace the 
concept of geonarcotics back to that event that catalysed international drug 
control: the US annexation of the Philippines in 1898. The US was forced to 
confront the opium smoking epidemic that pervaded the markets, houses, 
and even schools in the Philippines.89 Ridding the island of narcotics became 
tied to the argument that the US was a liberator, rather than following in the 
imperial footsteps of its Spanish predecessors. Drug discourse became part 
of American identity. The geopolitical subjectivity the US adopted was 
partially defined by what it was not: a colonial power that supported the legal 
trade. 
In examining how these geographies of drug production became geopolitical, 
I outline two interrelated approaches that characterised opium evil discourse. 
First, the weaponisation of opium, and second, the weaving of foreign and 
narcotic policy. 
WEAPONISED OPIUM 
There is a diverse literature on drugs as supplements, stimulants, and 
experimental tools in warfare. The famous MK-ULTRA experiments of the 
1950s or the Third Reich’s trials with methamphetamine are two examples.90 
Recent work has also examined where contemporary conflict is fueled by 
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performance-enhancing drugs that allow contemporary combatants to face 
their foes with less fear and more energy.91 During the 1930s and 1940s, 
some US officials believed opium, morphine, and particularly heroin were 
used as weapons of war in Asia. Evidence of these claims have been 
unearthed by historians, who examine where US officials at the FBN and 
Anti-Opium Bureau argued that Japan was pedalling narcotics to Chinese 
territories to make the population docile and amenable for conquest.92 
Similar accusations were then levelled at ‘Red China’ during the Cold War.93 
While historians are divided on the truth of these claims, it is worth noting 
that there is no literature discussing how these ideas were promulgated in 
the US. I develop these approaches by examining where narcotics have 
been explicitly portrayed as weapons of war inflicted in the quest for imperial 
conquest. I call this ‘weaponised opium’.  
NARCO-GEOGRAPHIES AND THE USA AS A VICTIM 
From the 1900s to the Second World War, narcotic control became 
increasingly synonymous with imperialism.94 The French, British, and Dutch 
empires dominated the trade in narcotics. As one of the first countries to 
develop punitive national narcotics legislation, the USA was also one of the 
first nations to contend with the illicit flow of contraband opiates. In this 
project, I build on the work of Susan Speaker who has examined the 
intersection between newspapers (particularly the Hearst Empire), popular 
anti-narcotic campaigners, and the relevance of these discourses to the US 
diplomatic position.95 She shows how morality blended with foreign policy as 
supply-orientated control circumnavigated tough questions about demand 
and the American appetite for narcotics on the world stage. 
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After the Second World War and with decolonisation on the horizon, Haq 
notes that narcotics were tied into efforts to maintain or repeal colonial 
control. This link between broader power struggles and narcotic discourse 
has not been examined. In the American press, drug diplomats became 
freedom fighters looking to liberate chemically oppressed populations. 
Weaponised opium could be used to further colonial conquests, or it could 
simply be portrayed as a lucrative revenue from which imperial powers were 
reluctant to withdraw. The US could lure allies to its cause by championing 
its anti-colonial credentials.  
One important reason why this geonarcotic discourse was not wholly 
successful is that it was not the only element acting upon the drug control 
assemblage. Grayson’s study of geonarcotics in Canada pays ‘greater 
attention to the discursive formation that established the parameters of 
legitimate discussion regarding drugs’.96 I depart from this approach to better 
understand the role of materiality, chemistry, and capacities of opium. To do 
this, I draw on the theories of new materialism that have become popular in 
political geography. These offer different ways of conceptualising objects in 
the world around us. As the opium evil made its way across US newspapers, 
the conference rooms of Vienna, New York, and Geneva revealed a much 
more complicated debate regarding the materiality of opium and its 
derivatives.  
Drugs, science and modernity: new materialism and narcotics 
Geonarcotic discourse does much to help us understand the role of the US in 
the international sphere, but alone it is not sufficient. Geonarcotic discourse 
does not account for technological and chemical changes to narcotics that 
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influenced production and manufacturing geographies. For one thing, these 
changes did not always feature formal diplomatic debate at the CND: though 
they were in the purview of the technical organisations of the LoN and UN. 
Advances in the sciences of medicine and chemistry promised answers to 
the problems of addiction, of trafficking, and of legal narcotic shortages. The 
chemical composition of drugs became a knowable and testable entity and 
combined with the American desire to curtail legal trades and monopolies. By 
the 1950s, narcotic expertise and diplomatic practice were linked to organic 
chemistry and the different alkaloids within opium.  
Narcotics were exhaustively studied, regulated, and experimented with, with 
varying results. They refused to yield a geographic origin and impeded 
legislation designed to control them (such as the Poppy Rebellion that is 
discussed in chapter four). At the same time, they gave diplomats chances to 
influence geopolitical proceedings. My material analysis of narcotic drug 
control is not just about powders, pills, and poppies. It is also a history of 
scientific equipment, ideas, routines, procedures, along with political 
regulations, stipulations, debates, and disagreements. 
As it stands, the literature on the history of drugs has been unable to 
conceptualise this complexity. My project addresses this lacuna through the 
idea of assemblage and writings of Andrew Barry. Drawing upon a 
philosophical tradition from Baruch Spinoza, Alfred North Whitehead, and 
Gilles Deleuze, assemblage thinking falls under the moniker of new 
materialism, an umbrella term for describing the role of things and matter in 
social and political life.  
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Before outlining how I use an assemblage approach in this study, I discuss 
theories of new materialism that inspired my use of assemblage theory. New 
materialism is useful for my project because it tackles an implicit 
anthropocentrism that pervades the social sciences.97 It also critiques social 
constructionism and discourse analysis for placing too much attention on the 
textual. Discourse is often associated with the work of Michel Foucault and 
his concern with how power is exercised through institutions, people, and 
ideas. It can be understood as the way ideas become real, through repetition 
and representations. Discourse analysis was a powerful motivator for early 
critical geopolitics but left the discipline bereft of tools for conceptualising the 
material world. 
Dissatisfaction with this dominance of discourse grew from feminist 
geopolitics and feminism more broadly, which argued for an analysis of 
gender in capitalist systems and their embodied impacts upon women.98 With 
these theoretical insights came a new branch of emotional geography.99 
Others drew on the thoughts, feelings, bodies, and emotions as sites of 
geopolitics. Many geographers found solace in the call for non-
representational geographies, spearheaded by Nigel Thrift.100 These broad 
efforts were made to better conceptualise the hard-to-grasp aspects of 
existence.101 In this way, the body, emotions and affect shared what Pile 
terms a ‘relational ontology’102 or a flattening of traditional divisions between 
mind/body and matter/thought. 
Proponents of new materialism charge that the social sciences have long 
ignored the agency that objects exert upon human beings and their 
discourses. Bennett provides a materialist analysis of political events where 
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she ascribes agency to non-humans. She terms this a ‘green materialist 
ecophilosophy’ or ‘vibrant materiality’.103 Her aim is to disrupt the most 
Cartesian of notions, the mind as separate from the body (her example is of 
omega acids acting on the brain). Her work does not reduce or remove the 
idea of human agency, but positions materials as active agents in the 
political world. Others use different metaphors that do not give materials so 
much power. The enrolment of materials in actor networks,104 or a kind of 
‘geopower’ as elaborated by Elizabeth Grosz, where materials, objects, 
bodies, and things help construct a geopolitical stage upon which discourses 
play out.105 For Grosz ‘nonhuman forces – from the smallest sub-atomic 
forces to the operation of solar systems … connect the human to all that is 
both human and non-human’.106 For Karen Barad, post-humanist 
performativity makes matter, ‘matter’ once more. Barad states that materials 
enact their roles depending on the situation they are within, much the same 
way humans behave differently depending on the company they keep.107 
Isabelle Stengers draws on her career as a physicist and uses complexity 
theory to examine the scientific process from a materialist perspective. She 
suggests an ‘ecology of practices’ can question scientific truths about the 
material world.108 Pushing new materialism to its limits, Harman suggests 
that materialism is better thought of as immaterialism, where forces in the 
world are not reducible to representation via discourse, objects, and agency, 
but are defined by both. His study of the Dutch East India company settles 
on portraying that company as a symbiosis of ideas, objects, and 
thoughts.109  
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Each author is concerned to re-position the material world as a serious agent 
of change in contemporary social life. The danger of new materialist theories 
is that they paint materials with a simplistic gloss of agency. As Connolly 
suggests, objects are not sentient, but the Cartesian dualism of mind/matter 
is a careless characterisation of our relationship to the material world.110 
Connolly reminds us that the two pounds of bacteria a human body carries 
daily are central to its survival and to the functioning of the brain, the spongy 
materialisation of the Cartesian mind. As work in neuroscience has recently 
suggested, the relations between the body and environment are critical to a 
brain’s development. The circuitry of the brain may change depending on 
what environments a body operates in (brains are said to exhibit neuro-
plasticity).111  
In a review essay, Dittmer noted how these sophisticated treatments of 
materiality were absent from the earliest studies of critical geopolitics.112 
Materiality, practices, and embodiment are common in the field today, 
whereas the geopolitics of the 1990s and 2000s were characterised by 
words, ideas, and discourse. Currently, the most influential materialist theory 
in critical geopolitics is that of the Deleuzian assemblage. Assemblage is a 
clumsy translation of the French verb agencement, denoting a process 
where things constantly come together. Often taken as a noun, assemblages 
describe an ensemble of heterogeneous things, ideas, affects and objects 
that are in a state of flux. They are not defined by the properties of their 
component parts (the narcotics themselves), but the relations between these 
parts (the relations between narcotics and diplomats). Manuel DeLanda 
gives the example of the body as described by Hegel.113 In Hegel’s day, a 
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body was a totality that could not be disassembled into individual parts. If you 
cut out a beating heart, both the body and heart would die. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, an assemblage better describes the body today, as organs are 
regularly disconnected and reconnected from bodies and placed into 
different bodies. Likewise, artificial machines (kidney dialysis machines and 
respirators) can perform the body’s functions. DeLanda suggests that an 
assemblage can be defined by its expressive components (the skills required 
to sustain a heart and perform the surgery) and its material components (the 
tools and technologies required to do the surgery). Together, these 
components refer to the social and embodied components that territorialise 
an assemblage towards an identity that is always provisional. 
Assemblages open our eyes to connections that Hegel’s totality precludes. 
For Freeman, it re-conceptualises disparate things which were previously 
thought to exist in separate domains.114 While they acquire a degree of fixity, 
Dittmer tells us it only takes a single new or old component to deterritorialise 
the assemblage and change its outcome entirely.115 This is what is novel 
about assemblages. Stivale summarises this situation pithily, suggesting 
assemblages, unlike Foucault’s dispositifs, ‘are always coming together and 
moving apart’.116 In the specific case of narcotics, further differences 
between assemblages and Foucault’s work are notable. Scholars using 
Foucault’s work stress biopolitics and the management of populations,117 and 
that the ‘ordering, security and stratiﬁcations, and [that] these powerful 
processes need not be negative’.118 Foucauldian approaches to drug studies 
thus focus on the management of addiction and the bodies of addicts.119 In 
other words, we know much about the biopolitics of managing addiction in 
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contemporary and historical populations, but less about the biopolitics of 
managing the flows of legal medicaments.  
An exception comes from Eva Hershinger. 120 Her account of the GDTR uses 
the dispositif to show the lists of controlled substances that constitute the 
targets of international drug laws often struggle to accommodate the 
constantly changing innovations of chemical engineering. Hershinger 
concludes the GDTR ‘is one – if not the – major place where the 
ambivalence of drugs is negotiated, where the need to govern and supervise 
drugs is cemented, and where accordant power relations are established’.121 
Hershinger shows there are many crossovers between assemblages and 
dispositifs, something Deleuze himself noted.122 Like dispositifs, 
assemblages can be well identified and defined. 
In response to Herschinger, I argue that while Foucault helps us understand 
drugs and the national body politic, an assemblage analysis steers us away 
from circulation and points us towards the emergent geopolitical subjectivity 
of the state rather than the health of the nation. For example, geonarcotic 
discourse played a role in stabilising international drug control as a fight 
against foreign flows. DeLanda describes this as a process of coding and 
decoding the assemblage. A coded assemblage has a singular identity, 
whereas a decoded one is less cohesive. Different elements can be working 
at cross-purposes to make the assemblage more and less stable at any one 
time.123 An example from my study is the ODP. Just as diplomats put their 
faith in geographically determining a seizure by its chemical signature, the 
material methods of assaying and measuring samples revealed just how 
complex opium’s chemistry could be. This does not mean that we should 
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erase the differential degrees of influence between the agency of human and 
non-human actors. Opium was not more powerful than those working with it, 
and it certainly did not defeat the scientists at the ODP. Instead, we should 
strive for ‘a distributive image of agency’ that pairs human action with the 
material world.124 In my case of the ODP, this means analysing the 
chemicals, materials, packaging, and labels that adorned seizures of 
narcotics.  
The advantages of conceptualising geopolitical phenomena as an 
assemblage stem from recognising how things, ideas, bodies, and affect 
have capacities to connect and give rise to geopolitical subjectivities. For 
Dittmer, this allows us to avoid dangerous materialist thinking of classical 
geopolitics.125 Unlike the racism in the Nazi claims for Lebensraum or 
determinative claims of Halford Mackinder’s Heartland thesis, assemblage 
theory does not grant the material environment decisive power over human 
behaviour, just as humans do not master the planet. It also points to the 
diplomatic system ‘itself as a type of body politic, the existence of which 
shapes the first [individuals] and second order [states] bodies politic 
embedded within it’.126 We can think of multiple, second-order body politics, 
the (US drug diplomatic core) connecting to other bodies’ politic through the 
larger diplomatic system. Protevi’s notion of bodies politic points towards 
affective, somatic, and political crossovers that have been neglected in 
diplomatic histories.127 His study of the racialised response of the US State to 
Hurricane Katrina is a study of the governmental Body Politic. He considers 
how exaggerated reports of looting, rape, and murder in the aftermath of the 
hurricane contributed to the militarised response. I use his work to add an 
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affective dimension to the drug control assemblage. This considers how 
narcotics were painted as terrifying weapons that turned the body into a 
geopolitical battlefield. 
Applying assemblage theory 
For Connolly, adopting a new materialist approach means adopting a 
‘problem orientation, pursuing the contours of an issue up and down these 
interacting scales, as the issue requires’.128 I conceptualise the international 
drug system as an assemblage, one that is characterised by multiple 
instances of coding, decoding, territorialisation, and deterritorialisation. I also 
consider the American system as a separate assemblage that interacts with 
the international system. While assemblages permit and encourage 
researchers to find connections between diverse objects, individuals, 
thoughts, and ideas, they do not allow a researcher to find connections 
anywhere and everywhere. As Graham Harman reminds us, ‘we would not 
claim there is a real assemblage formed by the Pacific Ocean, Angela Merkel 
and the set of all coins and beans that have ever existed or will exist’.129 
Assemblage theory treads a tightrope by preserving the internal of the 
properties of things without portraying these properties as unchanging 
essences. It is open enough to appreciate dynamism and emergence but is 
not so open that it evacuates structure. Assemblages are often extremely 
structured, but that structure is only ever provisional. 
Furthermore, thinking through materials and discourses as parts of an 
assemblage does not mean we must consider opium as a thinking, active 
agent. In urban studies, assemblages lead to a focus on micro and macro 
conditions that moderate systems. Energetic material systems share their 
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environments with many other processes.130 Following William Connolly, and 
his reading of philosopher Alfred North Whitehead and physicist/complexity 
theorist Ilya Prigogine,131 I consider agency as distributed throughout the 
assemblage. A narcotic’s role in drug politics was contingent upon the other 
elements within the assemblage.  
What does it mean to think of a narcotic materially? Most importantly is to 
note that narcotics are not single, individual chemicals. They are multiple. 
They are a family of drugs that share similar qualities: they deaden pain, 
depress respiration, and induce constipation and sleep. Thus, I define a 
narcotic by its capacities rather than its properties: what it can do rather than 
what it is. This is because its capacities (effects) vary widely and pinning 
down its properties is pharmacologically complex. Within raw opium, we find 
many other narcotics. There are many derivatives of opium. In this thesis, the 
most commonly mentioned are the alkaloid phenanthrenes of morphine, 
codeine, and thebaine, but there are also non-narcotic isoquinolines of 
papaverine and noscapine. Synthetic narcotics such as fentanyl and 
hydrocodone are those that are not derived from raw opium, but are either 
semi-synthesised from narcotics such as morphine or created from entirely 
different chemicals while still mimicking the effects of opium. Socially, the 
term narcotic is also imprecise. Like the term drug, it has an unclear legal 
definition in the US and is often used to refer to any illegal psychoactive 
substances.  
The complexity develops when we consider the forms a narcotic may take. 
Throughout history, narcotics have been made into pills, powders, gum, 
paste, liquid tinctures, injectables, oral medicines, and suppositories. This 
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influences how they interact with the body, but also how easily they can be 
transferred, stored and smuggled. General pharmacological principles that 
govern their behaviours are useful, but they will differ from situation to 
situation. One body may react very differently to a specific narcotic. The 
presence of other chemicals such as alcohol or naloxone will change how a 
narcotic behaves (naloxone is an opioid antagonist, meaning it can instantly 
reverse the effects of a heroin overdose).  
Even if they are isolated, the relative proportion of organic material 
influences their form. When referring to morphine, heroin, codeine, or even 
opium, we gloss over thousands of minute variations that can exist between 
two different substances. For example, the relative proportions of atoms that 
make up a narcotic that is sourced from raw opium vary depending on 
geography. The morphine content of Indian opium is generally higher than 
opium grown in China. A narcotic is therefore emergent from the relation 
between chemistry and geography. The same is true in diplomatic contexts. 
Of course, some degree of generalisation is pragmatic. However, by using 
assemblage theory, we can apply a more nuanced framework of material 
vitalism to narcotics in geopolitical settings that helps understand how to 
‘decentre, or better, to embed, military and political subjects by looking to 
emergent processes above, below, and alongside subjects’.132 For Protevi 
‘the hydrosphere is not just chemically pure H2O but is “water,” which has 
plenty of organisms, air, and minerals in it’.133 Following Protevi, it is the 
structure of ‘the process of production of substances rather than the 
properties of those substances, once formed’, that is of interest.134 It makes 
no sense to think of a narcotic as a pure, pre-arranged mix of chemicals, but 
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instead as comprised of a varied mix of organic and inorganic materials that 
change in time and space.  
Narcotics vary, and their geopolitical capacities depend on the specific 
geopolitical situation within which they were encountered. Narcotics are 
material and discursive. We can add these into our new formation of a 
narcotic. A narcotic could be a dangerous drug in China peddled by the 
Japanese, a chemical signature for geographic determination, and a 
strategic war material for the Allied forces.  
Finally, changes, additions, or removals of elements in an assemblage lead 
to a lead to predictable patterns of behaviour or stable, actualised states, or 
entirely new, deterritorialised, and repatterned outcomes that change the 
assemblage entirely. For Protevi, Deleuze defines the actual as ‘the set of 
stable substances endowed with sets of extensive properties [that are] 
locked into stereotypical behaviour patterns’.135 The virtual is potential 
change. It is not undifferentiated chaos, but a set of ideas that could be 
actualised. They are actualised when an assemblage is deterritorialised, 
leading to an entirely new system or type of behaviour. The same applies to 
international systems when they are conceptualised as assemblages. As 
Dittmer suggests  
When foreign policy apparatuses of the state enter into assemblage 
with one another, whether through traditional diplomacy or in more 
bureaucratic encounters associated with the international relations of 
the late twentieth-century, they open themselves up to transnational 
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affects that rework the basis on which national interest is 
calculated.136  
The Deleuzian event causes an assemblage to deterritorialise and change 
into an entirely new configuration. Events led to new ways of interacting and 
of exercising power. The researcher’s job is to examine how these events 
change the system. I focus on different elements that led to events and 
changes in the system. 
I now outline the theoretical concept I developed when applying assemblage 
theory to the history of drug control, followed by supplementary approaches 
that enhance my use of assemblage theory. 
DIPLOMATIC OPIUM  
This concept helps conceptualise how US drug diplomats strengthened their 
diplomatic positions through legal narcotics, digging deep foundations for 
more stringent prohibition in later years.  
Diplomatic opium refers to the ways opium helped persuade other nations to 
adhere to the American approach to drug control. It circumvents the 
problems of demarcating between medical/recreational and licit/illicit uses. It 
involves thinking through the value of a narcotic’s analgesic properties in 
securing geopolitical agendas. A similar strategy was adopted by Glassman 
& Choi, in their paper on American procurement of South Korean and 
Japanese commodities and services for Hyundai and other Korean Chaebols 
(family owned business conglomerates) during the Cold War.137 By focusing 
on Hyundai’s role in the Vietnam War, they illuminate the role of commodities 
and construction in East Asia’s industrial and geopolitical development, thus 
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showing how non-military forces played a key role in diplomatic 
development. I look to do the same with legally sourced narcotics. 
The US sourced and stockpiled morphine on at least two separate 
occasions, once during World War Two and again during the Cold War. 
Ensuring narcotic provision was a critical goal for both Allied and Axis 
powers and indeed for armies well before the Second World War.138 
Shortages of morphine, codeine, and other opioids during and after the war 
were heavily exploited by the US, who doled out their surpluses to other 
allied powers. This story has not been explored adequately for narcotics, but 
Susan Reiss has analysed cocaine and its place in the American war 
chest.139 By showing how and where legal cocaine was sourced, produced, 
and traded, she reveals how distinctions between illicit/licit and 
medical/recreational use are insufficient for explaining coca’s diplomatic 
value. She suggests coca leaf stockpiles ‘were a reserve supply not only of 
critical and strategic commodities, but also of the international labour power, 
energy, supply networks, and other resources that had gone into their 
production’.140 No such analysis has been taken for narcotics. 
Diplomatic opium is an important concept because, as Dittmer suggests, it 
avoids a traditional analysis of traditional players, what he calls ‘directors or 
political masters’.141 In my project, I use diplomatic opium to place these 
figures in a context of distributed agency with the narcotics in the 
assemblage. 
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The limits of assemblage theory 
The speed with which the disparate theories of new materialism have spread 
across human geography is astounding. Examples include material 
cultures,142 urban studies,143 and infrastructure144 and agricultural 
practices.145 A shared frustration with the centrality of words, representation 
and ideas at the expense of things, stuff, and matter has bubbled up through 
the geographical journals. This turn towards matter has been welcomed 
cautiously,146 but it is not without criticism. Such unquestioning enthusiasm 
has alarmed some who worry that the solid ‘thing’ risks becoming more 
important than other states of matter such as gas and water.147 As Rose & 
Tolia-Kelly suggest, we cannot make do with a superficial acknowledgement 
that matter ‘matters’.148 
At this point, I introduce some criticisms of assemblage theory to explain why 
I supplement it with other theoretical insights. First, Martin Müller has 
reconciled ANT with assemblage theory to create a sophisticated theory for 
understanding how geopolitical knowledge emerges from the ‘black box’ of 
singular entities such as the League of Nations or UN.149 Actor-Network 
Theory (ANT) has had widespread influence in geopolitics and critical 
security studies and I draw on Müller’s ‘cross-fertilisations’ between ANT and 
assemblage theory to navigate the division between discourse and 
materiality. ANT provides assemblage theory with an explicitly spatial 
account of how relations are created. Along with his work on the concept of 
discourse as practice as well as textual or spoken,150 Müller suggests there 
is no ontological reason why a discursive analysis need be opposed to a 
materialist analysis. 151 This simple and powerful observation is worth 
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stressing. New materialist approaches must be sensitive to the material and 
discursive approaches to both data collection and analysis in human 
geography.  
Second, assemblages are concerned with flux, change, and becoming. This 
is one of their strengths. This should not, however, mean that order and 
stability are neglected. For Stephen Legg, order can be productive as well as 
negative. The trafficking of children in the interwar years was an assemblage 
‘of actual movements, policies, novels, rumours, myths, desires, and places 
of disembarkation, slavery, purchase and policy’.152 Legg suggests it is better 
to think of assemblage theory and Foucauldian theories dialectically. Both 
are extremely useful when studying the international system. 
With these two critiques in mind, I argue that assemblage theory can be 
adapted for my specific case study with the aid of other theory. Müller has 
argued that the concept could do more to explain how power emerges from 
assemblages. He feels it could benefit from a crossover with other social 
theories, specifically Foucauldian approaches to language and meaning.153 It 
is for this reason I offer a more traditional, geopolitical analysis that focuses 
on the territorialising role of geonarcotic discourse in the second empirical 
chapter.  
Narcotics were, as the Commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 
described, entirely ‘Janus-faced’. They had multiple capacities to ‘plug into 
other assemblages’.154 Narcotics are multiplicities, defined by Deleuze as an 
entity that originated from the contorting of other elements.155 They are 
provisionally stable, but always becoming. They are quantitative multiplicities 
72 
 
in that they can be counted, recorded, and analysed. They are also 
qualitative multiplicities in that they enfold social and cultural attitudes. These 
multiplicities were only appreciated by a minor group of chemists and 
diplomats. They understood what opium, if placed into a new set of economic 
or geopolitical relations, could become. In public discourse, understandings 
of narcotics were not so nuanced. The wider sentiments and affects of the 
opium evil spread by newspapers, domestic lobbying groups, and the FBN 
made the identity of narcotics provisionally stable. Foreign dope was 
terrifying, colonial, and ever-present in society. The narcotics prescribed by a 
doctor were not. While the FBN scrambled to stockpile much of the world’s 
morphine during World War Two, the Commissioner of Narcotics continued 
to publicly paint a terrifying picture of foreign narcotics entering the country 
illicitly, a story greedily seized upon by newspapers across the states. It is 
this tension between the popular geopolitics of drugs and their uses as 
diplomatic bargaining chips that are of critical interest in this project. 
The second critique is that international system cannot be considered without 
mention of advances in technology and organic chemistry. While 
assemblage theory alerts us to the role of materials and relations, it does not 
provide specific enough tools to conceptualise the role of scientific progress 
in diplomacy. Fortunately, there are other scholars who combine new 
materialist ideas with governmentality and scientific progress, international 
politics, and chemical and pharmaceutical practice. I turn to this work now. 
TECHNOLOGICAL ZONES AND INFORMED MATERIALS 
I supplement my assemblage analysis with Andrew Barry’s notion of the 
technological zone156 and informed materials.157 The technological zone is a 
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corrective to thinking through technology as networked, smooth, and 
immaterial (analysed without reference to its materiality). By thinking through 
zones rather than networks, the scholar is not limited to bounded 
understandings of technology that are separate, or a solution to, political 
debate. The zone opens up technical aspects of scientific progress to 
political analysis. Examples such as standardisation, troubleshooting, 
expertise, and tacit knowledge can be interrogated for their role in political 
life. Barry’s case study of air quality monitoring via remote sensing in the 
London borough of Southwark is useful insofar as it deals with a theme 
congruent with my work: the use of remote sensing technology to ‘catch’ 
motorists with highly polluting cars. Like remote sensing technology, opium 
determination was politically palatable because it was deemed apolitical; it 
was indifferent to questions of who smuggled the opium. It simply pointed to 
a geographical region. I use Barry’s work to highlight the geopolitical 
importance of changes in organic chemistry, agricultural practice, and 
laboratory work in the quest for stricter drug control that tried to pinpoint the 
nations from which seizures emerged. This necessitates a focus on the 
failure of the ODP due to the problematic conceptualisation of opium as 
predictable and malleable. As Barry rightly argues, ‘a material analysis of 
politics is one which must attend to the resistance of matter to political 
control’.158 
Barry’s interpretation Bensaude-Vincent and Stenger’s notion of informed 
materials provides nuance for a recurring theme in this thesis. For Barry, an 
oxygen molecule in the laboratory is not the same as an oxygen molecule in 
the atmosphere. He instead uses definitions from Gabriel Tarde159 and Alfred 
74 
 
North Whitehead to think about how the ‘molecule that is isolated and 
purified in the laboratory will not have the same properties as it has in the 
field, the city street or the body’.160 Barry’s focus is on contemporary 
pharmaceutical production which includes ‘data about potency, metabolism 
and toxicity and information regarding the intellectual property rights 
associated with different molecules’.161 These contribute to a medical drug 
being marked as safe for consumption today.  
The informed material, Barry tells us, is a molecule that is already invested 
with information. How it is perceived, and the environment within which it is 
encountered, matter greatly. Today, molecules are understood as invariant 
and unchanging, providing a wide range of possible combinations for new 
composites that can be digitally mapped and then synthesised. Drawing on 
Timothy Mitchell, Barry argues that much of the public interest in the Baku-
Ceyhan-Tbilisi pipeline was due to geopolitical concerns.162 Technical 
matters were somewhat invisible and left to BP and other corporations. The 
invisibility of technical matters in political histories of drug control is another 
area where research is lacking, and Barry’s formulation nuances the 
assemblage framework I used to expose these technical matters.  
I argue that combining Barry’s work with assemblage theory brings the 
technical aspects of drug control into the limelight. My study traces the 
science of opium determination back to the early days of organic chemistry in 
the 1940s. Where a Foucauldian analysis would point towards the attempts 
to standardise and bio-politically govern traffickers and users, my approach 
emphasises how and why these efforts to bring the various chemicals into 
order were fallible; the narcotic in the laboratory was never the same as the 
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seizure at a US port. What they missed were how matter and politics were 
imbricated. Seized opium was more just the gum, paste or power that 
scientists analysed. Seizures were accompanied by information on their 
potential origin. This attendant information was crucial to technical 
experiments but also became politically controversial when offered as 
evidence for a seizure’s origin. Efforts to isolate and identify a geographical 
location were heavily influenced by the information that came with samples 
of opium. The isolated laboratory sample did not account for the wider 
contexts in which narcotics were encountered. 
Barry’s ideas lead me to emphasise the ways molecules take specific 
historical forms. Much of the attendant information that was generated in the 
ODP was designed to provide standards that would make the UN 
identification programme reliable, allowing different chemists to replicate 
findings on opium samples.  
SCALE AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF NARCOTICS POLICY 
Another aspect of my study is to use assemblage theory to rethink through 
scale. Scholars and lawmakers recognise that international drug law does 
not always trump national policy.163 Some nations flagrantly breach the 
GDTR treaty parameters with legalised marijuana markets. The INCB can do 
little but offer the occasional rebuke,164 a move which some see as 
overstepping its mandate.165 Today, an increasingly loud NGO sector is 
making waves at the United Nations’ Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 
upsetting the traditional diplomatic exchanges between nations. Negotiations 
at the UN are rarely the drivers of national policy changes, yet nested 
understandings of scale are still dominant when it comes to narcotic policy. 
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This was just as true in the first half of the twentieth-century as it is today. 
How to theorise this complexity? 
Human geographers have provided theoretical work that troubles nested 
understandings of scale. Scale is now understood to be a constructed 
political hierarchy where the global/national/local lenses do not adequately 
represent the way power is exercised. Scholars have adopted networked 
understandings of hierarchies that critique ‘taken for granted and shape our 
thinking in implicit ways’.166 As Müller and Schurr suggest, this troubling of 
scale is a strength of ANT as it demonstrates an ‘explicit spatial sensitivity 
where it refers to regions, scales, distance and topologies’.167 I show how 
scalar thinking was put to political use to secure certain geopolitical aims by 
drawing on Legg’s use of assemblage analysis to British India’s relations with 
the LoN.168 He suggests the acrimony between the British and League grew 
out of conflicting understandings of the division between national 
sovereignty, domestic law and international mandates. Ultimately, a lack of 
faith in the League’s geographical reach and sovereign authority led to its 
eventual demise.169 
Assemblages are less concerned with hierarchy as a frame of analysis, and 
more with emergence and dynamism. I approach the history of narcotic law 
similarly, suggesting international policy did not simply trickle down to nation-
states. Many nations flouted their international obligations by citing national 
concerns and violations of their domestic sovereignty. The FBN often 
circumvented the international arena by bilaterally engaging nations. This 
was particularly true of nations where US foreign policy was focussed. By 
harmonising narcotics policy with foreign policy, the Federal Bureau of 
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Narcotics inserted itself into an intelligence network that spanned the globe. 
It transcended its role as a domestic regulatory agency to become an 
important player in international affairs. 
To surmise, the assemblage approach outlined here leads me to four starting 
points.170 First, the assemblage is gestalt. Each element cannot be reduced 
to its functions. It is the relations between elements within that lead to 
emergent causality (or the creation of an international drug system). Second, 
the assemblage is constantly becoming. This is not to say it is constantly 
changing, but it can never be thought of as stable or entirely coherent. 
Periods of stability are better understood as periods of provisional 
territorialisation; periods of incoherence are deterritorialised, signalling new 
actants that are making new connections that lead to further change. Third, 
we must be open to including surprising actors and events in our account; 
assemblages are never truly demarcated by scale. Fourth, discourse plays 
an important role in coding or decoding an assemblage with meaning, but 
materiality can do the same, if not more. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
this led me to a methodological focus on new ways of reading the archive 
and analysing the history of drug control. 
Reflexivity, ethics and positionality 
I begin this final section with the question of where I stand as a researcher. 
This, as Donna Haraway would suggest, is because we cannot claim to 
represent without escaping representation.171 While personal opinions may 
seem irrelevant to understanding drug diplomacy in the early-mid twentieth-
century, Bailey et al., remind us ‘wanting to know what happened in the past 
is connected to our development and self-understanding as modern 
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individuals’.172 My interest in this topic was purely academic, growing out of 
my master’s thesis on the symbolism and alter-geopolitics of the 
remembrance poppy. My position as an interested, but unaffected, 
researcher is not tenable for many people who find their lives dramatically 
altered due to punitive drug regulation. Likewise, my position as a white, 
male researcher from a prestigious research university ultimately helped 
negotiate access to sources which others might not have access to. 
As a scholar, I have been influenced by the approaches to geopolitics 
outlined in the literature review as they blend with my wider politics. In critical 
geopolitics, where the male, tactician’s eye has viewed much of the world as 
conquerable and inert, rather than as an active biosphere.173 It is only in the 
last decade that this position has been roundly challenged. The materialist 
position that seeks to correct the anthropocentrism within political geography 
brings our attention to the non-human factors that shape not just geopolitics, 
but the planet. Similarly, the feminist theories that seek to open geopolitics to 
everyday individual experiences influenced me greatly, not just as a 
researcher, but as a British citizen living between London and the US.  
I undertook my PhD, however, as new materialist theories became 
fashionable. As much as I feel they are useful for explaining diplomatic 
history in a more accurate and non-anthropocentric way, they will eventually 
be superseded by a new approach. This alerts me to their fallibility. They 
have theoretical shortcomings (outlined above) and methodological 
challenges for researchers applying them to a study (discussed in the next 
chapter). While undertaking a new materialist reading of the archive, the 
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theories did not map easily onto the research design. For one thing, the 
realm of drug diplomacy was (almost exclusively) the domain of white men. It 
would not be possible to tell this story without reference to the decisions and 
attitudes of some of these figures. They helped shape the geonarcotic 
discourses by giving interviews in the papers and over the radio. They often 
wrote extremely influential position papers that influenced Congress and 
international delegates. It is their perspectives that have survived and form 
the raw data for this project.  
If we take Keith Ansell-Pearson’s definition, the goal of ‘new materialism is to 
be strictly non-anthropocentric: there is no privileging of human bodies or 
even of human capacities for agency’.174 This poses a methodological 
problem: how can we place human and non-human agency on an equal 
footing in archival research which is written exclusively by humans for 
humans? Resolving this issue became a practical and theoretical goal for 
me. It meant that my research design was a constant negotiation between 
recognizing the limits and biases inherent in the archives, applying the 
correct interpretive framework and thinking through the agency of materials 
as relational with human actors. These are discussed in depth in the next 
chapter. 
Contributions: making narcotics international  
Just as theory can help tell a new empirical story, the empirics can help 
nuance the theory. I believe my thesis helps develop new materialist theory 
in political geography in three different ways. 
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• Opening the terrain of historical drug studies to political geographers 
through assemblage theory, informed materials, and the concept of 
‘diplomatic opium’ (empirical) 
• Developing the theory of new materialism so that it can be applied to 
historical objects in critical geopolitics (theoretical) 
• Providing a framework for a materialist analysis of historical objects in 
archives (methodological, discussed in the next chapter) 
We now study plenty of historical objects. There are studies of the politics of 
milk,175 and watermills on the Thames in the 18th century.176 Making Things 
International 1 and 2, edited by Mark Salter, is an impressive collection of 
essays that show how things, ideas, and expertise circulate in our globalized 
world today. Salter suggests ‘diplomacy is made by telegrams, the Internet, 
diplomatic pouches, chicken dinners, and cameras’.177 The book is an 
important contribution to international relations that compliments this study 
greatly. While ‘Making Things International 1’ does include reference to 
cocaine, it is an analysis conducted in the latter half of the twentieth-century. 
Only recently is there work in political geography that applies this materialist 
approach to historical topics.178 My study shifts the materiality to objects 
which are not prosaic parts of an assemblage but, are intense objects of 
study. Narcotics, so obviously important to geopolitical life, remain poorly 
conceptualised as objects of regulation, rather than objects of prohibition.  
Throughout this thesis, the reader will see where narcotics and their 
materiality, along with formal and popular geopolitics, blended to support or 
scupper American efforts to impose a more prohibitory international system 
of drug control. By drawing on work in critical geopolitics, I tease out the 
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disjuncture between the public and popular understanding of narcotics and 
expert understandings of their medical and diplomatic uses.  
By placing narcotics at the forefront of my analysis, I offer three broad 
contributions to political geography. First, I go beyond the division of 
narcotics into legal/illegal categories. Such a division is unhelpful when 
considering their role at the League of Nations and United Nations. Second, I 
explore the geonarcotics of early drug control, and how the illicit 
understanding of opium and its derivatives crowded out their analgesic uses 
to the detriment of pain-killer access worldwide. I draw out the narcotic 
geographies that described a world divided into producers, manufacturers, 
and consumers. By comparing these roles against a country’s geopolitical 
standing with the US, I highlight how international relations and narcotics 
became intertwined after 1909. Finally, I emphasise the materiality of the 
substances, and how changes in the technology and geography of drug 
production influenced and thwarted the missions of the ‘grand old men’ of 
drug control. In doing so, I develop theories of new materialism that have 
developed in critical geopolitics. 179 
Through these contributions, I hope to provide critical geopolitics with an 
opening into the fertile field of drug studies. The point is not to imbue opium 
with a set of powers, diplomatic, weaponised, or otherwise, that have 
heretofore remained undiscovered. It is rather to examine how opium was 
critical part of wider networks and discourses and became geopolitical. 
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Methodology and Method 
In this chapter, I use a narrative timeline to guide the reader through my 
decisions about research design, data collection, analysis, and presentation. 
Next, come the limitations. I point to the compromises I made with the data, 
the archives, and institutions from which it was collected. I made many other 
choices about the scope of the project, but the scope was also set by 
practical considerations of the project (funding, timeframe, and visa limits in 
the United States). Contingency, surprises, and dead-ends played a part in 
this thesis, forcing me to look for new approaches to problems and even 
abandon data collection methods entirely. I show how I circumvented such 
problems by altered my methodology and the empirical scope of the study.  
Research design  
The project’s overarching aim is to re-tell the history of drug diplomacy from 
the perspective of a critical, materialist geopolitics. The three research 
questions are restated below 
A. What is the relationship between narcotic discourses and geopolitical 
agendas from 1909-1961? 
B. How did the materiality of narcotics shape American attempts to 
create international narcotic legislation during this period? 
C. How did the same materiality confound attempts to know and 
determine narcotics?  
I began the research design with a strong urge to contribute to debates on 
animating the archive. These debates seek to ‘bring the material and 
documentary properties of archives into play’.1 I hoped to create a set of 
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principles for geographers who were dealing with objects that had once 
existed (opium seizures, purchases, samples), but were only recognisable by 
their textual traces. Scholars have applied Deleuzian thought to their 
methodologies in a variety of ways.2 Examples include visual images3 and, 
more specifically related to this project, ethnographies with drug users and 
interviews with teachers and students who engage in drug education.4 
Dowling et al., suggest ‘it is essential that the particular historical trajectories 
of new objects of study are thoroughly investigated and brought into the 
present’.5 The same can be said of international relations. Salter suggests 
that the usual archival methods are ‘unsuited to the task of understanding 
how particular objects, ideas and people come together to create, dispute, 
solve, or perhaps cause the political configurations’.6 We do not yet have a 
methodological approach for assemblages that no longer exist. This 
methodology shows how I used archival sources to analyse entirely 
deterritorialised assemblages. 
The research design I constructed made it impossible to ignore the 
interactions between the material properties of narcotics and foreign policy. It 
invokes what Deleuze, drawing on Whitehead’s concept of the ‘fallacy of 
misplaced concreteness’,7 calls transcendental empiricism. This concept 
examines how other abstract concepts used in research (the State, the 
international drug control system, etc.) are immanent to the situation a 
researcher is examining. This immanence refers to ‘the specificity or 
singularity of a thing; not to what can be made to fit into pre-existing forms’.8 
Thus, the questions examine how the international drug control system and 
geopolitical subjectivity of the US emerged from the relations between 
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geonarcotic discourse, materials, and affect. In doing this, I follow other 
geographers and avoid pre-conceived identity of ‘The State’ to structure my 
analysis.9 
In my approach, the causality between those actors who make up the state 
and international system and the eventual state effects is problematised. 
This is because an assemblage is always becoming. Becoming is not just ‘a 
process of transforming from one thing to another’,10 it is a recognition that 
any degree of stability was always provisional and subject to change. Of 
course, the debates and treaties hammered out in international forums led to 
the adoption of narcotic laws, but so much of what was agreed in these 
boardrooms was catalysed by public moods and narcotic discourses, as well 
as developments in chemical processing, external conflict, and of course, the 
chemical capacities of the narcotics themselves. As I have shown, these 
laws are continually being reinterpreted, renegotiated, and outright ignored.  
There are empirical limitations that my research design created. As Dittmer 
suggests, archives contain preselected material.11 The researcher has no 
access or way of analysing the absences an archivist has created. Second, 
the size of the archive limited the practical scope of what I could achieve 
during my fieldwork. For example, there were over one hundred synthetic 
and semi-synthetic narcotics under international control by 1961. These 
drugs were accompanied by hundreds of pages of technical documents in 
LoN and UN committee meetings, as well as the national laws and position 
papers of the assembled nations. It is impossible to tell all their stories in one 
thesis. Narrowing my focus to narcotics, and the smaller subset of narcotics 
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mentioned in this thesis, is one limitation of my archival and assemblage-
based approach.  
Data collection 
New materialism for old archives 
Archival research was the most appropriate method for collecting data for 
this project. There are rigorous accounts of the GDTR tracing back to its 
inception in 1909. As I will show shortly, I planned to hold interviews with 
policymakers and ex-narcotic agents. They were problematic and this led me 
to abandon them. 
Archival research also allowed me to conceptualise narcotics ‘materially’ and 
was the best-suited method for using assemblage theory. I examined parts of 
archives that previous historians have viewed as mildly interesting footnotes. 
An example is a diplomatic struggle over the international opium monopoly 
(IOM). McAllister suggests this idea failed because of the obsessions of its 
chief architect Leon Steinig, head of the Division of Narcotic Drugs (DND) of 
the United Nations. McAllister argues that Steinig’s blinkered insistence on 
this programme was undermined by American diplomats who pushed for a 
more stringent law (the 1953 Opium Protocol).12 This reading has merit; it 
brilliantly captures Steinig’s domineering role at the UN. In departing from 
this human-centred approach, I consider the failure of the IOM through a 
more dispersed agency; new technologies of cropping increased the yield 
from raw opium significantly and reduced the demand for raw poppy crops. 
With an assemblage methodology, researchers can ask new questions of 
archival documents that previously have been deemed uninteresting. 
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McCann and Ward use the notion of urban assemblages to describe how 
policy is made and materialises in specific places.13 These are determined by 
local practices rather than any scalar, or hierarchical authority invested in 
authority figures or institutions. In a similar vein, De Goede focuses on the 
policy implications of assemblages. She examines how security practices 
‘exceed institutional change and coherent direction’.14 For De Goede, 
financial services, corporations, and legislation impact the multiple paths that 
illicit flows of money take. When it comes to people, she considers more than 
formal stakeholders. Technical advisors, mid-level bureaucrats, and 
administrators also shaped policy debates. The lessons of these papers, 
when applied to my archival methods, were that I should focus on technical 
minutia – or prosaics – of the diplomatic proceedings, as well as fringe 
figures who may not be central, but are nevertheless part of the emergent 
international system.15 
Andrew Barry develops this way of thinking through materials in the archive. 
In Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline, Barry presents the paradox 
of materiality. As geographers have become more alert to the vibrancy and 
unpredictability of studying things, materials, and the ‘natural’ environment, 
they forget that materials are written about, studied, risk-managed, 
accounted for, deliberated, and predicted. Information, and the materials 
such information concerns, are intimately bound together. Barry 
recommends we ‘develop accounts of the political geography of materials 
whose ongoing existence is associated with the production of information’.16 
His case study is the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan pipeline, an international project 
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that brought together companies, nations, and protestors who produced 
conflicting information-rich narratives about the pipeline.  
Barry is interested in the materiality of the pipeline insofar as it generates a 
wealth of conflicting information which is used to support conflicting political 
claims. I apply his approach to his data sources on historical narcotics. When 
considered in relation to their geonarcotic discourses, their scientific and 
chemical profiles, the archives become treasure troves of data. In other 
words, technical detail about narcotics (their purity, seizures, quantities etc.) 
becomes just as vital to understanding drug diplomacy. His approach to 
archival data makes clear the need to understand ‘how and why particular 
materials, events and sites became so controversial’17 and why certain parts 
of the pipeline became important where others did not. 
There are other approaches from critical security studies that support the 
idea of thinking materially about narcotics in the archive.18 An already 
mentioned approach is Foucault’s dispositif, along with a wealth of research 
on Actor-Network Theory. They each have their similarities with my 
approach. ANT, for example, considers an actor a ‘patterned network of 
heterogeneous relations’.19 Latour has recently elaborated an approach 
called dingpolitik or ‘thing theory’.20 One study on drone strikes applies 
dingpolitik and yields fascinating findings. Walters suggests objects can be 
‘fleeting, ambiguous, partial…and more-single’.21 To demonstrate this, he 
uses archival and textual research to explain the role of missile fragments 
from a drone strike in Gaza. Here, two groups contested the legality of the 
strike by disputing the number of non-combatants. He shows how alternative 
conceptions of the drone and missile from Human Rights Watch and the 
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Israeli Defense Force created forensic accounts that gave more credence to 
the missile fragments than to the voice of victims of the strike. In each of 
these studies, the goal is to examine the way different groups understand 
materials, technology, and technical studies of materials work become part of 
political life. Likewise, Mark Salter defines the dispositif as a ‘constellation of 
institutions, practices and beliefs that create the conditions of possibility 
within a field’.22 Both are useful when thinking about narcotics as multiple. 
Indeed, in my archival research, I found reports on seizures of narcotics that 
contributed to the understanding of weapons of war. In the same archives, I 
found files that documented the importance of narcotics as critical war 
materials. 
On their own, none of these approaches are enough to use archives to 
analyse geonarcotic discourse and materiality together. For example, thing 
theory and dingpolitik both ask ‘how materials and objects become entangled 
in political controversies, and how objects mediate issues of public 
concern’.23 In doing so, these theories move away from issues of governance 
and strategies of governing, what Rose and Miller call political technologies 
of calculation.24 As my study is concerned with the regulation of narcotics, I 
did not wish to dispense with this focus. Instead, combining parts of these 
approaches with Barry’s work on informed materials and previous studies of 
assemblage theory allowed me to explain how narcotics and their properties 
became part of diplomatic technologies of calculation.  
Timeframe, location, and scope 
The first decision I made was to decide the period of history in which I would 
collect data. Here, I was guided by previous scholars and gaps in the 
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literature (see previous chapter). For example, Eva Herschinger has 
analysed the contemporary expression of post-1961 drug treaties through a 
materialist lens.25 I did not want to repeat her work, which I think admirably 
captured the essence of ambivalent materiality in this era. I decided to cast 
my focus back in time to the twentieth-century and its drug laws, which 
created plenty of further questions about drug control in the early twentieth-
century.  
When focusing on the where of my project, my preliminary research 
identified the importance of American drug diplomacy as it was at the 
vanguard of prohibition based on supply reduction in the early twentieth-
century. The US was also a logical choice as a data source. Records at the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA, Record Group 170) 
contain files from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Various other record 
groups from the Department of State, War Production Board, and General 
Treasury Records are located at NARA (see Appendix One for a list of all 
archives consulted). For many scholars, the papers of private individuals, 
particularly those of Harry J Anslinger, are particularly pertinent to 
understanding his thinking as the pre-eminent drugs czar. Other official 
documents are in Vienna at the UN Drug Control Programme Archives or in 
the League of Nations Archives in Geneva and other relevant figures such as 
Colonel Sharman of Canada have relevant papers in Ottawa, Canada. The 
archives at Vienna are the most comprehensive collection on League and 
UN deliberations. 
I did not have the funds to visit all these countries. I focused my project on 
the United States as I knew the breadth and detail of that country’s archives 
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would be sufficient. After discussing with other researchers who have worked 
in the field, I concluded the Vienna archives would not be as useful as the 
NARA documents for my specific purposes. The United States was also 
advantageous as the archives concerning the laboratories involved in the 
Opium Determination Programme are located at NARA.  
I surveyed the various archives outside of NARA in the United States, but 
many of the files dealing with figures of drug diplomacy were scattered 
across the country. A version of the Harry Anslinger archive is held in the 
Truman Library in Missouri, while another is stored at Pennsylvania State 
University. I focused on the databases of the NARA in the US and planned to 
conduct archival fieldwork there. The benefit of doing so was twofold. I would 
have access to the historical records at NARA, which would reduce the costs 
of fieldwork and travel to surrounding states. It was for these reasons I 
settled on Washington DC. 
In November 2014, I applied to the Economic and Social Research Council’s 
flagship PhD fieldwork programme. The fellowship is for scholars who 
required access to the Library of Congress’ archives. The fellowships were 
up to six months long and opened the world’s single most extensive archive 
of research data I had not considered previously, nor had been widely 
consulted by other researchers in the field. In applying for the ESRC 
fellowship, I consulted reference librarians at the Library of Congress who 
pointed me to a treasure trove of unexamined archives at including 
manuscripts, unpublished theses, cartoons, maps and images on twentieth-
century narcotics. The Library’s newspapers and manuscripts division would 
bring a whole new perspective to the issue of geonarcotic discourse.26 I was 
98 
 
accepted into the Library of Congress programme in June 2015, with a 
departure date of September. 
Limitations 
Interviews 
The design of my interviews is only briefly discussed here since the few I 
conducted were not used in the final project. I developed a list of expert 
interviewees who would supplement my archival data with contemporary 
understandings of the US’s relationship to international drug laws.27  
I settled on specific informal and semi-structured interviews based upon the 
expertise of the research participants. I included academics, journalists, 
politicians, their staff, and federal employees. I also looked to conduct oral 
histories of ex-narcotic agents. The Association of Former Federal Narcotics 
Agents was to be the gatekeeper. These potential participants would allow 
for the reconstruction of past events from the perspective of involved 
individuals.28 To better answer question B, I would use these findings to 
show supply logics influenced the daily workings of narcotic agents, and how 
credible they felt geonarcotic discourses regarding the weaponisation of 
heroin were.  
After arriving in Washington DC, I soon realised that expert interviews were 
problematic. The Association of Former Federal Narcotics Agents website 
only recruited ex and active Drug Enforcement Agency employees, not 
employees from the disbanded Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Second, 
bureaucratic processes stopped me using the findings in this project. For 
example, I secured an interview with a congressional aide on Capitol Hill to 
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talk about US drug policy. Because of UCL ethical guidelines, I had to keep 
these participants anonymous in my study and provide each participant with 
a consent form. Before the formal interview started, the aide refused to read 
the form, let alone sign it, and our conversation became frosty. While I 
assured the aid that it promised total anonymity, they informed me they were 
only able to have with me a general discussion of the Congressional 
member’s official stance on drug policy, and their role on certain 
congressional committees. 
Even when federal participants were happy to sign the form, they said they 
would have to refer it to their legal counsel for checking, a process which 
could take more than six months, longer than my fellowship in America 
lasted. The few interviews which I did secure consent for provided thin, 
unsubstantiated, and insufficient data. I spoke to a drugs advisor for a 2016 
presidential candidate, but they were too busy with the campaign to partake 
in a formal interview.  
As a condition of my scholarship, I had to work in the library at least four 
days a week, and attending the National Archives and conducting my few 
expert interviews took up my spare time. I decided to abandon interviews 
entirely, along with my comparative study of contemporary US drug policy. 
Reflecting on this decision here, I remain convinced it was correct. My oral 
history interviews would have involved an arduous search for federal 
narcotics agents from the 1950s and 60s who may not have been alive, or 
under witness protection. This would have taken time from consulting 
archives outside of the Library of Congress. Further research into the 
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subjective accounts of narcotic agents who worked at the FBN could be a 
future direction for postdoctoral research. 
At the same time, my archival work was going magnificently. I took heart 
from Dittmer’s suggestion that archival analysis can be undertaken ‘new 
interpretive resources’.29 Baker aptly describes the challenge, ‘all historical 
geography is source-bound: all historical geographers should know the full 
range of their sources and so of their evidence, thereby enabling them to 
push their research to its empirical limits’.30 Many of the archives I found in 
the Library of Congress (The Richmond P Hobson papers, the Elizabeth 
Washburn-Wright Papers) are neglected, or briefly mentioned in traditional 
histories of drug diplomacy. I also collected quantitative data from my 
archival research information relating to historical trends in medicinal 
narcotics, the ODP, and the flows of narcotics.  
The only salient information I did not gain from archival research were direct 
observations of the quotidian workings of drug diplomacy between the United 
States and international machinery. This had been something I had hoped to 
speak to ex-diplomats about, and I viewed it as desperately important. As 
Kuus suggests, there is a pressing need to understand better how ideas 
travel from international to national frameworks.31 This is particularly true for 
my focus on assemblages and flat ontologies. 
In 2016, I was invited to attend the 2016 Special Session of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations (UNGASS). The special session was 
devoted to the world drug problem. It would give me access to speak with a 
range of diplomats and employees at various UN drug agencies. While the 
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diplomatic process has dramatically changed since the period I was studying, 
the archival resources I consulted only gave a sense of diplomatic process; I 
wanted to see the real thing in action. I returned to the US in mid-April of 
2016 and attended the UNGASS event held at the UN campus. I also had 
identified further archival sources which I visited on the same trip. These 
included the DEA library in Virginia and the Harry J. Anslinger collections 
held at Pennsylvania State University.  
When attending UNGASS, I adopted a non-participant observation approach 
to the proceedings. There were practical and theoretical reasons for this. 
Practically, I anticipated that formal interviews would be inappropriate for the 
hectic event. Ethnographic research is best suited to long, in-depth 
engagements with specific groups and communities and was also entirely 
inappropriate for the three-day event. I agree with Merje Kuus’ sceptical 
intervention on ethnography and foreign policy. She states, ‘it is one thing to 
recognize the analytical value of ethnographic fieldwork; it is quite another to 
do it’.32 UNGASS was heavily securitised, which lead some civil society 
groups involved to protest both inside and outside the grounds of the UN. 
Members of the Drug Policy Alliance dressed up in 1930s garb and handed 
out fake newspapers which criticised the prohibition of drugs. UN security 
then confiscated these stylised newspapers. As security became stricter after 
this stunt, my access to key figures from the UN drug machinery was 
hindered. Observers were physically confined to specific parts of the UN 
campus, away from the diplomats and sensitive proceedings. Many events 
took place in restricted venues, devoid of both press and civil society. 
Furthermore, civil society delegates were given UN grounds passes which 
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varied from day to day, with changing access to certain events. One bizarre 
incident involved members of Students for Sensible Drug Policy, a charity 
focused on youth and drug use, being refused entry to a side-event on youth 
and drug use. 33 
Being so tantalisingly close to experts and practitioners of drug diplomacy 
gave a new salience to Kuus’ assertion that ‘foreign policy institutions are 
opaque and inaccessible by design’.34 While Kuus soldiered on with 
interviews in her research on diplomacy and expert knowledge at the EU, I 
decided to adopt the non-participant observation approach. I paid careful 
attention to the ways that diplomats presented their cases and how UN staff 
managed dissidence in the conference rooms.  
My findings from the UNGASS trip are valuable as they introduced me to the 
language and comportments of drug diplomacy, as well as an understanding 
of the roles and disputes between the CND, INCB, and UNODC. 
There were plenty of archives I was unable to visit in the United States that 
might have yielded interesting findings. Examples include the National 
Library of Medicine and the United Nations Archive in Maryland. These are 
archives that have been visited by other scholars who told me they were of 
limited worth. However, these archives could well form part of a future, 
postdoctoral research project. 
Another limit stems from access to specific files at NARA. Some files 
contained the names of narcotics agents who were still alive and were 
confidential. The same was true for the DEA library; while I was told I could 
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access their library if I knew what I wanted to research, the catch-22 was that 
I could not access the classified finding aids to locate what I wanted.  
Furthermore, the quantitative data I present is not infallible: much of it is 
incomplete due to the non-compliance from various nations, and many 
scholars have suspicions about the validity of data from the FBN.35 Showing 
where the numbers disagreed, or complimented the stories being told about 
foreign narcotics, helps to triangulate the account of geonarcotic discourse I 
give.  
Data analysis 
There is little research which considers the way a researcher can use 
speculative and materialist philosophies to inform their data analysis. Pierre 
and Jackson addressed this problem in a special issue of Qualitative 
Inquiry.36 In this issue, Bronwyn Davies undertook a Baradian-inspired 
analysis of childhood anger.37 She viewed anger not as an inherent emotive 
force, but rather as a flow of intensities between multiple subjects. She calls 
this a diffractive analysis. She did not look to analyse anger inherent in her 
subjects, but rather the affectual relation of shared anger. For Davies ‘the 
question that emerges, then, is not who was to blame, but who and what 
came to matter’.38 Her approach can be transposed into my approach to my 
archival sources. I searched for the authoritative sentiments of authority 
figures or individuals who substantiated geonarcotic discourses and 
analysed how these discourses were emergent and dependent on the 
interactions between humans and non-humans. This is reflected in my 
coding and can be seen in the appendix. 
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The first step in analyzing data involved deciding which documents among 
the mass of sources were useful, relevant, and reliable. I had collected far 
too many pages of data in my visits to NARA and the Library of Congress. 
An initial reading of my selected data quickly revealed which sources were 
useful. Many texts were redundant, or outside of the timeframe I was 
interested in. To further limit my dataset, I homed in on official data on 
American delegations in international settings, which meant focusing on 
official documentation from the FBN. I also looked for technical reports that 
would help develop accounts of ‘informed materials’. Here, official statistics 
and reports, particularly the FBN’s annual Traffic in Narcotics and Other 
Dangerous Drugs reports, and UN’s Bulletin on Narcotics were fundamental. 
These specialised reports documented changes in yields, purities, seizures, 
potency, and price of narcotics. These variables helped to understand the 
ways agency was spread between human agents (farmers, diplomats, users) 
and the materials (opium, its derivatives, and technologies that improved 
yields or created entirely new substances). The personal collections of key 
figures (Harry Anslinger, Richmond Pearson Hobson, Elizabeth Washburn-
Wright) were also coded. They dealt less with proceedings from debates at 
the LoN and UN, but more on their personal understandings of the world 
drug problem. The Newspaper Division of the Library of Congress, plus the 
clippings kept by the aforementioned figures, were thus vital for 
conceptualising geonarcotic discourse in the US. A full list of archives I used 
can be found at the end of the thesis. 
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Coding my data 
For some scholars, the ubiquity of coding has meant that it is equated with 
data analysis per se.39 This is a superficial reading of the actual process of 
data analysis. I do not believe that simply because coding is a dominant tool 
in data analysis that it is used by researchers with ‘nothing much to say’.40 I 
instead argue that the quality of coding can be determined by the extent to 
which a researcher outlines their process and reasons for adopting a coding 
strategy. It is this I turn to now. 
First, I coded to categories the data by its subject matter. This was important 
for analysing the geonarcotic discourses: if a source referred to the opium 
evil, it was coded as an important signifier. I also coded data by its reliability. 
When referring to reliability, I do not mean replicable and repeatable, but the 
more popular understanding of a source as trustworthy, authoritative, and 
respected by the public. Hearst newspapers, while today known to be great 
engines of propaganda, were often the only source of information available 
to the public on the world drug problem.  
Etic and emic coding was also used, and both are justified by the theoretical 
approach I was taking. Assemblage theory led to deductive analysis; it was a 
theory applied to my data, whereas the actual workings of the materials were 
often inductive: the interactions between humans and non-humans in the 
assemblages emerged from the data itself. Mixing etic and emic forced me to 
capture ‘things that [were] always in the midst of unfolding’.41 Coding helped 
problematise the geographical hierarchy of the international sphere where 
the LoN and UN drug machinery is the most important, followed by the 
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national (FBN, US Congress) and finally local and state laws. My coding 
showed where these scales butted up against one another or overlapped.  
The codes were also significant for thinking about the data in new ways. For 
example, the relationship between the US and international law and the 
decisions over where international drug machinery would be located were 
both salient to my analysis. I developed this technique from Stephen Legg’s 
analysis of the LoN, particularly noting how he troubled the nested scalar 
analysis where the international sphere encompasses and eclipses the 
national and local.42 
Quantitative analysis 
Since I collected technical documents, I amassed quantitative data on 
historical trends in narcotic trades, production, and use. These reports, 
compiled by the FBN and the PCOB, provide fascinating insights into the 
information that legislators and the press were working with. While the 
figures should be deemed inherently unreliable (either distorted for political 
gains or often missing vital contributions from stubborn nations), they show 
which empirical material was used to substantiate various discourses of the 
opium evil or medicinal shortages. To understand these trends, I had to use 
basic descriptive statistics and Geographical Information Systems.43 While 
these techniques were useful for presenting and visualising my data, they 
also help bridge a gap that has been called the quantitative-qualitative divide 
in human geography and new materialism more broadly, which has been 
overly reliant on qualitative data analysis and presentation.44 
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Dowling et al., raise an important point about data presentation in qualitative 
non-human projects: scholars tend to rely on textual data.45 I supplement my 
qualitative analysis with quantitative analysis of technical data from the 
archive. Figures were made in Tableau and illustrate changes in treaty 
ratifications, narcotic production, seizures, or chemistry. I have opted for the 
simplest line and bar plots, maps, the occasional table, and a single map. 
This helps the reader in two ways. First, by substantiating the claims I make 
about geonarcotic discourse and diplomatic processes. Secondly, by 
providing yardsticks that the reader can use to compare the size of legal and 
illegal flows. 
Quantitative analysis allowed the materials to be conceived of differently. By 
examining the numbers, we can get a sense of the scope of the problems 
drug diplomats wrestled with and newspapers reported/exaggerated. They 
speak to the importance of material changes. For example, the massive 
increase in the use of poppy straw technology in Eastern Europe (discussed 
in chapter three) caused changes in the narcotic geographies and 
importance of players at the LoN. 
Data presentation and chapter structure 
The chapters and material have been ordered to show how the drug control 
assemblage was made of multiple material and discursive elements. Each 
chapter deals with a specific element as it changed over time: first is the 
traditional history; second is geonarcotic discourses; third is materiality and 
its role in diplomatic proceedings, and the fourth chapter is a discussion of 
attempts to determine narcotics. In using this structure, I depart from a 
chronological approach used by many other drug historians.46 The 
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discussion and analysis take place within each chapter, which spans the 
breadth of the project (1909-1961). In presenting my analysis this way, I 
analyse changes in geonarcotic discourse and materiality within the specific 
historical context, instead of a single, ahistorical analytical chapter. This 
shows how the assemblage of drug control was emergent and immanent. 
Methodological contributions 
Sixteen years ago, after the tenth anniversary of critical geopolitics, Klaus 
Dodds wrote that ‘much critical geopolitical writing on foreign policy and 
national identity has been concerned (perhaps excessively) with 
representation rather than the mass of textual and bodily practices which 
enable such expressions of geopower’.47 The non-human-human division 
has now become a methodological debate. As Hayden Lorimer suggests, 
‘there is a widely shared sense among non-representational and more-than-
human geographers that methods are lagging behind theoretical develop-
ments and that the discipline requires methodological invigoration and 
innovation’.48 
In the seven years since that intervention, political geographers have crafted 
fascinating new methodological stances and – in some cases – methods for 
engaging with the more-than-human project. In their study of nationalism and 
affect Militz & Müller travelled to Azerbaijan to examine the ‘banalities of 
belonging’ in national ceremonies.49 They used ethnographic fieldwork and 
what they term ‘affective writing’ to capture the shared feelings of belonging. 
This turn towards banal nationalism has proved fruitful, other scholars have 
examined maps and their logos to explore Jordanian nationalism.50 For 
Dittmer, analysing the more-than-human involves exploring how laughter 
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spreads among those engaged in the Model UN.51 As critical geopolitics 
turned away from the voice of the author towards the consumption of 
geopolitics by active audiences,52 a concern for human and non-human 
interactions became commonplace. My contribution to the discipline’s 
methodological development is to think about how the role of the non-human 
can be conceptualised in the archive. 
I do not believe historical data is always ‘a blockage for methodological 
innovation’.53 Contrary to Dowling, I show how archives can be examined or 
thought of as more-than-human: what an archive can do is limited by what 
we expect of it. The first methodological contribution I offer is that 
informational traces of objects in the archive can yield a new materialist 
perspective. In making this claim, I draw from a small cadre of 
interdisciplinary scholars who have discussed historical objects and their role 
in organising institutions and individuals. Cunha et al., focused their analysis 
of the Cambodian Genocide of 1971 and the objects that turned 
extraordinary violence into a normal experience of everyday life.54 In 
analysing their data, they grouped their objects into organisational, symbolic 
and administrative groups. They then developed a list of banal objects which 
helped normalise and sanitise the process of conducting genocide. They 
suggest that clipboards, pens, and even copies of Mao’s ‘little red book’ 
helped to bureaucratise genocide during the reign of the Khmer Rouge. They 
believe there is a pressing need to examine how such trinkets helped 
organise systems of murder and racism. In my work, I seek to invert their 
findings, showing how powders, pills, and potions became the objects of 
intense scientific and geopolitical focus. Following Martin Müller,55 we might 
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say it was through the enunciative dimension of an assemblage – the textual 
accounts that dramatised the danger of the chemistry of narcotics – that let 
geonarcotic discourses grow such deep roots in the American psyche.  
Second, I show that materialising the archive requires reading it differently. 
While I have consulted the same archives as previous scholars on the topic 
of drug diplomacy, I have examined them with an entirely different gaze. By 
conceptualising narcotics as informed, those interested in the materiality of 
archives have a method for extracting what Barry calls the in silico, or digital 
(in my case, non-digital) existence of narcotics as information.56 They were 
understood through a wider set of material/textual referents: their wrapping, 
packaging, strength, presence on a ship's itinerary, and of course, the 
country from which the seizure was coming.  
Third, archival sources should not be seen merely as documents, but rather 
as artefacts with capacities to influence drug diplomacy.57 For example, in 
the ODP, many documents were the product of expert knowledge, materials 
and bureaucratic procedures. They were authoritative statements or 
accounts regarding the chemical composition of opioids and drugs. Latour 
and Woolgar call such documents ‘inscription devices’.58 These devices 
solidified certain understandings about opium within wider networks, allowing 
other scientists to attempt to replicate their findings and understand opium in 
a standardised way. Many of these inscription devices are ‘more or less 
certain, more or less able to hold together, more or less precarious’.59 These 
inscription devices are more than the textual traces of narcotics; they are 
political attempts to create scientific truths about what opium was, rather than 
what it could be.
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The Traditional History of Drug Control 
In this chapter, I provide a brief history of narcotic control from 1909-1961. I 
structure my account through inflexion points that mark substantial changes 
in the international drug control assemblage. These points are the 
international conventions and protocols to which the world slowly became 
beholden. By telling this traditional story of drug control – through the desires 
and tactics of diplomats – I ultimately show it is insufficient by pointing out 
what it doesn’t tell us about: the role of geonarcotic discourse and materiality. 
It is a control chapter on which each of the following chapters builds. 
At the beginning of the twentieth-century, narcotic consumption was rife and 
widespread, but the type of narcotic, and method of consumption, varied 
geographically. McAllister’s typology of nations distinguishes between raw 
opium that was shipped or manufactured into opiates, opioids, and 
smoking/eating opium. As I show in chapters three and four, other 
information about narcotics was essential in diplomatic debates. 
Geographical factors influenced the morphine content, which in turn 
influenced the price and the user of the product. In later years, the strength 
of the opium, most often defined by its percentage of morphine, meant 
certain countries were welcomed into the legal market whereas others were 
not. 
The United States was one of the first countries to confront the problem of 
unchecked opium use. The concern came from medical practitioners who 
wanted to separate their profession from separate charlatans, quacks and 
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feckless peddlers.1 As Malleck suggests ‘opiates played an important role … 
in physicians’ sense of professionalism’.2 In 1903, the Pharmacists 
Association proposed selling opium and cocaine with a prescription. In the 
same year, Congress had a vote to enforce federal prohibition of certain 
types of drug use, which failed to reach a two-thirds majority in both houses.3 
The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 was the first American legislative act to 
provide consumers with information about their medical remedies, requiring 
manufacturers to label which ingredients were included in their substances. 
This legislation recognised certain substances were harmful, and that 
consumers needed more information about what was within. The second law 
was the Smoking Opium Exclusion Acts of 1909, which banned opium 
imports of prepared opium for smoking. As Gierenger argues, this was not 
done to tackle a public health crisis, but to curry favour with the Chinese, 
who had long suffered under the British trade and fought two separate wars 
to try and end opium abuse.4 Smoking opium was, traditionally, a popular 
pastime among Chinese migrants. If the US could help habitual users end 
their habit, they would distinguish themselves from the British. While the US 
didn’t enact federal legislation banning certain opiate exports and imports 
until 1922, the State Department disliked the international opium trade in the 
early 1900s. It afforded the UK, Dutch, and French empires dominance in 
Asian markets. The British would sell Indian opium to China, predominantly 
for smoking, and made substantial money off the trade.  
The Philippines monopoly 
Traditional historians such as McAllister are not unaware of geopolitical 
influences on drug control. He notes that when the US annexed the 
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Philippines in 1898, it colonised not only a war-torn nation but an opium 
monopoly (whereby opium was sold and taxed legally by the government).5 
Some 200 opium dens existed in Binondo, where Manila’s Chinatown was 
located. Initially, the US benefitted from a 45% sales tax on opium imports, 
with the McKinley administration tolerating the trade.6 Two events led to a 
change in attitude towards the monopoly. First, an outbreak of cholera in 
1902 led to increased opium consumption. Narcotics induce constipation, 
which was then an effective method of tackling diarrhoea and dehydration. 
Second, the US government worried that opium’s availability on the conflict-
ridden island would repeat the consumption trends of the Civil War. Addiction 
would rise as painkillers were doled out to the wounded, and troops stationed 
in the Philippines would smuggle raw and smoking opium back to the 
continental United States.  
The US had to act to control the rapidly spiralling epidemic. The Philippines 
Commission was appointed to tackle the problem. In 1905, the Commission 
created a subcommittee to ‘Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic 
therein’. Among its members was the Episcopal Bishop Charles Henry Brent, 
an ardent anti-opium campaigner. Brent and his compatriots sailed to 
countries and colonies with legal trades in opium (Taiwan, Java, China, 
Malay, and Burma, which was split then into Upper Burma and Lower 
Burma),7 to investigate how different countries managed opium consumption. 
The Commission reported back with two possible solutions. The first was to 
continue administering the Spanish opium monopoly, with one tweak. The 
US government would supply opium to users but slowly reduce the purity of 
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smoking opium and wean users off narcotics altogether. Opium monopolies 
had long been in use in Asia, particularly in Formosa (Taiwan), where this 
strategy had been used with some success.8 Under this system, a central 
authority or local government body would import opium and sell it to users. 
The second, favoured by Bishop Brent, was a gradual shift to prohibition 
which would provide users with time to wean themselves off the drug. 
The first proved attractive to US lawmakers as prices could be kept artificially 
high to keep consumption low, and tax revenues could be used to fund the 
rehabilitation of users. Opium users would have to register, allowing the 
government to keep pace with the number of users and the extent to which 
they imbibed. The downside was that a government monopoly also 
encouraged illegal imports at lower prices than the inflated government 
prices.  
Congress examined the idea, and it was approved by the Governor of the 
Philippines William Taft. That Congress even discussed it caused an uproar 
among Temperance advocates. Led by Dr Hamilton-Wright, another forceful 
advocate for anti-narcotic policies, the more stringent wing of the 
Temperance movement strongly opposed the opium monopoly on moral, 
rather than medical or economic grounds. Drug use, they insisted, was a 
moral failing, and could only be rectified by penance and abstinence, not 
government intervention. In 1903, The New York Times had rallied against 
the monopoly. 9 With this unfavourable public opinion, Congress scrapped 
the plan. They adopted the second recommendation. The US would 
gradually restrict the sale of Philippine opium over three years from 1907-
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1910 to eventual prohibition. The three-year period is significant. It gave 
users with high tolerance time to convalesce and dilute their dosage. Even 
the fervent Brent supported this period of withdrawal, noting that an 
immediate cessation of the trade would do little to stop cravings of users. 
While he abhorred the trade, he did not demonise users.  
Brent’s position signals an important point: Temperance advocates did not 
always agree about the best methods for tackling addiction. Some believed 
treatment should also be available for those in withdrawal, with some 
registration system for addicts. Others, such as Hamilton-Wright, took a 
much stricter view that that immediate cessation was the only hope.  
Scholars have not explored how this early version of the opium evil discourse 
influenced the decision regarding the opium monopoly. McAllister has 
investigated the Temperance movement’s attacks on the British opium trade, 
but not the Philippines monopoly itself, noting merely that ‘Washington 
imposed a policy of suppression, excepting medical needs, upon the 
Philippines’.10 This omission is significant; the Philippine opium monopoly 
used a strategy depended on morphine content; reducing the strength of 
opium was a public health strategy. If the amount of morphine were reduced, 
then users would be slowly weaned off opium. But for Hamilton-Wright, 
tinkering with the morphine content did not get to the route of the problem: 
the foreign production and trade in opium.  
In March 1906, an interim law was established where the opium was sorted 
by the degree of preparation. Crude and raw opium of up to 1kg was charged 
at 2.50 Philippines Pesos (p) cooked and prepared opium at the same weight 
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was charged at p7.50 with import costs of p2.50 and p0.5 respectively. The 
prices of licenses for opium varied. Users had to pay p0.5 retailers p200, and 
distributors p1000.11 While Bamero notes that the difference of prices 
between raw and prepared opium showed that potency was linked to price, 
little has been said about the way price, type of opium, and potency were 
manipulated for political purposes.  
Congress took a stronger tone than Bishop Brent and sided with Hamilton-
Wright. They overturned the interim law and decreed that, on 8th March 1908, 
all opium paraphernalia was to be handed into the government. All Filipino 
consumption was banned unless it was for medical use, and all non-Filipino 
(mainly Chinese) use was to be banned in three years. Under the new laws, 
strict fines and imprisonment awaited Filipino residents found to be 
possessing opium. Foreigners in breach of the law were deported. Opium 
prohibition won its first overseas victory, and opium was transformed from a 
palliative and pastime into a social menace wrought by foreign powers. 
Hoffmann suggests this punitive shift was caused by economic concerns 
over the cost of addiction to the Philippines,12 but I argue it was partly 
geopolitical: the US wished to show it was stricter than other Asian nations, 
that it was sympathetic to China’s plight, and that it would not countenance a 
colonial and barbaric trade. A critical account of the geopolitics and posturing 
of various nations is discussed further in chapter two. 
Prohibition in the Philippines led to legislative changes in the continental US 
in 1909. opium problem was mostly believed to be a foreign issue confined to 
Asia (one 1848 estimate suggested 27% of the Chinese population were 
119 
 
habitual opium users), but the problems in the Philippines brought it closer to 
home.13 The Smoking Opium Exclusion Acts of 1909 banned what was 
perceived as a Chinese behaviour (the racial elements of this argument are 
discussed in chapter two).  
The 1909 International Opium Commission 
Soon after prohibition in the Philippines, America’s ambitions for narcotic 
prohibition went global. Brent canvassed the Philippines Governor William 
Taft, and President Roosevelt, to create the first ever International Opium 
Commission to study the opium problem in the Far East. Brent blended the 
foreign trade with moralism and geopolitics. The US had already bilaterally 
agreed not to ship opium to China; a US-led commission would help repair 
damaged relations due to the Chinese Exclusion Acts of 1882 and Opium 
Smoking acts of 1909. The State Department agreed to the commission with 
one crucial caveat: the commission’s findings were to be advisory, and 
delegates were not given plenipotentiary powers.14  
The 1909 Opium Commission was to be held at The Hague. As invitations 
were circulated, a protest was raised from uninvited nations who demanded 
a seat at the table. Even worse, Turkey refused to participate. With its 
blooming, lucrative, high-morphine poppy crops, Turkey ostensibly did not 
attend because it had no representative in the Far East, but also because it 
did not desire international narcotic control.15 In a shaky start to the 
international efforts, Turkey’s absence signalled that producer nations held 
strong negotiating positions. One recalcitrant producer nation could quite 
easily sabotage multi-lateral efforts by ramping up its production. The 
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invitation list was expanded to include Austria-Hungary, China, France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Persia, 
Portugal, Russia, and Siam (Thailand). Of these nations, only Siam and 
China were independent Asian territories.  
When the Opium Commission met in February 1909, nations with little 
cultivation but plenty of demand dictated the parameters of the debates. Dr 
Hamilton-Wright led the American delegation. He viewed the problem 
through a supply-focussed lens and was keen to enamour the Chinese 
government to the US position on strict control.16 He argued colonial opium 
hurt the US trade with China in other goods, and offered a stringent definition 
of what legitimate usages of opium should be. This excluded all quasi-
medical uses that involved eating and smoking, practices that were illegal, 
and deemed non-medical in the United States. Apart from Hsu, who focuses 
on Japanese legislation in Taiwan,17 scholars haven’t dwelled on the 
significance of this division.18 In chapter three I will develop the argument 
that the division between illegal and legal or medical/non-medical uses of 
narcotics was more about the type of narcotic in question than usage.  
Colonial powers immediately objected to the American proposal, sensing a 
threat to their established trades. They believed opium smoking was a 
cultural behaviour deeply embedded in each country. Consumption was not 
a matter for international discussion; it was an issue for governments to 
legislate. They won the argument. The Commission recommended that each 
delegation ‘move its government to take measures for the gradual 
suppression of the practice of opium smoking in its territories and 
possessions, with due regard to the varying circumstances in each 
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country’.19 The point was moot. The Commission delegates had no 
plenipotentiary powers, and governments ignored the diluted 
recommendations. Only the US and Canada would begin to establish strict 
national legislation. In 1911, Canada successfully prohibited drugs with the 
Opium and Drug Act. It would take the US another two years to even begin 
this process. 
The 1912 International Opium Convention 
Following the minor successes of the first commission, the United States 
pushed for a second, binding conference with support from Brent’s ally (and 
now President) Howard Taft. Undeterred by the Shanghai meeting, they 
devised loftier goals: an international system that regulated countries who 
produced and manufactured opium, as well as some early efforts at 
interdiction against smugglers on the high seas.20 An attempt to discuss 
interdiction reveals that American diplomats were interested in supply 
control, rather than demand-based measures: responsibility for smuggling 
lay with the producing nations, rather than those facilitating the demand. 
While it is well established in the literature that economic policies that – apart 
from price – try to manage the demand of psychoactive substances are often 
ineffective,21 the geopolitical significance of a supply-based approach 
remains under-theorised. I suggest the American delegates knew that 
consumption was an off-limits topic. They instead tried to tackle the 
production of poppy crops and their movement from country-to-country. 
Twelve nations participated in the 1912 Convention and met at The Hague. 
The conference proved more successful than the 1909 Commission. Article 
One of the Convention required countries to ‘enact effective laws or 
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regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium’.22 It 
also led to states agreeing to suppress opium smoking, although no 
timetable was ever set for a clear plan. Chapter Four provided specific 
measures to tackle the traffic in China. It was also the first time that 
manufacturing states had their trade in opiates curtailed, although states only 
had to use their ‘best efforts’ to tackle the trade. This allowed Germany and 
France to escape serious action. The treaty behoved signatories to develop 
pharmacy laws and regulations on the import and export of medicinal 
morphine to other nations. Articles three and four only placed restrictions on 
the countries exporting raw opium to those who already had national 
legislation. Many nations who had not enacted legislation that prohibited the 
trade, effectively nullifying article four. Morphine and heroin were left 
unregulated. Before the outbreak of World War One, only eight ratifications 
of the 1912 Convention had been received. More would not come until 1919 
when countries ratified the Paris Peace Conference and the 1912 
Convention as part of that process. 
Despite the lacklustre progress on opiates, the minor successes with opium 
smoking were greeted with joy by the Temperance movement in the US. For 
Speaker, the results of the galvanised domestic support for further drug laws 
in the US. In 1914, 4,000 people stormed down Pennsylvania Avenue in 
Washington DC, singing ‘Onward Christian Men and Women’ to protest 
alcohol and drug abuse both in the United States and the Philippines.23  
 A disjuncture soon emerged between America’s international agenda and its 
domestic narcotic policies regarding opiates. Morphine abuse was still rife, 
and Dr Hamilton-Wright noted, ‘we have made ourselves a bit amusing by 
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the blithe way in which we called a conference to study the sins of others, to 
discover through it we are the greatest sinners’.24 Hamilton-Wright was 
questioning the US’s ability to lead international proceedings without strict 
domestic legislation regarding opiates.25 American politicians were united in 
their goal of narcotic control that was not limited to opium smoking. When the 
US did enact legislation, it helped shape the rigorous approach to prohibition 
that located the problem outside of the country. As we shall see, this caused 
them to clash with other nations that favoured domestic market controls to 
reduce opiate consumption.26 
The 1914 Harrison Narcotics Act 
The most important act of the early years of US drug control was the 
Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914. Musto states it consolidated the position of 
medical professionals as the legitimate arbiters of opium dispensation. The 
lengthy description of the act reveals a regulatory, rather than a prohibitive 
goal.  
An act to provide for the registration of, with collectors of internal 
revenue, and to impose a special tax upon all persons who produce, 
import, manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or 
give away opium or coca leaves, their salts, derivatives, or 
preparations, and for other purposes.27  
The Harrison Act stipulated a sales tax on all narcotic purchases and 
required all dispensers to register with the federal government. Dispensers 
were required to prescribe for all purchases, meaning that doctors and 
licensed chemists could legally provide opium and opiates to customers. This 
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act paved the way towards calculating the size of America’s narcotic 
appetite.  
In 1917, the Harrison Act guidelines were amended. Addiction was no longer 
treated as a disease, but rather a criminal, moral, and individual failing. The 
new guidelines banned the practice of maintenance therapy (providing 
addicts with legal supplies of narcotics and reducing an addict’s dosage until 
they were weaned off their prescription). The Narcotic Division of the 
Treasury employed some 170 agents to enforce the Act. The guidelines 
quickly led to court cases and disputes.28 While some physicians fought the 
rulings tooth and nail, the medical and pharmaceutical dispensers were 
eventually cajoled, incarcerated, and browbeaten into accepting the new 
federal drug approach. This would not be the last time the medical 
practitioners challenged the government on what they could and couldn’t do 
with narcotics. 
These early successes in prohibitive law are attributable, in large part, to the 
hard-line members of the Temperance Movement including Dr Hamilton-
Wright, the WCTU and ASL. These groups had formidable resources; they 
were spending millions of dollars on lobbying for alcohol prohibition. 
However, they were aided by medical practitioners who had first worried 
about a blurry division between medicine and quackery. By specifying 
legitimate uses of narcotics, the US created a system that enforced these 
divisions. This had the effect of discursively severing licit medicinal use from 
recreational, illicit use. The US would advocate for this division internationally 
time and time again at the League and UN.  
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The League of Nations 
With the end of the First World War in 1918, a new international approach 
was needed to make sure the world had a coordinated approach to ending 
opium smoking and also providing enough medicine. The newly created 
League of Nations in Geneva was charged with administering the 1912 
Convention and began its work on narcotics control on December 15th, 
1920.29 The United States did not join the League, but it would observe the 
regulatory proceedings through the watchful eyes of Dr Hamilton-Wright and 
Bishop Brent. They pushed the American agenda into proceedings. 
During the Versailles Peace Process in January 1919, a clause was inserted 
into the peace treaties mandating ratification of the 1912 Opium Convention 
by Turkey and Germany. As McAllister suggests, ‘with the stroke of a pen, 
the requirement of the 1912 treaty for near-universal adherence was 
satisfied’.30 This was the first time Germany and Turkey, two important 
manufacturing and producer nations respectively, agreed to tackle the trade 
and consumption of opium, but recall that the 1912 Opium Convention only 
dealt with raw opium, processed opium for smoking, and medical opium; its 
provisions for opiates were heavily diluted. With opium smoking on the 
decline but opiate usage and manufacturing rising, the 1912 Convention 
quickly became insufficient for tackling abuse of opiates. 
When the US Senate refused to join the LoN in 1919, American interests 
were only represented in ad-hoc functions (individual expert testimony and 
employment in the League). In 1920, the League of Nations Secretariat, 
recognising the sprawling world drug problem, delegated drug operations to 
two different agencies. The first was the Advisory Committee on the Traffic in 
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Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs, notable by its common name ‘The 
Opium Advisory Committee’ (OAC). The OAC was the fulcrum of drug 
operations, staffed by an advisory board of experts from various nations who 
provided political and legislative support for the League. It was the political 
arm of the League, dealing with the creation of international agreements. The 
second agency was the League Health Committee (which would become the 
World Health Organisation). It dealt with the classification of new substances 
and the science of addiction.31  
American diplomats deemed access to the League’s drug deliberations vital 
for keeping Americans safe from drug abuse, but they had to contend with 
public hostility towards the League.32 Many in the League hoped Americans 
could slowly integrate with League functions without officially joining. The 
Secretary-General of the League formally invited the United States to join the 
OAC in 1923, and the Harding Administration accepted and sent its first 
delegation to the OAC in the same year. It was comprised of Stephen G. 
Porter, former chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Bishop Brent, 
and former Surgeon-General Rupert Blue.  
The 1925 Conventions, American withdrawal and the creation of the 
PCOB 
In early 1924, preparations were made for two narcotics conferences (called 
the Geneva Opium Conference) to be held from November 1924 to February 
1925. When the American delegation was sent to discuss proposals for a 
new international treaty at the 1925 Geneva Opium Conference, their 
message of stringent drug control rang clear: elimination of excess 
production, the end of opium monopolies under governmental control, and 
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most importantly, that quasi-medical use would be expunged from future 
treaties.33 The Americans also hoped to tackle opium smoking, but colonial 
powers dismissed both proposals almost entirely. They argued that the illegal 
traffic would increase should they relinquish control of their opium 
monopolies. They also suggested opium smoking was not harmful enough to 
count as part of the world drug problem. Even if it was, the Royal British 
Commission in India had argued that medical use overlapped so heavily with 
abuse of opium it was practically impossible to separate the two.34  
The first conference resulted in signatories agreeing only to sell opium 
through legal monopolies. It also produced an agreement to phase out opium 
smoking in fifteen years. The US was unhappy with both pledges. They had 
denounced the opium monopoly in the Philippines, and fifteen years did not 
satisfy their desire for rapid change.  
The second of these conferences (named the Geneva Conference) was 
attended by 41 nations and proved more controversial. The American 
delegation looked to expand narcotic control beyond opium to cocaine and 
cannabis. 
American preparations for this second conference proceeded from a tough 
stance.35 Porter, Brent, and Blue came with an ironclad resolution passed 
unanimously in 1924 by both Houses. The resolution stated that international 
drug control had 
Utterly failed to suppress illicit traffic … without adequate restriction 
upon production, the source or root of the evil … has resulted in 
extensive and flagrant violations of the laws by reason of the fact that 
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the great commercial value of these drugs, the large financial gains 
derived from handling them, and the smallness of their bulk, which 
renders detection in transportation and sale exceedingly difficult, have 
induced and encouraged the unscrupulous to divert enormous 
quantities into the channels of illicit international traffic, thereby 
rendering partially, if not wholly, ineffective the [1912] treaty and laws 
adopted in pursuance thereof.36 
The Americans had noted the materiality of opiates compared to opium. 
Morphine, heroin, and codeine were usually powdered, potent, and purer 
than opium, and thus harder to detect while being more profitable and 
dangerous. They used the properties of narcotics to shift the focus away 
from usage towards the production of raw opium and manufactured opiates. 
The Geneva Convention was the first time that opiates, or semi-synthetics 
such as morphine and codeine, were discussed. 
The US startled other delegates with their hard-line, non-negotiable stance. 
They effectively demanded the League place non-negotiable limits on the 
world’s annual production of raw opiates. This would be set at the amounts 
required for medical and scientific usage. Only China and Egypt supported 
the American position, yet Egypt produced no raw opium for export. Before 
the civil war in China, opium production had almost been eradicated due to 
internal control. The British had also agreed to reduce their exports of Indian 
opium to the nation (the Ten Years Agreements) but had then drastically 
increased exports in 1917 to account for 9/10ths of the world’s production.37  
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Colonial nations deflected the focus from their production by pointing to the 
vast outflows of illicit opium from China and the Pacific. The increase in 
cultivation was attributed to warlords used opium to fund internal skirmishes. 
The Chinese revolution from 1925-1927 meant that — in later years — there 
was little governmental control to enforce drug law.  
Another sticking point came from disputes over defining what a dangerous 
substance was. In one draft of the treaty, Articles 10 and 11 of the 
Convention stipulated that the League’s Health Committee would advise and 
recommend to the Secretary-General that a substance be subject to 
international control. Each judgement was to be based on generally 
recognised scientific research. The trouble was that research into addiction 
was not generally recognised. Many countries disagreed about the addictive 
potential of opiates and other synthetic drugs.  
The final straw for the Americans came when the British Government forced 
a change in the wording of the 1925 Geneva Convention’s final document. 
The phrasing was changed from ‘limitation to strictly medicinal and scientific 
needs’ to ‘limitation to legitimate needs’.38 This rendered prepared opium for 
smoking and eating entirely legal, and would enable the enormous 
consumption of prepared opium in the Far East indefinitely. The 
Congressional resolution stipulated the American delegation could not 
renege on their proposals. Brent, Porter, and Blue had no choice. They 
withdrew from proceedings, quickly followed by the Chinese.39 The chair of 
conferences — British veteran diplomat Malcolm Delevingne — sought to 
assuage the Americans with assurances that the American proposals 
embodied the eventual goal of the League’s mission. The British even 
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promised to agree to the eventual suppression of opium smoking in their 
territories. It wasn’t enough. So enraged was Porter that he noted, on record, 
that ‘if when I get back to America anybody says, “League of Nations” to me, 
he ought to say it conveniently near a hospital’.40  
Despite these setbacks, the second conference established the Permanent 
Central Opium Board (PCOB) — the precursor to today’s International 
Narcotic Control Board (INCB) — to police the provisions of the 1912 and 
1925 conventions. The PCOB was tasked with collecting statistics on imports 
and exports of narcotics from signatory nations. It was hoped these numbers 
would provide an estimate of an upper limit for global raw opium production. 
This could be administered and policed by the neutral PCOB. The 
conference ended on the 2nd February 1925 and passed into law on the 25th 
September 1928.  
Disagreement over the efficacy and ethics of opium monopolies reared its 
head again in 1929. A League Commission produced a report on the relative 
value of prohibition compared to the opium monopoly as two models of drug 
control. The report concluded both systems had shown some reduction in 
trafficking,41 but both encouraged unscrupulous smugglers to produce and 
import a commodity that was in high demand. A year later, the US 
responded: it counter-investigated in the Philippines. The trip was led by Mrs 
Washburn-Wright, an ardent anti-narcotics campaigner who had taken up 
her late husband (Dr Hamilton-Wright’s) mantle. In 1930, Congress sent 
Wright to the islands, where she reported on the success of prohibition 
compared to the monopoly system. She conceded that a great deal of opium 
was smuggled into the nation.42 Contraband came from Persia, the Yunnan 
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peninsula in China, Hong Kong, North Borneo and Amoy. 43 Both systems 
were ill-equipped to tackle the illegal trade, and smuggling would be widely 
discussed in the 1930s.44 She used these findings to discredit the idea that 
opium monopolies could reduce illegal trafficking. With so much contraband 
on the island, there would be little incentive for users to register through a 
monopoly system. 
The significance of these reports and the evidence they presented have not 
been theorised from a geopolitical perspective. In chapter three, I examine 
the disputes over the opium monopoly in more depth. 
Enter Harry Anslinger  
1930 was a pivotal moment in American and International Drug Law. The 
Federal Bureau of Narcotics (hereafter FBN) was created in 1930. Harry 
Anslinger became Commissioner and de facto czar of US drugs policy. His 
recommendations came from Herbert Hoover and William Randolph 
Hearst.45 With a long career in diplomatic service both behind and in front of 
him, Anslinger would shape the legislative narcotic landscape of the US, the 
League, and UN for the next thirty-five years. Anslinger dominated the FBN 
by suffering no usurpers. He had been tutored by State Department senior 
negotiator Stuart Fuller, a man who was deeply sceptical of the League’s 
commitment to drug control. Along with later State Department counterparts 
(Joseph Stilwell and George Morlock), Anslinger would lead US drug 
diplomacy until he was forced out by the mandatory retirement age of 75 in 
1962.  
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It is essential to describe the FBN, as some view it as an institution that dealt 
with solely enforcing the law against illegal drugs.46 This is far from the truth. 
While the FBN did engage in well-publicised drug busts, much of its work 
was clerical, administering legal narcotics and the 200,000 wholesalers, 
pharmacists and doctors who handled and dispensed them.47 The FBN was 
charged with the licensing, auditing, and regulation of the US’s legal market 
in controlled substances, as well as educating the public about the dangers 
of narcotics. It made estimates of the nation’s medicinal needs, issued 
permits for the import of opium, examined, weighed and assayed these 
imports at US ports, stored opium in secure facilities, divided the opium into 
quotas, and licensed them to American manufacturers. It also audited 
manufacturers, chemists, doctors, and pharmacists. As we shall see, it was 
these legal duties, and the powers the FBN wielded through them, that gave 
its Commissioner international influence. Anslinger had complete control 
over the narcotics bought and sold by the US. This was a powerful position, 
and is perhaps the most overlooked aspect of his tenure. It is fully discussed 
in chapter three.  
The 1931 Conventions 
1931 marked the negotiation and passage of two international events. First, 
an Agreement Concerning the Suppression of Opium Smoking, held in 
Bangkok on 27 November. This agreement was designed to highlight the 
problem of opium smoking in Asia, and the signatories (Table 1) pledged to 
stop sales to minors and curb opium use by limiting sales to government 
retailers (opium monopolies). The measures were largely tokenistic. 
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Stopping the legal sales to minors did not tackle diversion from the licit 
market, nor did it combat illegal smuggling or production.  
TABLE 1: COUNTRIES AND DATES OF RATIFICATION OF THE 1931 OPIUM SMOKING 
SUPPRESSION AGREEMENT SOURCE: UNTC TREATY DATA. 48 
Country Date of Ratification 
France 10 May 1933 
India 4 December 1944 
Japan 22 January 1937 
Netherlands 22 May 1933 
Portugal 27 January 1934 
Thailand 19 November 1934 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
3 April 1933 
 
The League held a second conference in 1931. This was the Geneva 
Convention for Limiting the Manufacturing and Regulating the Distribution of 
Narcotic Drugs (hereafter 1931 Convention).49 It was attended by 57 nations 
from 27 May to 13 July 1931. It symbolised a return to US cooperation with 
the League. Afterwards, John Caldwell, of the State Department’s Division of 
Far Eastern Affairs, served on League advisory committees. The presiding 
member of the PCOB was Herbert May, an American lawyer who would 
spend 25 years working for the OAC and later, at the UN’s Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs (CND) at the LoN and UN respectively.50 
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The 1931 Convention placed supply reduction and regulation at the centre of 
the League’s operations. It had four parts: ‘regulating the illicit trade, 
suppressing illicit manufacture, reducing excess raw material production and 
attacking the international traffic’.51 Its specific directives were varied: firstly, 
Article 15 required nations to create a federal regulatory agency based on 
the remit of the FBN. It included both regulatory and prohibitive dimensions 
that the US desired. Second, it built on the import and export calculations 
introduced into the Geneva Conventions. It required nations to furnish the 
PCOB with estimates of their medical and scientific needs of manufactured 
narcotics. Estimates were based on imports and export ratios which the 1925 
Geneva Convention had stipulated must be furnished by each country 
annually. These estimates were to be evaluated by a newly created Drugs 
Supervisory Body (DSB). The DSB was empowered to establish estimates 
for countries not party to the treaties, and for those who failed to furnish their 
estimates, but it lacked powers of enforcement. The estimates supplied 
were, in theory, binding, yet they could only be published with the respective 
country’s agreement. 
An under-examined aspect of the 1931 Convention was provision via 
stockpiling. All nations agreed that providing a steady flow of medicines was 
vital, but the American Civil War had shown how vital narcotics were, and 
World War One had proved that international markets could be disrupted. 
The League recognised this, and the provision of narcotics was written into 
the 1931 Convention via Article 4. Article 4 stipulated that pharmaceutical 
companies could procure a six-month stockpile of raw materials for 
manufacture. It also stated that government stocks were exempt from the 
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six-month rule, a loophole that Anslinger would exploit in later years to great 
effect.52 Countries did not have to indicate which signatory nation they would 
buy opium from, allowing them to shop for the lowest price. Finally, it 
established protections for the pharmaceutical firms and markets. This was, 
according to the State Department, a key strength of the agreement because 
‘the quantities of dangerous drugs manufactured in other countries, renders 
much stricter the control of the legitimate trade abroad in these 
substances’.53  
The 1931 Convention’s passage was hard fought by the Americans.54 Stuart 
Fuller went on the offensive by regularly criticising nations who were 
reluctant to sign it.55 Anslinger and Fuller found an early ally in Canada, 
which adopted the prohibitory spirit of its southern neighbour. Canada’s drug 
czar was Colonel Charles Henry Ludovic Sharman. He was Chief of the 
Narcotics Division of the Department of Pensions and National Health and 
pushed heavily for the American proposals. 
In 1932, the FBN was under threat of being subsumed into the Secret 
Service, only one year after its creation. It needed international victories to 
protect it from re-structuring.56 By working with Fuller, Anslinger cajoled 
nations into accepting the 1931 Convention by threatening to bar their 
medicinal exports to the US. Turkey ratified the 1931 Convention after this 
threat, and the League received the required number of ratifications on June 
9, 1933.  
At a luncheon celebrating the passage of the act, Sharman stated that ‘far 
from being a musty document from which occasional reference is made … it 
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is the foundation from which springs the daily exchange of information 
between Ottawa and Washington’.57 Both Anslinger and Sharman were 
shrewdly aware that drug control relied on cooperation. Adequate provision 
and narcotic security underlay the North American approach to prohibition. 
Indeed, Anslinger gained Canadian support by promising Sharman cheap 
and reliable access to narcotics if supplies ever dried up (discussed fully in 
chapter three). By 1931, there were five different international bodies 
involved with some aspect of drug control, not to mention the 40 plus 
countries who sent delegations to the League.  
Post-1931: The lead up to the Second World War 
Global opium production declined 45% from 1909 to 1937. From 1934 to 
1937, global legal opium production fell from 7,200 tons to 2,300.58 China’s 
output remained problematic. It produced, and consumed, most of the 
world’s opium. US seizures declined massively due to the war (figure 1) as 
German submarines closed the Mediterranean shipping channels. 
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FIGURE 1: SEIZURES OF PREPARED OPIUM (KG) IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 
YEARS 1932-1952. AS PREDICTED, SEIZURES DECLINED DURING THE WAR. 
SOURCE: FBN.59 
Between 1931-1938, the League of Nations made overtures to the United 
States which, in turn, pledged cautious but optimistic support for the 
League’s approach to drug control. They did not, however, change their 
hard-line stance of prohibition based on strict definitions of medical/non-
medical use. League officials were acutely aware of the complexity of the 
opium problem in the Far East, yet found themselves unwilling to contradict 
the US after the fractious negotiations of 1925.60 
When the 1931 Convention came into force in 1934, many nations 
cooperated with the League by furnishing the PCOB (Permanent Central 
Opium Board) and DSB (Drugs Supervisory Body) with statistics on their 
estimated needs, imports, and exports of narcotics. The figures they 
produced are some of the first clear measures of the world’s narcotic traffic. 
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The PCOB and DSB set about documenting and tabulating the rise of heroin 
and morphine abuse, but they lacked any enforcement capacity when it 
came to the illegal traffic.  
Much of the diplomatic history outlined by McAllister focuses on the key 
individuals of drug policy in this era. These include Bertil Renborg, chair of 
the OAC; Leon Steinig, an American-Austrian who became head of the DSB; 
and of course, Harry Anslinger.61 In 1936 he began authoring the FBN’s 
annual report to Congress entitled ‘Traffic in Narcotics and Other Dangerous 
Drugs’.  
The federal laws that created the FBN also made Harry Anslinger the chief 
enforcer of the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914. This meant the FBN’s earliest 
battles were not against drug dealers or belligerent diplomats, but against 
state legislatures. In 1932, Congress passed the Uniform State Narcotic Law. 
This act led to a gradual alignment of state legislation with federal law, but it 
would not enjoy the support of all fifty states until 1940. Heroin had been 
made illegal as both a medicine and recreational substance in 1924. The 
Narcotic Farm Act had become law in 1929. It established narcotic hospitals 
in Lexington, Kentucky and Fort Worth, Texas due to the overcrowding of 
prisons with minor drug offenders.62 Under Anslinger’s tenure, domestic drug 
law for the legal and illegal trades became the strictest in the world. By 1932, 
the US had criminalised the use of most narcotic drugs, unless specifically 
prescribed under strict conditions enforced by the FBN. The agency had 
offices across the country, which monitored druggists and pharmacists. The 
prescription of narcotics for maintenance purposes (providing an addict with 
a legal, safe supply of narcotics) became illegal. A campaign against 
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marijuana was gaining momentum, spearheaded by an Anslinger. He co-
wrote a publication entitled ‘Marihuana- Assassin of Youth’. 63 In 1937, the 
Marijuana Tax Act banned the drug’s use altogether. Although we know 
these campaigns were influential in the US, we know little about their impact 
upon international control.  
The 1925 Conventions had focussed the world’s attention on the global trade 
but rendered the issue of cultivation strictly off-limits. The 1931 Conventions 
had then made some inroads into controlling supply at the source. Neither 
tackled the illegal production and trafficking of narcotics. The senior US drug 
diplomats renewed their focus on the illicit (in their view, illegal) drug 
markets. No act of Congress would bring the cultivating nations to heel, nor 
would it deter foreign traffickers. Once again, the FBN’s attention turned to 
tackling narcotics at the source. 
The opium situation in China and Japan 
After World War One, the Japanese empire encouraged the production of 
home-grown, legal narcotics for domestic, medical, and scientific purposes. It 
maintained opium monopolies in Taiwan and Shandong Peninsula, arguing 
that the monopoly would gradually suppress the illegal trade. They argued 
their monopolies were effective routes to abstinence.64 Japan also looked to 
become a global competitor in the licit export market for manufactured 
narcotics. Under the guise of self-sufficiency, Japan’s exports to other 
nations also grew, particularly China.  
In the early years of the Roosevelt administration, the State Department was 
wary of upsetting Japan. The emperor had issued demands and claims to 
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Chinese territory that were in direct contravention of the US ‘Open Door’ 
policy that called on all nations to respect the sovereignty of China. The 
narcotic situation had gained a geopolitical glean with the establishment of 
Kwantung opium monopoly in North-eastern China in July of 1928, and the 
Mukden incident of 1931, a staged explosion on a commuter train (placed by 
Japanese militants).65 The explosion led to a Japanese invasion of North-
eastern China.66 Japan believed the region was important for defending its 
colony in Korea and bolstering against Soviet and Chinese aggression. The 
US did not want to engage in this diplomatic incident. Targeting the opium 
monopolies allowed the US to express its dissatisfaction with Japan and 
assert its tough stance on recreational use to other nations. In 1931, when 
the State Department sent Caldwell and Fuller to represent the United States 
at the League’s Conference on the Suppression of Opium Smoking, they did 
just this. To avoid being accused of ‘buckling down to the British’,67 Caldwell 
explicitly told the conference that the United States would not cooperate with 
any nation that continued to use a monopoly system. 
The Government of the United States most strongly urges frank 
recognition of the fact that there is but one real method by which to 
suppress the evil of opium-smoking in the Far East or anywhere else, 
and that this method is complete statutory prohibition of the 
importation, manufacture, sale, possession or use of prepared opium, 
coupled with active enforcement of such prohibition.68 
In making this statement, the US was throwing down a geopolitical gauntlet. 
While it provoked little discussion at the conference, its non-negotiable status 
increased acrimony between the US and Japan (at this point the world’s 
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biggest supporter of the opium monopoly). Opium monopolies were at the 
heart of the problems of the first 30 years of drug control; they reflected a 
debate over whether a legal market could tackle narcotic abuse and whether 
users could be registered and weaned off a substance by the state.69  
The FBN’s preoccupation with the Uniform Narcotic Act and campaign 
against marijuana meant that the Treasury Department did much of the early 
work at the LoN. Dr Hamilton-Wright had died in 1917 and Bishop Brent in 
1929. Narco-diplomacy fell to Stuart Fuller of the Treasury’s Division of Far 
Eastern Affairs. Fuller’s gusto for strict narcotic control at the League was 
unmatched. He worked ‘incessantly at it, seven days a week, and with 
definite and very great efficiency’ per one State Department colleague.70 
Fuller’s workload is unsurprising, considering the worsening narcotic 
situation in the Far East. In the early years of the decade, the seizures of 
illicit opium in that region increased with a sharp spike in 1935 and 1936 
(Table 2).  
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TABLE 2: TOTAL WORLD SEIZURES OF OPIUM FOR THE YEARS 1932-1941. SEIZURES 
INCREASED MASSIVELY BEFORE THE WAR BUT DECLINED SIGNIFICANTLY DURING 
THE WAR. SOURCE: OAC. 71 
Year World Seizures (Kg) 
1932 17,161 
1933 24,222 
1934 34,372 
1935 195,600 
1936 143,326 
1937 36,252 
1938 37,865 
1939 28,724 
1940 19,279 
1941 9,646 
 
Many of these seizures came from China. Both the LoN and the Americans 
blamed this on Japan and Persia. Whereas Turkish and Eastern European 
opium travelled westwards towards Europe and North America, Japanese 
and Persian opium travelled eastward to China, Malaya, Hong-Kong, and 
Singapore. Persia had increased its production and exports due to the slack 
from Indian reductions in 1926. It outright refused to participate in the PCOB 
estimate system, meaning the figures calculated for the actual size of the 
nation’s output were unreliable.72 In China, narcotics were legally produced, 
sold to unscrupulous traders and then unleashed upon the general 
population for recreational use. If they were exported to other countries, they 
were often diverted into the illegal traffic. In the earlier years of the twentieth-
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century, narcotics had often been legally produced before entering the illegal 
market. It was rarer for poppies to be grown explicitly for the black-market. 
In 1935, the OAC estimated that a minimum of 12,261 tons and a maximum 
of 18,000 tons of opium were being produced in China,73 amounting to 67% 
of the world’s total (Figure 2).74  
 
FIGURE 2: PREWAR PRODUCTION OF WORLD RAW OPIUM IN TONS 1934-1937. THE 
FIGURE SHOWS CHINA’S WORRYING SHARE BUT EXCLUDES THE PROVINCES OF 
MANCHURIA AND JEHOL. SOURCE: PCOB.75 
The US was uneasy with China’s unchecked production and Japan’s growing 
dominance in the Far East. Opium from China was being seized in ‘Australia, 
Hong Kong, Netherlands, East Indies, Malaya and the Philippines’ and North 
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America.76 China’s internal strife meant warlords had used opium crops to 
fund military campaigns. Warlords had long used the national banks to store 
profits from opium, and it is estimated that one-quarter of all the banks that 
emerged between 1912 and 1926 did so to cater to the opium trade.77 
American suspicions about Japan’s colonial ambitions were confirmed when 
the puppet state of Manchukuo was established in Manchuria and Jehol in 
1932. This led to the Opium Law of Manchukuo in 1933, which gave the 
state control over the production and drug markets.78 By this time, 
international faith in the Japanese’s commitment to tackling the narcotic 
problem had all but been destroyed. Madame Chiang-Kai Shek, the wife of 
the leader of the Kuomintang, stated that ‘opium pellets long preceded lead 
bullets in Japan’s invasion of China’.79 
The US believed that Japan actively benefited from the sale of narcotics into 
China. Japan had created a demilitarised zone in East Hebei as part of the 
Tanggu Accords (a formal truce agreed two years after the invasion of 
Manchuria). Here, Japanese soldiers sold narcotics with impunity, as did 
members of Zaibatsu, the Japanese pharmaceutical industry. They also 
exploited the Tanggu Accords by extending the demilitarised zone further 
into China.80  
On 17 April 1934, The Central China West newspaper asserted that massive 
quantities of morphine and heroin were reaching the American West coast, 
as well as pouring into the Chinese territories. The paper noted with obvious 
frustration that the PCOB reports, which at the time had recorded a 14% 
drop in morphine production in Europe, were not considering the illicit traffic 
and thus ignoring the Japanese activities.81 The article stated that the United 
145 
 
States Treasury had found significant increases in morphine and heroin 
being smuggled into the country. The report referenced was the 1934 ‘Traffic 
in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs’, authored by none other than 
Anslinger. Stuart Fuller was particularly eager to note that the Japanese 
policy in Manchukuo was facilitating flows of Persian morphine, of much 
higher morphine content than domestic Chinese opium into the US.82 With 
wider relations between the US and Japan on tenterhooks, Fuller’s zealous 
criticism earned him a cautionary dispatch from Undersecretary of State 
William Phillips.83 
The situation in Manchuria was more complex than reported. Many 
Japanese administrators did not favour the opium monopolies. In the years 
leading up to the war, no opium was found on any Japanese craft.84 Ellen 
Newbold La Motte, an American nurse and author, had long praised how the 
‘Japanese Government is as careful to protect its people from the evils and 
dangers of opium as any European country could be’. 85 More likely was that 
a small section of the Kwantung Army – operating without permission from 
the Empire – sold opium and morphine illegally. For Kinsberg, Japan’s 
imperial power depended upon staying free of the opium that weaker nations 
fell prey to.86 
There was also evidence to suggest that the nationalist Chinese government 
(Kuomintang) was benefitting from the domestic growth of opium within 
China, using it to fund their war against the Communist army headed by Mao 
Zedong.87 This was despite the New Life Movement, a Kuomintang-led civic 
movement, issuing a commandment banning opium across the country.88 
Furthermore, Walker suggests that the FBN, drawing on reports from the 
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Treasury Department attaché in Shanghai, was fully aware of the role Chiang 
Kai-Shek’s nationalist government played in facilitating the opium traffic 
within Southern China.89 Joseph Stilwell, a US general in charge of China 
during WWII, went as far as suggesting Chiang was a ‘vacillating, tricky, 
undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word’.90 Regardless, they 
felt that Kuomintang represented the best efforts to eventually suppress the 
traffic. This complexity did not stop the anti-Japanese sentiment spreading in 
the US and at the League. 
The DSB and PCOB’s mediating functions deterred nations from acting 
outside treaty stipulations, as those nations which did have large estimated 
requirements were immediately subject to critical scrutiny (Table 3). As 
relations with Japan worsened, the DSB and PCOB issued increasingly stern 
condemnations against Japan’s requirements in Kwantung. 
TABLE 3: THE USAGE OF MORPHINE AND HEROIN IN DIFFERENT NATIONS AS 
ESTIMATED BY THE PCOB IN 1930. NOTE THE HUGE CONSUMPTION IN 
KWANTUNG.THE FIGURES REPRESENT CONSUMPTION (OF UNSTATED 
MEASUREMENT, ASSUMED TO BE TONS) PER MILLION INHABITANTS. SOURCE: 
PCOB.91 
Country Morphine Heroin 
Great Britain 8.42 1.05 
France 16.09 2.06 
Germany 18.09 0.59 
USA 16.89 0.03 
Kwantung 91.67 33.33 
Japan 13.74 21.1 
Formosa 2.63 12.94 
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The PCOB provided political cover for all nations; all benefited from its role 
as an intermediary. Accusations or complaints were not made by nations 
against nations, but quietly processed through the PCOB, who would give 
countries a fair chance to bring their markets to order. Even so, the PCOB 
and DSB could only admonish and shame nations who submitted 
suspiciously large estimates for their requirements. If no such statistics were 
offered, the DSB would calculate forecasts on behalf of the absent nations. 
Japan and its territories stood out as having aberrantly large medical 
requirements. Privately, many League officials conceded that the quantities 
outlined in Table 3 could not be for medicinal purposes, and most of the 
drugs were being diverted into the illicit traffic. The problem was delicate: 
how could Japan be encouraged to act against its citizens without being 
alienated at a time of geopolitical turbulence? 
One solution that would both placate Japan and provide some control over 
the narcotics problem was to certify Manchukuo as an exporting state that 
could then be subject to PCOB control – allowing League officials to at least 
estimate the size of the traffic. This was geopolitically unpalatable. If the 
puppet state of Manchukuo were given the authority to issue import and 
export certificates, the League would be de facto recognising the sovereignty 
of the Japanese in this region. This was an impossible option for the 
Americans since recognising Manchukuo violated the American ‘Open Door’ 
policy they held with China.92 This solution was the most effective method of 
drug control and would have usually been welcomed, but it clashed with 
American foreign policy. 
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Another solution was to have the PCOB issue estimates for the region of 
Manchuria, thus preserving Chinese sovereignty and providing a framework 
to regularise the traffic.93 This strategy would be based on estimates from 
previous years. The problem was the Kuomintang had submitted no statistics 
on production and consumption in the Northern regions before the Japanese 
invasion. Notwithstanding the figures provided by Japan, there was very little 
information on the actual scope of the problem to infer estimates from.94  
The situation was resolved when Japan left the League of Nations in 1933. It 
continued to submit estimates until 1935 when Tokyo ordered their 
representative to resign his position at the OAC.  
The 1936 Illicit Trafficking Conference 
The 1931 Convention had successfully addressed the legal market but had 
neglected the problem of illicit trafficking. As such, preparations were made 
for a new agreement (called the 1936 Illicit Trafficking Convention). This 
conference’s full title was the ‘Convention for the Suppression of the Illicit 
Traffic in Dangerous Drugs’. The Americans once again offered proposals 
that would end the trade of non-medical or scientific drug use. These were 
summarily rejected by the other delegations, led by the Portuguese (a nation 
with considerable investment in the licit trade in coca in South America) who 
contended that raw licit ingredients (opium and coca leaf) were outside the 
scope of the conference. They believed it would be improper to even discuss 
such matters at a conference designed to tackle the illegal traffic.95  
Anslinger and Fuller were furious, but initially unable to withdraw the US from 
the conference. The State Department did not want to appear uncooperative 
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with the League; it was mindful of the American withdrawal from the 1925 
Convention. Instead, Anslinger and Fuller paid little attention to the rest of 
the proceedings.96 
The convention’s outcomes were bland. It provided some provisions for the 
extradition of drug traffickers and vague assertions to reduce the traffic. The 
US eventually refused to sign it, stating that it was too weak. The treaty failed 
to gain the ten signatures needed for ratification and the outbreak of war 
postponed its entry into force indefinitely.97 As Taylor argues ‘rather than 
deal with the question of supplies at the source, the international conferees 
attempted to control the supplies themselves with the hope that sources 
would automatically contract’.98 Ironically, the start of World War Two meant 
that seizures and supplies contracted as traditional shipping routes closed. 
By 1936, the PCOB’s aim was to decrease the licit demand of global opium. 
If nations only purchased what they estimated, the price of raw opium would 
fall into equilibrium. With a decrease in demand, the PCOB hoped that the 
number of growers would fall concurrently. In this venture, the League had 
already somewhat succeeded: the price of raw opium in the 1930s was one-
quarter of what it was in the late 1920s.99 Sensing changes in the geopolitical 
winds, Anslinger made the risky but hugely profitable move of secretly buying 
opium, morphine, and much of the world’s painkiller. This strategy is 
discussed in-depth in chapter three. 
America’s entry into World War Two 
The American entry into World War Two provided more opportunities for the 
advancement of American narcotic policy than peacetime negotiations ever 
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had. The core functions of the PCOB, DSB, and OAC were threatened in 
Geneva by the Nazis. An agreement was brokered by Herbert May, chair of 
the PCOB, whereby these three branches were transferred to Washington 
DC on a temporary basis.100 The move meant the technical and 
administrative aspects of the League drug machinery (the DSB, OAC and 
PCOB) survived. These organisations continued to collect information on the 
legal drugs trade, yet the war massively hampered their efforts. With their 
operations taking place in Washington, the core drug bodies were kept within 
the purview of the US.101 
As we shall see in chapter two, the geonarcotic discourses of America’s 
opposition to Japan intensified during the war, but narcotic trafficking stalled 
as many traditional smuggling routes closed. After the war, the illicit traffic 
was negligible, and consequently less worrisome than the short supply of 
medicines. Opium production in China was eradicated under the Chinese 
Communist Party between 1942 and 1952. In 1944, American reports put 
total world production of opium between 2,400 and 2,647 tons, with world 
requirements only averaging between 400 and 440 tons for medical and 
scientific purposes (Figure 3).102 India produced on average 700 tons of 
opium annually from 1946, capturing a large proportion of the licit market.103 
The situation meant that there were both shortages of medicines and 
increases in the illicit trade as the post-war period progressed. 
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FIGURE 3: ESTIMATES OF TOTAL WORLD PRODUCTION IN JULY 1944. CHINA AND 
IRAN WERE PRODUCING WELL OVER THE WORLD’S ESTIMATED REQUIREMENTS. 
SOURCE: STATE DEPARTMENT BULLETIN.104 
The newly created United Nations brought the issue of drug control under the 
purview of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). It was populated by 
previous League employees. McAllister describes an ‘inner-circle’ of drug 
experts including Harry Anslinger, Colonel Sharman of the Canadian 
Narcotics Division, Herbert May of the PCOB, and Helen Moorhead of the 
Foreign Policy Association. They all campaigned to have the tenets of the 
supply and control agenda built into the new UN system: strict national 
control mechanisms and the abolition of non-medical use.105 These ideas 
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were formalised in Congressional joint resolution No. 241 in 1944. The 
President encouraged opium producing nations to reduce production to 
legitimate amounts for medical and scientific needs. 
The UN’s first task was not to reduce, but to fend off the expected rise in 
narcotic abuse following the end of the war (as had happened during the 
First World War). The ‘inner circle’ of seasoned diplomats had to contend 
with new personnel with different ideas for the post-war approach to drug 
control. Bertil Renborg (chief of the League’s Drug Control Service) and Leon 
Steinig, head of the DSB, looked to revive the League’s old machinery that 
would place each man at the head of the system. Anslinger’s greatest fear 
was a post-war revival of the League of Nations drug mechanisms and 
senior staff to their ossified positions at the OAC.  
The end of the national opium monopolies 
On 10 November 1943, the Dutch and British announced their intention to 
suppress opium monopolies in their territories, thirty-three years after their 
initial signature to the 1909 International Opium Convention. McWilliams 
attributes this decision to a stunning display of diplomatic wrangling by Harry 
Anslinger and his allies, although he concedes other forces played a part.106 
There is certainly merit to this account. In 1943, Anslinger pre-emptively 
challenged the British and Dutch at a meeting of the OAC, claiming that the 
US and Canada both concurred on the need for opium suppression in the 
colonies.107 Neither Canada nor the US had officially announced this 
position. Anslinger risked a dressing down from the State Department, but 
the risk paid off. With US forces occupying their Pacific territories, both the 
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UK and the Dutch feared that the State Department might delay in handing 
back control should they attempt to restore the opium monopolies. 
It was not just Anslinger’s prowess that led to this change. When the UN 
pressured the Dutch to grant Indonesia independence, they lost much of 
their interest in the opium trade. The Dutch privately informed the British of 
their decision, should they wish to join them and make a joint statement.108 
This influenced some senior policymakers in the UK, but the Colonial Office 
was reluctant to relinquish the lucrative trade. In 1940-1941, the year before 
its demise, the Hong Kong opium monopoly had sold more opium than any 
previous year since 1928 due to an influx of refugee smokers from China.109 
This profit was not replicated across the empire. In Burma and Malay, the 
1934 figures show the number of opium users had declined enough to render 
opium revenues negligible. The Colonial Office found itself outgunned by the 
Foreign and Home Offices. When an interdepartmental opium committee 
convened in September 1943, it was agreed that territories under Japanese 
control would not have their opium monopolies re-opened upon return. The 
decision was also made to close the Hong Kong monopoly. The 1943 
decisions were followed by the French commitment to end their opium 
monopolies and suppress the opium traffic in 1945. When the British granted 
independence to India and Burma in 1947 and 1948 respectively, India 
retained its markets and position as a dominant exporter for legal poppy 
crops, and with its independence in 1947, became a powerful producer 
nation on the international scene. Burma continued to produce opium, 
although much of it was destined for the illegal market (it became part of the 
Golden Triangle of illicit opium producers). 
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When the newly established United Nations formally undertook the League’s 
functions after the Lake Success Protocol of 1946, it assigned international 
drug regulation to ECOSOC. ECOSOC delegated its duties to the 
Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), The CND reported directly to 
ECOSOC and replaced the OAC of the LoN.110 A newly-created Division of 
Narcotic Drugs (DND) was charged with the preparatory work for 
international conferences and was headed by Leon Steinig, an old hand of 
the League. The PCOB continued to police the international narcotics 
treaties, and the DSB continued to compile statistics. Colonel Sharman of 
Canada retired from the Canadian Narcotics Division but increased his 
international standing by becoming chairman of the CND in 1945. In 1948, 
he also gained a seat on the DSB. Scuffles and turf wars continued to plague 
the administrative function of the international machinery.  
In chapter three, I move away from senior squabbles and show how changes 
in the production and type of narcotics dramatically influenced international 
policy. The creation of the DND is also important because it created the 
Narcotics Laboratory Section (NLS) in 1954 through Resolution 834 of the 
United Nations General Assembly.111 The NLS was responsible for the 
development of standardised testing for narcotics and their origin, which I 
examine in chapter four.  
One of the last acts of the LoN had been to expel the USSR in 1937. The 
Russian return to drug diplomacy through the UN was received with mixed 
feelings. Control advocates approved of Russia’s punitive policies for drug 
users (termed ‘narcology’).112 Narcology involved widespread incarceration 
of drug users under Josef Stalin.113 The USSR also submitted some statistics 
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to the PCOB, indicating its desire to cooperate in tackling international drug 
trafficking. They did, however, withhold information, particularly those 
pertaining to legal supplies. Illicit trafficking across the border between the 
Soviet and Allied zones of Berlin was rife. There were no simple 
arrangements regarding drug regulation within divided Berlin. The Soviets 
refused to acknowledge any drug abuse within their zone. Nor did they allow 
UN investigations into their producing and manufacturing facilities. 
Notwithstanding these refusals, the Soviet’s strict position on drug abuse 
meant that the American focus on narcotics remained in the Middle and the 
Far East.  
After the war, all nations agreed that new international law was needed to 
deal with the trade in new, synthetic drugs that had proliferated during the 
war years. New synthetic substances were not created from opium, and thus 
escaped control. The change from natural opiate to synthetic opioid is 
symbolic of changes in drug diplomacy occurring at the time. New families of 
synthetic drugs, ranging from opioids to amphetamines, were churned out of 
the pharmaceutical industries of manufacturing nations. An example is 
Pethidine, created in Germany just before the war. Since it was not a 
derivative of opium but was instead created in a lab, it escaped all the 
previous treaties.114 Powerful pharmaceutical firms created pills for pain, 
weight loss, and psychological disorders. As companies sought returns on 
these costly investments, the advertising of synthetics continued to grow and 
so did their abuse. The international system struggled to keep pace with 
innovation in the licit market. The 1948 Synthetic Protocol went some way in 
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tackling synthetics substances that could be added to the 1931 schedules. 
These are discussed in chapter three. 
The 1948 Synthetic Protocol duly passed into international law on 19 
November 1948 in Paris. It represented a significant victory for control 
advocates. The WHO, the successor to the League Health Committee, would 
designate new synthetic substances as dangerous and subject to 
international control. The fact that it passed without much debate is a 
testimony to the massive problems new narcotics were causing. 
While illicit drug use did not experience the post-war upswing that was 
anticipated, the US inner circle tried steering the international community 
away from etiological and public health approaches towards policies that 
limited excess production and curbed diversion into the illegal trade. This first 
meant encouraging newly independent and non-signatory nations to ratify 
the 1925 and 1931 Conventions that dealt with the trade and supply of 
narcotics. After this, they looked to create a new, stringent treaty in the early 
1950s. 
The 1953 Protocol and failure of the opium monopolies  
During the early years of the UN, many power grabs were made by different 
figures to climb onto the ‘poppy throne’.115 The most salient figure is Leon 
Steinig, an Austrian-American international lawyer who directed the Division 
of Narcotic Drugs from 1946-1952. Steinig proposed an international opium 
monopoly (IOM), a system whereby one regulatory agency (headed by 
himself) would buy opium from producing nations and sell the required 
157 
 
amounts to manufacturing nations. In doing so, each nation would be 
provided with its legal requirements, without an ounce more. 
This idea was immediately unpopular with American control advocates, as it 
would see Steinig controlling the world’s market supply, a position Anslinger 
had de facto held to great effect (as we shall see in chapter three). 
Pharmaceutical companies worried that such an agency would encourage 
higher prices on the world market to reduce demand. Producing nations 
worried the exact opposite: that an agency might encourage lower prices for 
their exports. With key figures in the inner circle denouncing Steinig’s ideas, 
the idea collapsed.  
The collapse of the idea of the international opium monopoly is important. It 
was the death knell for international legislation that tried to use narcotics to 
reduce narcotic addiction. Furthermore, it turned licit activities that were not 
deemed medical or scientific (by American standards) into illicit ones. This 
was the precursor to a clear definition of illegality.  
The need for new international agreements arose around the obvious 
shortcomings of previous treaties. The LoN had produced a tightly regulated 
legal market where diversion of legal narcotics into the illicit market was low 
and declining. This change begat new problems, particularly increases in the 
consumption of opiates (semi-synthetic narcotics and fully synthetic opioids). 
When these industries became profitable, illicit heroin and morphine 
production was driven into the ungoverned regions of the Golden Triangle, 
Afghanistan and Mexico. The drug control treaties did not give the CND and 
PCOB an international mandate to tackle production outside of government 
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control. Up until 1953, they had been predominantly focused on the legal 
traffic. More importantly, crops grown exclusively for the illicit traffic were not 
included in PCOB estimates. Nobody was sure just how much of a problem 
illegal production was, and cross-border drug activity presented a new 
international challenge to nation-states. 
A new treaty was required. The 1936 Convention had been signed by only a 
handful of nations. Others had deposited signatures but had never ratified 
the 1912 or 1925 Conventions. In the 1950s, a new agreement based on 
national controls was presented by Charles Vaille of France to the 6th 
session of the CND in 1953.116 This would eventually morph into another 
international agreement to add to the eight preceding regulations and 
became known the 1953 Opium Protocol (Protocol for Limiting and 
Regulating the Cultivation of the Poppy Plant, the Production of, International 
and Wholesale Trade in, and Use of, Opium). This was a strict, punitive 
treaty on the production of poppy crops that was favoured by the Americans 
and French.  
The 1953 protocol was negotiated in only five weeks. It contained onerous 
provisions for producing states. Its most important provision was Article 2, an 
explicit recognition of the need to restrict opium use to medicinal and 
scientific uses (a formal, legal recognition of American standards of licit and 
legal use). Defining ‘Opium’ and ‘Stocks’ proved troublesome, yet ultimately 
agreed by recourse to the 1931 Convention Text.117 With the 1953 protocol, 
quasi-medical use would be consigned to history, and illegal drugs would be 
targeted and sanctioned by international law. 
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Despite these protections, the treaty was received lukewarmly. The Dutch 
and British, fearing for their manufacturing markets, did not ratify. Neither did 
the Soviet states, who disagreed with the onerous inspection processes 
proposed. It required three ratifications from the seven producing nations to 
enter into law, but only received two before 1963. Ambivalent nations 
watched the rivalry between those who favoured an entirely new simplified, 
single treaty that would incorporate all others, and those who favoured the 
1953 Opium Protocol.  
Both Anslinger and Vaille pushed for more ratifications of the 1953 protocol 
based on the first draft of the text. Western manufacturing nations with 
powerful pharmaceutical lobbies aggressively resisted it. They wanted to 
increase the number of licit producers from the seven that the draft treaty 
stipulated. This was because of shortages in 1955, catalysed by Iran’s opium 
ban, had driven prices up. Diplomats worried that future shortages, caused 
by artificially by government edicts or naturally by crop blights, would 
damage their markets. The British — who were heavily lobbied by their 
pharmaceutical industry — also feared increased prices if the seven 
producers behaved like a cartel. To amass support for an alternative to the 
1953 Protocol at the CND, they convened a cabal of manufacturing nations. 
A close ally was West Germany, particularly eager to re-assert its role as a 
medical manufacturer. 
Producing states were aware that the 1953 Protocol was particularly strict on 
their exports. It required them to report the same figures as manufacturing 
nations were required to by the 1931 Conventions.118 Many refused to ratify, 
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despite pressure from the Americans. The protocol required at least three 
signatures from producing nations to enter into international law (figure 4).  
 
Figure 4: RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION TO THE 1953 OPIUM PROTOCOL BY 1960. 
PRODUCERS SUCH AS AFGHANISTAN, TURKEY, GREECE, THE USSR, AND 
YUGOSLAVIA DID NOT RATIFY BY 1960. SOURCE: UNTC TREATY DATA. 119 
Figure 4 shows that the main producing nations were almost absent from the 
protocol’s ratifications, effectively blunting it. All agreed that the 1953 treaty 
should be modified and improved, or negotiations for a new, single 
convention should be started. India was an exception. To show its 
commitment to licit production, it banned quasi-medical use, ended its sales 
of smoking opium, and tightened controls on production by only allowing 
opium to be grown for export. They ratified the protocol, thereby qualifying 
themselves for a share of the trade in licit opium production.  
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In 1960, it appeared Turkey would provide the all-important third ratification 
to make the 1953 Protocol law. Charles Vaille was the architect and driving 
force behind the treaty. Just as he thought he would secure his legacy and 
protect the interests of supply control advocates, he was promoted to 
Inspector General of Health for France and removed from the League.120 
Without his leadership on the 1953 protocol, support quickly collapsed. 
Without Vaille, more moderate voices prevailed. Producing nations withdrew 
their support, and the debate turned back towards the Single Convention.  
The road to the 1961 Treaty Negotiations 
Seizures had grown in the post-war years (Table 4). The PCOB and DSB 
continued to serve out their functions by reducing diversion but could do little 
to tackle smuggling and illicit production. 
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TABLE 4: GLOBAL POST-WAR OPIUM SEIZURES. SOURCE: BULLETIN OF 
NARCOTICS.121 
Year Kg 
1946 22,413 
1947 18,389 
1948 17,948 
1949 20,503 
1950 46,286 
195l 39,492 
 
Some countries suffered from the illicit traffic more than others. Figure 5 
shows the geographical distribution of the origin of seizures of raw opium. 
The situation in Thailand and Burma meant newly independent states sought 
help to tackle the illicit production of raw opium, now cultivated in lawless 
hinterlands where governments could not or did not intervene.  
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FIGURE 5: COMPARISON OF ORIGIN OF SEIZURES OF OPIUM BY COUNTRY IN KG. 
1946-1951. SOURCE: BULLETIN OF NARCOTICS.122 
By 1960, the world drug problem was characterised by a paradoxical 
situation: shortages of some opiate medicines, an abundance of synthetics, 
and plenty of illicit opium in Asia.  
Negotiating the Single Convention 
Negotiations for the Single Convention proved to be just as tricky as the 
1953 Protocol. In January 1961, 73 nations attended the debates in New 
York. Producer nations stressed the importance of regulating synthetics and 
new psychotropic drugs. This angered manufacturing nations, who had 
developed an astonishing range of new medicines for all sorts of ailments. 
They did not want to see these substances become subject to the same 
onerous provisions placed upon opiates. The USSR sided with producing 
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nations, blanching at the on-site inspections advanced by the US and the 
French. 
Furthermore, in-fighting between Anslinger and Gilbert Yates, head of the 
DND, diverted attention away from policymaking.123 Yates had won a victory 
when he had negotiated the move of the DND back to Geneva from 
Washington (where it had moved to during World War Two). Still smarting 
from this move, Anslinger sent underlings to treaty negotiations in protest, 
and in doing so only succeeded in isolating himself from the action. He still 
looked to revive the now-defunct 1953 Protocol. After Sharman’s retirement, 
Kenneth Hossick took charge of the Canadian delegation. Under his tenure, 
the country became more amenable to ambulatory treatment and public 
health approaches. Anslinger lost a key ally. Domestically, the FBN found 
itself under siege from dissident doctors and lawyers, particularly due to the 
passage of the Boggs Act of 1956 (discussed in chapter two). Anslinger’s 
bombastic style of diplomacy at the CND put him at odds with the Kennedy 
and Johnson administrations. With little support domestically, he lost clout 
internationally.  
Conference attendees eventually agreed upon a single convention that 
incorporated elements of the nine previous treaties (excluding the redundant 
1936 Convention). Most importantly, the Single Convention would terminate 
the 1953 Protocol entirely, along with its requirement of a cap on legal 
producers at seven. Although the treaty did require each producer to create a 
government agency that licensed growers and then bought narcotics from 
them and sold them on the international market, the goal of strict control at 
the source (as the US envisioned it) had not been achieved.  
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The final draft of the treaty was approved on the 30th March 1961. The US, 
through the final play by the outgoing Commissioner Anslinger, spurned the 
treaty, believing it would bring about ‘a retrocession of international narcotic 
controls’.124 The official rejection was due to the lack of control of raw opium 
production, and a clause allowing countries to withhold estimates about their 
production. McAllister speculates that Anslinger, in the latter years of 
negotiation, was particularly opposed to the 1961 Convention due to the 
threat to his domestic job.125 The 1961 Treaty would replace the 1931 
convention that had mandated each country establish an FBN-style agency. 
Without that, the FBN lost its international protection from restructuring by an 
unfavourable executive branch.  
This was the third time that the US had rejected international attempts to 
control the illicit trade. The rejection required the FBN to draw allies from 
afar. Anslinger mustered support from pharmaceutical organisations and 
allies in Congress. He also leaned on the Greek delegation (a producer 
nation) who had ratified the 1953 Opium protocol just before the Single 
Convention came into force. Anslinger ‘won the ratification race but lost the 
war’.126 81 nations approved a resolution for the Single Convention at the 
1962 CND session, and it entered the law on 13 December 1964, replacing 
nine previous international treaties, including the 1953 convention. Many 
nations quickly began to sign and ratify the treaty thereafter. By 1967, when 
the US finally ratified the 1961 Convention, 61 nations had deposited 
signatures or ratified the treaty (Figure 6). Without the provisions of the 1931 
Convention, the international mandate for the FBN was lost. Anslinger retired 
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from the agency in 1962, and the FBN was restructured in 1967 by the 
Johnson Administration.  
 
FIGURE 6: SIGNATURES, RATIFICATIONS AND ACCESSIONS BY 1967. NOTE THAT 
MANY NATIONS SIGNED, BUT DID NOT RATIFY OR ACCESS UNTIL AFTER 1967 
SOURCE: UNTC TREATY DATA.127 
When it entered into force in 1968, the Single Convention carried over the 
complicated system of calculating estimates, imports, and exports 
established by the 1925 and 1936 conventions. It also transferred the 
regulatory functions of the PCOB and DSB to the newly created INCB.128 
The INCB was given authority to schedule substances based on WHO 
recommendations (discussed in chapter four). These came from the WHO’s 
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Expert Committee for Drug Dependence that has formal responsibility for 
classifying narcotics at the UN today.  
The years beyond 1961 represent the modern era of drug control, governed 
by the 1961 Convention that included more nations than ever before. Turkey 
signed the Single Convention in 1967, in doing, so it gained status as a legal 
opium producer.129 However, the Convention’s shortcomings in the face of 
rising drug abuse became apparent as illicit production rose to meet the 
demand. Synthetic abuse exploded around the world, and this led to another 
set of international agreements (the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances and the 1972 Conference to Consider Amendments to the 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs).  
The declaration of a ‘War on Drugs’ by the Nixon Administration came in 
1971. Nixon secured a symbolic victory in pressuring Turkey to end its 
production after the coup d’état in 1971. Unfortunately, Mexican heroin 
producers picked up the slack.130 Three years later, Turkey re-legalised its 
opium production, following domestic pressure from farmers who charged 
that US interference on an industry upon which Turkey relied so heavily was 
an imperialistic violation of sovereignty.  
When compared to the US position in the previous half century, Nixon’s ‘war’ 
is somewhat progressive, particularly in its approach to foreign countries. 
This was the first time the US focussed on demand reduction at home and 
internationally. The United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) 
was pushed for by the Nixon Administration in 1971. The US donated $2 
million to this fund. Producer nations demanded technical assistance to 
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combat addiction in their own countries. More than ever, the international 
community shared a belief that drug abuse was a threat to all of humanity, 
rather than a weapon in a single nation’s arsenal. INCB reports indicated that 
the world’s illicit market was almost entirely in the hands of criminals, and 
production took place in regions out of governmental control. One report from 
the WHO Expert Committee on Dependence-Producing Drugs of 1965 
estimated that there were some 200 tons of licit production worldwide 
compared to 1000 tons of opium produced in South East Asia alone.131  
The ‘Grand Old Men’ of the League of Nations is the name of an article 
authored by Bertil Renborg, Former Chief of the Drug Control Service of the 
League of Nations.132 In it, he listed the achievements of figures mentioned 
here: Bishop Brent, Malcolm Delevingne, and Harry Anslinger. The scholars 
cited in this chapter followed suit. They trace a very human story of 
international drug control and situate it against the wider geopolitics of the 
20th century. Some hint at other human actors who are excluded from 
diplomatic accounts: members of the Temperance Movement, 
pharmaceutical companies, and wealthy politicians. 
There is merit to this formal, diplomatic history: it shows where the desires of 
power-hungry diplomats clashed, where global events influenced 
proceedings and how the US pushed for a hard-line understanding of drug 
regulation. However, to cite Dittmer, the history offered is one where ‘pre-
existing geopolitical subjects [are] coming together’.133 It is a history of what 
Protevi calls second-order body politics: nations or supranational 
organisations comprised of first-order body politics (individuals).134 
Ultimately, the decisions of the individuals are most important when it comes 
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to the political history of drug control. However, the League of Nations and 
United Nations were not the only arenas where international drug diplomacy 
took place. To ascribe agency to the individuals located in New York, 
Geneva, Vienna or even Washington DC is to exclude a suite of other actors, 
things, affects, and media that formed the international drug control 
assemblage and affected the ‘grand old men’ of drug control. For example, in 
this chapter, I have hinted at how geography featured in international 
debates. Drugs were understood to be a foreign problem, which necessitated 
control at the source, rather than with the consumer. 
The geographical elements of anti-narcotic discourse have not been in 
explored in detail. We are missing a geonarcotic account that explains how 
and why control at the source became the centrepiece of the American 
delegate’s mission and ultimately led to them withdrawing from two sets of 
international negotiations. This critical account of geonarcotics will be 
developed in the next chapter. There, I explore how affectively charged 
media was immanent to the drug control assemblage, playing an important 
role in its development.
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Geonarcotic discourse: the ‘Opium Evil’ 
In this chapter, I focus on what Müller calls the enunciative element of the 
assemblage: the growth of US geonarcotic discourse. The opium evil, as this 
discourse was commonly known, neatly cleaved narcotics into 
medical/legitimate and illicit/recreational groups. Following Grayson, this 
chapter explores the ways that narcotics became ‘illicit’, referring to a social 
circumscription rather than a legal one. The FBN quickly realised that the 
illegality of drugs would not be accepted by the public if they were not also 
culturally taboo.1 For narcotics to become illicit, a process of meaning 
construction that was inherently geographical took place.  
Today, the scourge of drug abuse is understood to be a universal problem. In 
the earliest days of American drug control, drug abuse was, ultimately, the 
fault of other nations. The US posited itself as a victim of an illicit, 
international trade, most notably through its withdrawal from the 1925 
Geneva Conventions. Here, the domestic and international were intricately 
linked. Geonarcotic discourse was predominantly a reactive force that 
responded to international action, but also it played out in the bodies and 
consumption choices of Americans. Drugs and drug users were both 
understood to be terrifying threats to the US body politic. As a powerful social 
and affective force, American geonarcotic discourse was emergent. As World 
War Two loomed, narcotics were no longer understood as lucrative and 
immoral commodities forced upon the poor by imperial powers: they were 
described as actual weapons of war used by Japan and, in later years, 
Communist China. The evidence to support these ideas is thin, but these 
claims performed important affective work in the US. By combining narcotics 
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with the threat of war, smuggling narcotics became a terrifying method of 
conquest in which the consumptive choices of American could decide the 
fate of the country. 
We should not just look to diplomats formally representing the US as the sole 
promulgators of this discourse. This idea was nurtured by one powerful anti-
drug activist called Richmond Hobson, perpetuated by William Randolph 
Hearst, and made its way into diplomatic proceedings through Harry 
Anslinger.2 Furthermore, these individuals drew on certain material 
capacities of narcotics to give weight and sincerity to their claims about the 
danger of foreign drugs. 
The early 1900s: the wild west of drug control 
The term ‘opium evil’ had been around in the nineteenth century, particularly 
to describe opium smoking by Chinese migrants in the US. Everything about 
opium signalled something different to other pastimes such as drinking or 
tobacco smoking. The smoking paraphernalia was different, the 
establishments within which it took place were exotic, and of course, the 
psychoactive effects of opium use were entirely different from smoking and 
drinking. For Malleck, historical interpretations of opium use in China have 
often skewed towards a simplistic story: opium use was forced upon a 
hapless population via British gunboat diplomacy. The realities are more 
complex; opium smoking was not always seen as debilitating, and nor was it 
the dominant drug of use in twentieth-century China; some Chinese valued 
morphine and heroin.3 Nevertheless, Malleck, suggests that the myths of 
imperial-sponsored opium smoking were central to eventual narcotic 
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legislation in Canada.4 This was equally true in the US. The term opium evil 
was first used by doctors in the US in 1899,5 but it retained its colonial 
associations when used by anti-narcotic advocates.  
As mentioned, the earliest years of the twentieth-century were replete with 
many substances that contained narcotics. For the Temperance movement, 
this was a failing of government. In an interview in The Oregon Daily Journal 
in 1911, Hamilton-Wright noted that other nations had taken steps to protect 
their citizens from ‘the most pernicious drug known to humanity’, but 
‘opposition representing aggregated capital of $100,000,000 with an annual 
turn-over five times that’ had quashed anti-narcotic bills (the prohibition bill of 
1903) in the House.6 In this early formulation, Dr Hamilton-Wright cast opium 
as a lucrative trade, backed by big money that cared little for the harm their 
product caused.  
In the US, the geographical aspects of the opium evil were linked to social 
and racial inequality. The Smoking Opium Exclusion Acts were passed in 
1909. Evidence had drawn directly from physicians who concluded opium 
smoking would increase miscegenation.7 Opium eating and smoking were 
roundly condemned as non-medical, migrant Chinese behaviours. Chinese 
migrants were deemed to have brought the habit of opium smoking to the 
United States and were responsible for wider use in the white population 
(this conveniently ignored widespread opiate use among white, wealthy 
Americans in the form of Laudanum and injectable morphine). Raw and 
smoking opium were demonised vis-à-vis the medical uses of opiates such 
as morphine. Doctors testified in Congress with stories about the foreign 
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roots of the American narcotics problems. They did not mention analgesic 
opiates such as morphine which also caused widespread iatrogenic (self-
inflicted) addiction. 
The Smoking Opium Exclusion Acts banned imports of prepared opium for 
smoking in the US. Scholars have long discussed the Sinophobia of this 
period,8 but there is an important material qualifier that supplemented this 
racism. By outlawing smoking opium, Congress was approving certain types 
of narcotic and prohibiting others. Morphine, popular with white middle-class 
women, was still freely available. The chemical form a narcotic took was an 
indication of its acceptability. By passing the Opium Exclusion Acts, 
Congress sketched out a model that would lead to drug schedules that 
categorised the legitimacy of a drug by its material composition and capacity 
to be used in injurious or recreational ways. Classifying narcotics by their 
materiality was inherently geopolitical. Certain types of narcotics from certain 
places were a threat to the US, whereas others were not. This early 
stratification of narcotics was the basis for alcohol regulation during 
prohibition; some alcohols were deemed medical, and thus legitimate, if 
prescribed by a doctor.9  
The Harrison Narcotics Act 
The pressure by religious activists dovetailed with the aims of the nascent 
pharmaceutical lobby who watched the passage of the 1914 Harrison 
Narcotics Act closely. They recognised that public opinion against opium 
threatened their medical markets. In 1913, the Charlotte Observer wrote that 
the US ‘imports more than 100,000 pounds of opium [this] proves, therefore, 
that the balance is being used either for smoking or illicit medical 
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purposes’.10 Pharmaceutical companies worried that Congress might ban 
many of the medicinal products they manufactured. They courted the 
religious lobby to create legitimacy for themselves. The American 
Pharmaceutical Association (APhA), the American Medical Association 
(AMA), the State Department, and the Treasury Department, all worked with 
Dr Hamilton-Wright to craft the Harrison Act. As Musto argues ‘by 1914, 
prominent newspapers, physicians, pharmacists and congressmen believed 
opiates and cocaine predisposed habitués towards insanity and crime’.11 
This division between medical, scientific, and quasi-medical/ recreational that 
was outlined in the Harrison Act became the defining backbone of the US 
drug legislation. This led to a seductively simplistic conclusion: ‘the only 
method which can stamp out drug addiction all over the world is to reduce 
opium production to the exact needs for scientific and medicinal purposes’.12 
Prohibition would be reached by ensuring a monopoly on legitimate 
provision. Convincing the world of this approach would become a priority for 
US diplomats at future negotiations.  
The 1914 Harrison Act clamped down on the abuse of narcotics for the 
population at large by making all narcotics less accessible. However, it had 
unintended consequences. Fewer middle-class women used morphine, but 
more working-class Americans picked up an opiate habit in the form of 
heroin, an opiate that had been discovered in 1874 and marketed as cough 
medicine.13 With the Harrison Act limiting domestic access to pharmaceutical 
supplies, demand for heroin and morphine grew. In 1924, heroin was banned 
from the United States as both a medicine and recreational substance. By 
1915, American concerns with alcohol and drug use were reflected in society 
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in groups such as the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and 
the Anti-Saloon League (ASL). Temperance advocates concentrated on the 
spiritual aspects of drug abuse, particularly the pervasive and unwholesome 
human desire to alter human consciousness.14 There were complex debates 
about the morality of drug use, but ardent prohibitionists coated drug and 
alcohol use with a moral gloss that saw intoxication of any kind as an 
individual problem. This project, however, is concerned with how the 
production of the trade was portrayed. Geopolitically, the blame was cast 
outside of the United States as the domestic demand for smuggled narcotics 
grew.15 This vindicated the anti-narcotic advocates’ position that narcotic 
abuse was foreign-born, domestically inflicted, and individually suffered.  
In 1919, journalist Albert Weber, responding to the Chinese decision to buy 
some £3,000,000 of British Indian Opium, described the decision as ‘China’s 
Future Opium Evil Problem’.16 The strictest prohibitionists of the Temperance 
movement developed the colonial links further. Many Western missionaries 
in Asia found their work hampered by a suspicion of opium.17 The actions of 
their own government, in supporting the monopoly, would further impede the 
word of God. They argued passionately against the opium monopoly as a 
medical programme and response to addiction. They posited it as little more 
than a revenue stream for colonial centres. Consumption was individualised, 
but production was collectivised to become a problem of international 
relations. In ‘Temperance Torchlights’, a booklet full of poems, essays, and 
topics on the Temperance Movement written by Matilda Erickson, a prolific 
author for young people, one memorable poem entitled ‘Sparks from the 
Anvil’ thundered that ‘when the Dutch Flag was raised on a certain Island in 
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the East Indies, the first building was not a school, nor a church, but an 
opium den’.18 With many citizens describing the McKinley administration’s 
decision to take the Philippines as a form of European imperialism, the 
Temperance movement offered McKinley a strategy for distancing the US 
from other colonial centres by taking a strong stance on opium.19 
Geonarcotics post World War One 
After the First World War, diplomats sought to regulate the trade in legal 
narcotics as the American public’s view of the League of Nations, and its 
efforts to control narcotics became decidedly hostile. At the League, 
American drug diplomats had a nuanced agenda. They wanted strict control 
of the trade for two reasons: to limit diversion into the black-market and to 
maximise their medical stockpiles in the face of future conflict. These twin 
understandings of opiates would influence diplomatic proceedings for the 
next forty years.  
Strict prohibition advocates, emboldened by the success of the 1919 
Volstead Act, looked to the American diplomats to eradicate opium abuse. It 
is worth comparing the geopolitical significance of alcohol and narcotic 
prohibition. With alcohol, prohibition was an introspective exercise. Blame 
was cast inwards towards American brewers, saloons, and distilleries. 
Bootleg beer and whiskey were a domestic problem, but also compounded 
by the imports of whiskey and gin from the UK and Canada (ironically, 
Canadian drinkers in Ontario viewed American drinkers as troublesome and 
representative of social disorder).20 With narcotics, the blame was cast 
entirely outwards towards smugglers and foreign governments. Opium was a 
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foreign problem created by specific foreign actors. In 1922, the Washington 
Post ran an article titled ‘British Opium Policy is a Menace to the World’. The 
piece excoriated the British for a policy in which ‘America [was] being 
systematically drugged’.21 The article drew on statistics from the Public 
Health Service of the Treasury which compared the average per capita 
consumption of grains of opium in Italy (1 grain) and Germany (2 grains) with 
the United States (36 grains). It argued that the British were expanding their 
trade to previously held German territories in Africa and fuelling demand in 
China. While not blaming the British directly for opium smuggling, the 
newspaper argued the black-market grew out of the legal trade and that 
responsibility to combat it lay with the British. The Pittsburgh Daily Post ran a 
similar story in 1923. It reported that the US was the number one consumer 
of dope (referring to opium, morphine, and heroin) in the world, imbibing over 
17 times more than in any other country. It posited that American addicts 
were consuming enough dope to furnish 36 doses to every man, woman, 
and child in the country.22 This was despite the 1914 Harrison Act. As the 
paper lamented, the Harrison Act ‘prohibits altogether the importation of 
derivatives. But it cannot prevent smuggling.’23  
America’s role as the world’s largest consumer of illicit opium was incidental, 
rather than constitutive of, the opium evil discourse. Demand was 
understood to be a function of supply. This meant that newspapers focused 
on the illegal diversion of legal stocks from colonial trade into the black 
market. This dovetailed with domestic racism. Opium smoking was a 
Chinese behaviour. Indeed, Grayson notes that as early as 1920, some 
Canadian commentators speculated that narcotics were being used as a 
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weapon to overthrow the white races.24 Hostility to the flows of certain types 
of narcotic into the United States was present, rather than a rejection of 
narcotics per se. The legal flows of morphine, codeine, and other derivatives 
into the United States were controlled by the Harrison Act and Narcotics 
Division’s accountants. The trade in raw opium and prepared opium for 
smoking, both illegal in the US, was not. Geonarcotic discourse scripted 
narcotics by the chemical form in which a user encountered them. Only by 
convincing other nations of the danger and immorality of the legal trade in 
raw and prepared opium (from other countries), could the US be protected. 
This idea was developed by one man who stepped onto the drug regulation 
scene in 1919.  
Richmond Pearson Hobson 
Admiral Richmond Pearson Hobson lived an extraordinary life. As a naval 
officer in American-Spanish war, he had been responsible for the sinking of 
his ship (The Merrimac) in the Battle of Santiago Bay. He gave the order to 
blockade the bay to try to stop Spanish ships from entering. It failed, and 
Hobson was captured. At the end of the hostilities, Hobson was released and 
Congress, unsure whether to imprison or honour him, presented him with the 
Medal of Honour. Hobson became a House Representative for Alabama but 
did not excel in formal politics.25 Sir Arthur Willert, The Times correspondent 
in Washington, recalled ‘he [Hobson] came home as a national hero, but 
unfortunately allowed himself to be kissed in railway stations and other public 
places by female admirers. That finished him’.26 In the 1920s, Hobson turned 
to what he saw as a scourge of substance abuse. He retired from formal 
politics and spent the remainder of his years campaigning for alcohol and 
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narcotic prohibition. At the height of his career, he was the highest paid 
speaker on the alcohol prohibition circuit, accruing large profits from the Anti-
Saloon League. After the repeal of the Volstead Act, Hobson would focus on 
narcotics until his death in 1937.27 
Hobson made sure his speeches and writings recognised the foreign nature 
of narcotics and the threat they represented to the US, a strategy he had 
used to whip up anti-Japanese fervour in the 1910s.28 He did this with widely 
exaggerated claims about the extent of addiction, and by blaming the Bureau 
of Public Health for suppressing these statistics.29 In 1924, Hobson sent a 
memorandum entitled the ‘Menace of Narcotics Shadows the World’ to King 
George V in London. The letter exaggerated claims of addiction, suggesting 
there were five times as many drug addicts in the US as there had been 
African slaves. Hobson implored King George to recognise that  
America is assailed by Opium with Asia as a base, by Cocaine with 
South America as a base, by Heroin and Synthetic Drugs with Europe 
as a base. This deadly drug warfare, that from three sides is striking at 
our citizens, our homes, our institutions.  
This ‘germplasm of our people’, according to Hobson, was ‘more dangerous 
for our future than would be united warfare against us from these 
continents’.30 He repeated this assertion in a New York Times article on 9th 
November. King George declined to reply.  
Hobson spatialised the narcotic threat. He gave it a geography. The US was 
under attack on both coasts and from the south. Drugs flowed into the US 
from uncaring colonial territories and were facilitated by an incompetent 
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international bureaucracy at the League’s headquarters in Geneva. Hobson 
cast blame outside of the US and, in doing so, away from the issue of why 
people consumed narcotics.  
For Hobson, the proliferation of narcotics into semi-synthetic forms was as 
dangerous as the smuggler who brought them in. Hobson helped shaped 
what Jasanoff and Kim call a socio-technical imaginary. They use this 
concept to describe how visions of the future are transformed into realisable 
political goals.31 A socio-technical imaginary is by no means a simple 
representation of an issue that is repeated in the news and media; it 
operates in between ‘public opinion and instrumental state policy’.32 It shapes 
government activity, the allocation of funds and, in this instance, the 
development of legislation. I use the concept to think through Hobson’s 
geography of drug production and his prophecy for a terrifying, unregulated 
chemical future.  
In one sense, Hobson’s socio-technical imaginary was prophetic. The growth 
of new substances did indeed present the international system with new 
problems. Hobson’s early warnings about technological fatalism tied into a 
foreign-focussed discourse. In the 1920s and 1930s, the US pharmaceutical 
industry lagged behind Europe and Japan. Hobson suggested unchecked 
pharmaceutical growth threatened the United States with their chemical 
creations. He attacked the chemical sciences, directly citing the industries 
inability to control or understand new compounds they were creating. In a 
1924 New York Times article, amid the ongoing discussions at the LoN’s 
1925 Convention, Hobson wrote  
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Modern chemistry, responsible for morphine, cocaine and heroin, as 
yet offers no sure defence against the Frankenstein of its own 
creation, nor has medical science been able to cope with this 
merciless exploitation of the human race.33 
Hobson believed the American people should protect themselves against 
narcotics through education. In 1927, Hobson founded the World Narcotic 
Defence Association (WNDA) to provide this service. This was a public 
pressure group that dominated the airwaves in the USA. Hobson’s salary 
reflects his importance in this movement, as his $7,000 annual paycheck 
was the WNDA’s single largest expenditure (the next highest paid staff 
member received around $500 from 1934-1935).34 The WNDA preached its 
message through the Press, the Pulpit, and the Radio.35 It castigated the 
1925 Conventions and celebrated the 1931 Conventions alike.36 It served as 
the public mouthpiece of America’s quest for stringent international drug 
laws, organising a Narcotic Education Week in the second week of February 
of every year from 1930 until Hobson’s unexpected death in 1937.  
With the repealing of alcohol prohibition in 1930, mafia involvement and 
smuggling in narcotics grew, seemingly vindicating Hobson’s predictions. 
Missionary groups, disappointed with the failure of alcohol prohibition, 
supported his anti-narcotic message. Hobson drew on his experience as a 
military figure who had spent time abroad to lecture on a coming war with 
narcotics. He painted the traffickers and smugglers as a terrifying adversary. 
In an indicative passage, in one of the pamphlets of the WNDA in 1931, he 
stated there was  
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A dark cloud on the horizon. When the traffickers in narcotics were 
driven out of Turkey by the drastic action of that government [strict 
domestic laws which banned production in certain areas] and the 
vigilant enforcement activities of the Turkish officials charged with that 
duty, they invaded Bulgaria and China, and are there engaging in 
extensive activities, which will require resolute decision on the part of 
the government, and zeal on part of its enforcement officials.37  
Hobson used the WNDA to change how the international trade in drugs was 
understood by the public. Eschewing the delicacies and intricacies of League 
deliberations, the importance of provision, and the complaints of other 
nations, his achievement was to remove nuance and context from the world 
drug problem. Hobson’s narco-geography was filled with synthetic narcotics, 
stubborn and irresponsible nations, greedy scientists, feckless 
manufacturers, and shadowy traffickers outside of the United States.  
Narcotics were discursively separated by legality and their medical value. 
The public knowledge of licit painkiller provision was slowly marginalised, as 
was the League’s important work in this field, at least in the minds of the 
American public. His annual Narcotic Education Week made narcotics — 
and America’s battle against them — a public issue. 
Image removed. 
FIGURE 7: POLITICAL EDITORIAL BY JAMES ENRIGHT ENTITLED ‘FROM THE EAST AS 
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DOPE. WASHINGTON HERALD, 10TH SEPTEMBER 1934. SOURCE: HARRY 
ANSLINGER ARCHIVES, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, AUTHORS PHOTO. 
Scholars have debated Hobson’s convictions regarding the narcotic 
problem.38 As a formidable fundraiser, whose livelihood and reputation was 
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dependent upon deep-seated fears of narcotics, it is no wonder some 
scholars point to his wild exaggerations regarding narcotic abuse (claiming 
millions of addicts menaced the United States as early as 1920). He 
earnestly lobbied his old colleagues in Congress to mandate drug education 
and wrote educational pamphlets he desired to see in every school.  
More than any other figure, Richmond P. Hobson took the pulse of the 
American public most accurately by focusing on post-war American anxieties 
that were existential in their nature. In doing so, he gave geonarcotic 
discourse an affective intensity. Rupert Wilkinson has typified these anxieties 
into four broad categories: the fear of being owned and dependent (through 
colonial rule), the fear of anarchy and societal collapse, the fear of failing 
progress in America’s goals and the fear of losing past virtue.39 Hobson 
slotted drugs into all four of these fears.  
One of the least researched parts of the early anti-narcotics armature is 
Hobson’s influence in international diplomacy. Significantly, Hobson helped 
shaped develop the US’ strict and non-negotiable position at the League of 
Nations. Through the WNDA, he bought the debates at the OAC squarely 
into the public eye. In 1936, he noted that the WNDA’s relationship with both 
the League and the State Department had become ‘more intimate’, noting 
that the Secretariat of the League had published a special document 
reporting on the WNDA’s activities.40 The League was interested in the 
variety of activities that the WNDA and its affiliated organisation were taking 
against drug abuse since the League did little to promote education and 
awareness itself.41 Through Hobson, the obscure and technical discourse of 
diplomatic process became a pressing issue of public concern. This public 
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scrutiny meant that the American delegation could not afford to lose face at 
the 1925 Geneva Conference. For a nation defined by narcotic 
exceptionalism, Hobson’s socio-technical imaginary gave legitimacy the 
delegation’s decision to withdraw from the 1925 conferences.  
Hobson created an international arm of the WNDA and called it the Geneva 
Centre (the eponymous location of the League of Nation’s headquarters in 
the early 1930s). This Centre leveraged LoN diplomats, providing Hobson 
with some access to diplomatic proceedings. In a memorandum circulated 
between League delegates, the Geneva Centre was painted in a positive 
light, which noted its ‘firm intention of doing everything within their power to 
promote the successes of any conferences which the League of Nations may 
hold in the future’.42 If anything, a warm reception to the centre was one 
small condolence the League could offer the US after their withdrawal from 
the 1925 Conventions. The Geneva Centre communicated with the Director 
of the Opium Traffic Section of the LoN, which in turn corresponded with the 
OAC.  
American reactions to the 1925 Conference withdrawals 
The American press reported the delegation’s decision to withdraw from the 
1925 Convention favourably.43 One local Pennsylvanian newspaper noted 
that without the American presence, the conference was in a ‘terribly 
weakened position’.44 The press also noted the plight of China, itself a victim 
of the colonial-administered opium evil. The Indiana Palladium noted that 
American missionaries had first begun their fight against narcotics in China 
and that they should not give up because of this setback.45 Congressman 
Lindenberger of California introduced a resolution to hold another 
190 
 
international conference in the US on the narcotic evil, effectively 
embarrassing the League of Nations. He drew support from Hobson, who 
made thorough plans for the conference. He planned for President Coolidge 
to invite 500 delegates from countries around the world and 2000 delegates 
representing concerned organisations, states, provinces, and cities.46 
Although that conference never materialised, it signalled the exceptionalism 
the US felt as both a victim and leader in the fight against narcotics.  
Much of the blame for the US’ plight was focused on Europe. The press had 
long criticised the Colonial Centres’ grasp on the trade in manufactured 
narcotics. In 1923, the Chicago Tribune accused Europe of ‘narcotic fakery’, 
noting ‘well over 90% of all narcotics seized in and near New York City in 
original packaging have been of foreign manufacture. This seems to point 
the finger of accusation directly at Europe’.47 This is important insofar as it 
draws our attention to the first of many examples where seizures at US 
borders acquired geopolitical significance due to their packaging. Packing 
became a critical part of early efforts to geolocate the origin of opium 
seizures. This is discussed further in chapter four. 
Hobson took advantage of the stuttering diplomatic progress to press for 
domestic legislation.48 In 1925, he pushed for the passage of the Uniform 
Narcotic Act, a law that would harmonise state-wide legislation to stop 
domestic smuggling and was ultimately successful in doing so.49  
In a radio address celebrating the success of the implementation of the 1931 
Convention, Hobson identified the next goal of narcotics legislation as 
‘destroying altogether the narcotic Drug Evil. There remains the evil’s other 
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main root, — ineffectively restricted production of the raw materials out of 
which narcotic drugs can be made’.50 This evil of ‘ineffectively restricted 
production’ drew the American press focus on the opium and coca crops of 
Asia and South America.  
In assemblage terms, Hobson did much to territorialise the American drug 
control towards prohibition. He connected narcotics to a variety of other 
issues: alcohol; through a shared framework of control, foreign policy; 
through the imperial powers, and new synthetic substances through the 
chemical sciences. Hobson also abetted Anslinger, protesting when plans 
were made to subsume the FBN into the Secret Service. He is what 
McConnell & Dittmer refer to as a ‘liminal figure’ in the drug control 
assemblage: he was not a traditional diplomat who represented American 
interests at the LoN, but he influenced the public and on formal US drug 
control position.51 As Musto suggests, ‘although not respected by someone 
like Anslinger, [Hobson] was used as an active propaganda force; he knew 
influential people’.52 It was Hobson’s ability to enrol new actors to the cause 
of drug control that made him so useful.  
Hobson’s direct contribution to the League of Nation’s debates was minimal, 
but he did much to intensify the affective struggles and representation of the 
US position at the League by exaggerating America’s battle with narcotics. 
His role in creating US drug diplomacy is therefore central, showing how 
scholars must look beyond traditional diplomatic histories to understand how 
geopolitical subjectivities emerge.  
192 
 
The WNDA eventually went bankrupt in 1936, and Hobson died of a heart 
attack on the 16th March 1937. After his death, another figure picked up on 
the importance of shaping geonarcotic discourse. However, this figure was 
very much an insider, more aware of the multiple materialities of opium and 
the League’s bureaucratic processes. Harry Anslinger would code both the 
American and international drug assemblages towards prohibition. 
Anslinger’s geonarcotics 
As alcohol prohibition ended in 1930, many of the Bureau of Prohibition’s 
employees were transferred to the newly created the FBN. Part of its remit 
involved educating the public about the dangers of drug abuse. In his early 
years, Anslinger was happy to collaborate with Hobson, effectively 
outsourcing education to the WNDA. He appeared at their events to address 
the nation on the dangers of narcotics. Anslinger like Hobson, played down 
the issue of consumption. It was an unfortunate, individual failing, ultimately 
caused by foreign forces. After Hobson’s death, Anslinger assumed the role 
of America’s anti-narcotic hero by feeding the press information about FBN 
busts and raids. As Pembleton argues, he did this by working with reporter 
Frederic Sondhern in the late 1940s,53 yet we can trace Anslinger’s use of 
the press back even further to the creation of the FBN. 
Alfred Blanco and the opium monopolies 
Disagreement over the efficacy and ethics of opium monopolies reared its 
head again in 1929. The US’s role in discrediting the opium monopoly is an 
important part of geonarcotic discourse. While monopolies were touted as 
public health interventions in Japan, the opium evil discourse was built on 
individual choice, rather than a collective understanding of public health. 
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Opium consumption, unless prescribed, was a moral failing in the eyes of 
anti-narcotic campaigners in the US. The best thing governments could do 
was to make it as difficult as possible for individuals to obtain opium. A 
material argument for licensed opium monopolies emerged, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, from the Anti Opium Information Bureau (AOB), an 
organisation that usually supported strict prohibition based in China. This 
one-man organisation was founded by the ‘colourful cosmopolite’54 Alfredo 
Blanco, a disgruntled ex-officer of the League’s Opium Section who worked 
there from 1922-1928, yet was dismissed due to his more radical advocacy 
of all-out prohibition. Described as a ‘striking figure, speaking perfect English 
and French, sartorially dressed with white spats’, he was credited with 
keeping ‘the narcotics problem alive for the general public, thus obtaining 
their support’.55 Blanco was a keen proponent of supply reduction measures 
in the Far East; dross was the substance that remained after being smoked, 
roughly 40-60% of the original opium.56 This contained a small measure of 
morphine which could then converted into purer forms of morphine or heroin. 
The AOB recommended a monopoly system in China so that the dross could 
be collected from registered addicts, rather than making its way into the 
black market. Privately, Anslinger suggested he would support it if opium 
smoking were legalised, but that publicly, he could not express an opinion.57 
Geonarcotics, Japan, and the Hearst newspapers 
In the late 1930s, the blame for the world narcotic problem moved from 
Europe to hostile nations in Asia. This was due to geopolitical developments. 
Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the declaration of war by the 
British on Germany on September 3, 1939, meant that American foreign 
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policy became more aggressive, culminating with their entry into World War 
Two in 1941.  
As the situation with Japan worsened, League officials struggled to challenge 
the country directly on its opium policy. Leaks were an important mechanism 
for pressuring change. They could shame a nation into action, but leaking 
official data submitted voluntarily by states could also discourage 
participation in the future League activities. When leaks did occur, they were 
channelled through the Anti-Opium Bureau. The AOB produced pamphlets 
with titles such as ‘The Drug Evil in China’ and ‘Japanese Drug Trade 
Poisoning North China.58 Many of Blanco’s reports and ideas – including a 
plan to halt all opium smoking and eating by 1948 and another to reduce the 
world requirement of raw opium to 290 tons — were cited in American 
newspapers and drew massive support in China.59 He invoked the ire of 
many senior League officials by accusing the League of being beholden to 
countries ‘financially interested in the manufacture of narcotics’.60 Blanco had 
little hope for a change of stance from the Japanese, describing this as likely 
‘as forest fires in the North Pole’.61 
Anslinger was also less concerned with diplomatic protocol. He deployed the 
full force of the media to vividly render the narcotics problem with a 
Japanese taint. Much has been written on the association between Anslinger 
and the media.62 Marshall suggests Anslinger had few qualms with 
exaggerating narratives in order to give credence to the important work of the 
FBN. Douglas Kinder notes that Anslinger used the media to ‘sensationalize 
intelligence reports reflect[ing] a crusading side of Anslinger's personality. He 
employed that tactic to redirect the public's perception of drugs toward the 
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one held by the FBN’.63 Kinder also labels Anslinger as a survivalist: when 
the Roosevelt administration looked to restructure the FBN and transfer its 
functions and agents into the Secret Service, he was forced to respond. Both 
moves threatened the very existence of the FBN and with it Anslinger’s 
career. It remained in the FBN’s interest to highlight the importance of its 
work, particularly in stopping foreign drugs from reaching the United States. 
To do so, it needed an echoing chamber to highlight both the scale of the 
problem and the FBN’s role in solving it. William Randolph Hearst was a 
newspaper magnate whose papers reported the progress made at the LoN 
and America’s efforts to convince the world of the importance of the 
prohibitory approach. Hearst newspapers would do much to politically code 
the US drug assemblage and the FBN’s role in it. While the details of 
Anslinger’s relationship with Hearst are unclear, there can be no mistaking 
their symbiotic gains. Some have pointed to Hearst’s heavy investments in 
the wood pulp as a reason for his aversion to marijuana (the hemp plant 
threatened to destabilise the wood pulp industry). Others point to the 
Mexican Revolution, and some 80,000 acres of land Hearst lost in this 
process, citing this as a factor for his eagerness to castigate the foreign drug 
and its Latino users.64 Hearst newspapers had focussed on the ‘Oriental’ 
problem of opium smoking during the 1900s, and then on the mafia 
connection post-prohibition 1930s. For Taylor, Hearst newspapers were 
critical to developing drug law. He notes that ‘publicity was considered to be 
the most important weapon in the fight against the drug evil’.65 I examine this 
idea specifically for narcotics. Hearst newspapers focused on the foreign and 
domestic parts of the illegal drug trade. As we shall see, geonarcotic 
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discourse was affective. It tied into wider fears of impending conflict to bring 
the FBN into the US war effort. 
William Randolph Hearst’s newspaper conglomerate was the perfect 
bedfellow for geonarcotic discourse. It had long emphasised the foreign 
aspects of America’s ills, and Heart’s aversion to ‘Oriental’ immigration has 
been documented elsewhere.66 His newspapers attacked plans to use 
Chinese Labour to dig the Panama Canal, and opposed the intermarriage of 
American and Japanese citizens. His newspapers had tracked the FBN’s 
battle against the Mafia and Chinese Tongs who had muscled into the 
narcotics trade after alcohol prohibition in 1933.67 After the Russo-Japanese 
War, Hearst saw Japan as threatening US interest and territories in the 
Pacific.68 Narcotics were a conduit for anti-Japanese sentiment. The Hearst 
newspapers ran a series of political editorials on the threat of narcotics to the 
United States in 1934. These editorials were accompanied by foreboding 
cartoons. The cartoonists included well-known figures such as Frederick 
Packer, Walter Enright, and Windsor McCay.  
The campaign was well received by the political elite in Washington. An 
article dated 31 July 1934 from the Washington Herald entitled ‘Hearst 
Campaign Lauded for Campaign on Dope Evil’ reported that a Superior 
Court Judge congratulated the campaign for its ceaseless efforts to educate 
the public on the narcotic menace. 
Image removed. 
FIGURE 8: STILL A MENACE’ WASHINGTON HERALD, THURSDAY, JULY 12TH, 1934 
SOURCE: THE HARRY ANSLINGER FILES, PENNSYLVANIA STATE ARCHIVES, 
AUTHOR’S PHOTO.69 
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Figure 8 depicts the foreign aspects of the drugs trade. While Americans 
squabbled amongst themselves over the details of domestic legislation, 
foreign drugs, symbolised by death, make their way ashore. The image 
establishes the US as a victim nation. The editorial accompanying the image 
describes the passage of the 1931 Convention that came into force in 1933. 
It asserted Japan had ‘conquered provinces of Manchukuo and Jehol [and] 
are fostering opium culture and putting out vast quantities of cheap morphine 
which reaches our West coast’.70 This is the first hint that narcotics were 
deliberately being produced for the American consumer. 
Image removed. 
FIGURE 9: STAMP IT OUT’, THE WASHINGTON HERALD, OCTOBER 19TH, 1934, 
SOURCE: THE HARRY ANSLINGER FILES, PENNSYLVANIA STATE ARCHIVES, 
AUTHOR’S PHOTO.71 
Hearst newspapers saw the US government as the main defence against 
narcotics. This second cartoon in Figure 9 personified dope as a snake-like 
creature, struggling to penetrate the US under the watchful eye of the FBN, 
(‘dope’ is used as an umbrella term for all drugs, as opposed to just 
narcotics). The editorial notes that ‘the Federal Narcotics Bureau has already 
made substantial progress in stopping our newest dope menace- cheap 
smuggled opium from the Far East… State enforcement officials must now 
support adequately the Federal Government’s intensified campaign’. This 
refers to the State Uniform Narcotic Act. Recall that the Act was designed to 
harmonise state regulations so that a minimal level of regulation and control 
existed across the country in the licensing, purchasing, and selling of 
narcotics. In 1933, only nine states had ratified the act, and in 1935 
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Roosevelt publicly endorsed the Act in a message on Columbia Radio 
Network.  
Image removed. 
FIGURE 10: ‘STILL POURING IN’ WASHINGTON HERALD, JUNE 18TH, 1934. SOURCE: 
THE HARRY ANSLINGER FILES, PENNSYLVANIA STATE ARCHIVES, AUTHOR’S 
PHOTO.72 
The image in Figure 10 depicts the opium bloc – a collection of colonial 
nations unwilling to end their unregulated trades in opium, heroin, and 
morphine – as the figure of greed. Notable is the association of the bloc with 
John Bull and British fashion. The UK was perceived as the ringleader of the 
narcotic nations, particularly after it refused to place restrictions upon its 
prepared opium exports to its territories (despite the Bangkok Conference on 
opium smoking). The editorial makes direct reference to the failure of the 
opium bloc to make substantial progress on the opium problem. It instead 
noted all the bloc could offer were ‘pious platitudes’.  
The article vindicates the honest and moral demands of the American 
delegates at the League. It consecrates America’s exceptionalism as an anti-
narcotic nation. With punitive narcotics policy that disavowed all but the most 
tightly regulated supplies of medical and scientific drugs, the USA was 
unique. This is demonstrated by a triumphant report in the Washington Star 
in November 1934. It celebrated Fuller’s scathing criticisms of the opium 
monopolies of France and Great Britain, which offended the Swiss, Dutch, 
Indian, and Austrian delegates.  
By 1938, the geonarcotic discourse had firmly shifted from Europe to Japan. 
The US had gained support for their position. The Ottawa Journal reported 
that Colonel Sharman, the Canadian drugs czar, ‘stood behind Fuller’s 
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attacks on Japanese narcotics policy 100% in 1938’.73 The Albuquerque 
Journal later reported that four other nations, China, India, Great Britain, and 
Egypt concurred with Fuller’s accusations.74  
Hearst newspapers functioned as a mouthpiece of the FBN. Occasionally, 
opinions that were contradictory to the FBN’s stance slipped through the net. 
The example of Army Doctor Captain La Roe, stationed at Lowry Field 
shows this clearly. La Roe was a supporter of maintenance policies. These 
provided addicts with medically-authorised narcotics to deal with their 
cravings. La Roe had published in American Weekly. This was anathema to 
the FBN position. Very quickly, Anslinger described him as a ‘dangerous 
demagogue’ and the Medical Corps denounced his position as not of their 
office. In a letter, Anslinger noted the article was contrary to Hearst policies 
and ‘as is sometimes the case, some of these fanatics sell themselves to an 
editor who is not thoroughly familiar with the policies and it takes some time 
to correct the situation’.75  
The Hearst newspapers painted a sardonic picture of a real and terrifying 
future due to the stuttering progress on international narcotic prohibition at 
the League of Nations. The cartoon editorials analysed here encouraged a 
resigned, cynical chuckle at foreign incompetence, but they also pointed to a 
biopolitics of drug use. As Malleck suggests, a good citizen was of good 
morality and physicality. Their civic duty was also their duty to their own 
body.76 American’s would not find help from the opium bloc, nor, under 
Anslinger’s tenure, should they look to their own government to protect their 
fragile corporeality against foreign dope. To win the fight against narcotics, 
they had to stay strong, sure of purpose, and most importantly, sober. 
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Narcotics as a weapon of war 
Just before the outbreak of war, narcotic discourse would undergo a new 
development that shifted the attention Eastwards. The 1930s was the first 
era of ‘narcotisation’, or the belief that certain nations were using narcotics 
as weapons of war. As Malleck suggests, addiction was a term that was 
‘rooted in notions of slavery and a loss of freedom’.77 It did not prove difficult 
to link a public health crisis to wider geopolitics.  
Nevertheless, the press and politicians who accused another nation of 
narcotisation took a large step forward from condemning the policies of 
London, Amsterdam, and Paris. The most viperous criticism levelled against 
Japan was that it was deliberately flooding China with narcotics to make its 
population amenable to conquest. By actively peddling drugs for finances in 
Japanese-administered Manchuria and Formosa, critics alleged that Japan 
was fostering addiction among the Chinese, and weakening the body politic. 
In 1937, Anslinger filed a report to the Commission on Genocide 
recommending narcotics be considered a weapon of war.78 
Narcotisation was portrayed as a biopolitical form of warfare, enacted by a 
cruel and callous enemy. With Japan’s withdrawal from the LoN, the FBN 
was free from the usual practices of restrained diplomacy in making such 
drastic allegations, and the State Department did not intervene to stop the 
narcotisation discourse. In 1940, the AOB produced a press release entitled 
‘Narcotics as a Weapon of War’ which argued that ‘the man who has never 
touched drugs and who would give his life for his country is capable, when 
doped, of betraying his country’.79 The issue of enslavement, demoralisation, 
and surrender of the Chinese population dominated American perceptions of 
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the foreign drug trade. The occupied territories in China became a ‘vast 
arsenal of narcotics’80 as Japan was using Manchukuo for the base of its 
nefarious operations. In one letter sent to the editors of the Fresno Bee in 
December of 1937, a concerned citizen noted ‘with Japan cognizant of the 
terrible power of opium to subjugate whole peoples, with a minimum of 
military activity, should we not become cognizant of our own susceptibility?’81 
The form of weaponised opium was invariably smoking opium. The Muncie 
Evening Press reported smoking opium was peddled through opium 
monopolies, and that this had the dual purpose of ‘smashing his [the 
enemy’s] resistance and making him pay for it at the same time.’82 This 
represents the two dimensions of the weaponisation thesis. The Chinese 
were first subjugated physically through their continued addiction to smoking 
opium, facilitated by the Japanese, who then reaped the financial rewards of 
selling the narcotics. The newspaper drew on charges made by Stuart Fuller 
at the OAC and noted that the Japanese were charged with importing opium 
from Iran and ‘manufacturing huge quantities of narcotic derivatives and 
exporting them to the United States and other countries for the illicit traffic’.83 
Furthermore, Americans who purchased narcotics illegally were seen to be 
aiding Japan’s military. Upton Close was a journalist specialising in the Far 
East. He gave a lecture in Portland where he suggested Japan gained 
‘money to purchase materials of war from the United States by selling in 
America 90% of the narcotics Japan produced’.84 While this report went 
uncorroborated, the assertion was clear. Buying illicit drugs meant US 
citizens were helping the Japanese develop their war machine.  
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As Grayson suggests, ‘ideas of security and Canadian identity [have] 
managed to code particular practices as unCanadian, thereby making it 
possible to pursue various forms of prohibition’.85 In the US, geonarcotic 
discourse was inscribed into the bodies of Americans. The moral and 
physical weaknesses of users directly contributed to America’s enemies, the 
bodies of addicts were sites ‘where geopolitical strategy [was] animated and 
made material’.86 A true patriot was a sober patriot. Just one sniff, injection, 
or puff on a pipe was enough to render an American amenable to conquest 
from a foreign foe, putting the security of the rest of the nation at risk. 
Anslinger’s Army: Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde 
Commissioner Anslinger — the authoritative source on narcotics in the US in 
the late 1930s — gathered a network of allies early in his career. John 
Collins calls this network of grassroots organisations ‘Anslinger’s Army’.87 
This included the Foreign Policy Association (FPA), the General Federation 
of Women’s Clubs, the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, and the 
National Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU). Despite his lack of 
medical credentials,88 Anslinger also courted the interests of the National 
Association of Retail Druggists (NARD) and the American Medical 
Association (AMA), a crucial move in his war against health professionals 
who disagreed with the Harrison Act’s stipulations on addiction.89 
These organisations helped spread geonarcotic discourse in the United 
States. Narcotisation was given a domestic mouthpiece through a joint 
publication of the Institute of Pacific Relations and the Foreign Policy 
Association (FPA), entitled, ‘Japan and the Opium Menace’ by Frederick T 
Merrill. This book, published in 1942, squarely laid blame ‘at the door of 
203 
 
Japan, and particularly of the commanders of the Japanese armies operating 
in Chinese territories and the Kwantung- leased territory’.90 The book 
described a ‘Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde policy’ where Japan appeared ‘to have 
two opium policies. One towards its own citizens, the other as it relates to 
Chinese’.91 In other words, Japan abhorred opium use in Japan but used it to 
exploit other nations.  
Merrill alleged that Japanese traded opium in Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Kwangchowan. This opium would then make its way to the US. He argued 
opium seized in the US came with familiar labels (Lu Fook Yee, and Yick 
Kee, discussed further in chapter three). Where seizures were not directly 
applicable to Japanese smugglers, the book blamed the Southern Japanese 
invasion for an influx of refugees and increases in smuggling in that region. 
The book received interest in Canada and the UK, and parts were reprinted 
in Economic Record, New Masses, Chatham House, Far Eastern Quarterly 
and Magazine Digest.92 The text is important because it construed the US as 
‘the first country to fully recognise that it alone could not effectively limit the 
supply of drugs’, and that the international machinery was ‘a place where 
nations could be arraigned for transgressions against the common good’.93 It 
distorted the purpose of the OAC to that of a court rather than a debating 
chamber for future policy. It thus positioned Japan as a nation with no 
qualms about the opium trade, nor using it to exploit, pacify, and even kill its 
neighbours. 
As Bewley-Taylor rightly argues, ‘the United States consistently put its faith 
in a policy that held control at the source to be the most effective way to halt 
drug use within its own borders. Consequently, the source of the drug 
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problem had already been placed outside of American societal borders’. 94 I 
would add that this also applies to legal drug production, itself located 
outside of the United States.  
Geonarcotics post World War Two 
By the end of the war, a minority of ethnic Chinese users on the West Coast 
continued to smoke opium. Morphine, heroin, and codeine were the illegal 
narcotics of choice. At the same time, stockpiling caused the price of opium 
to increase to three times its value (discussed in chapter three).95 The 
seizures of narcotics dropped precipitously, as did the purity of morphine and 
heroin. Prices subsequently increased.96 Both were touted as a proof of the 
success of US policy. The FBN claimed that the lower purity inadvertently 
weaned addicts off their substances. It was a material signifier of the success 
of the US strategy of supply control at home.97 
However, World War Two was far more responsible for changes in the drug 
traffic than any policy decisions. The American geonarcotic focus continued 
to be fixed on the Far East, not least because of battalions of American 
troops stationed in the Pacific. With fears that injured and addicted soldiers 
could bring back a wave of demand to the United States, a discourse of 
narcotic containment preceded the discourse of communist containment.  
In chapter one, I noted that the closure of the opium monopolies was an 
important American victory. Here, I suggest the British and Dutch decisions 
were also guided by geonarcotic discourses. The viability of the opium 
monopolies had been tainted by Japanese abuses in Northern China.98 The 
history of the opium monopoly was told as a long history of negative 
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consequences for the health of citizens, particularly due to the influence of 
Miss Ellen Newbold La Motte and Elizabeth Washburn-Wright.99 The opium 
monopoly could not shake its moniker as an Axis method of conquest, rather 
than a public health approach to drug control. In the UK, the Temperance 
movement had long opposed London’s policies abroad, and public support 
for the market was at an all-time low.100 Additionally, the government of 
Chiang Kai-Shek had pledged to abolish opium smoking from its country 
under the ‘6 Year Plans’ made in 1935, and publicly burned 950,000 ounces 
of opium in January 1946 in Peiping.101 The very public and national 
commitment to anti-opium policy from the Chinese and the Dutch weighed 
heavily upon the British. Continuing monopolies in Hong-Kong, Burma, and 
Malay would inevitably lead to smuggling and undermine China’s largely 
symbolic efforts to rid itself of a problem inflicted upon it. 
The US applied geopolitical pressure to the imperial powers. The Judd 
Resolution of 1944 was passed by both houses. It called upon the US 
President to ask the opium-producing nations and empires to end their 
trades.102 The British did not want to risk alienating the Americans, an ally on 
whom they were entirely reliant during the latter years of the war. After 
closing their monopolies, Britain’s strategic interest shifted to its domestic 
manufacturing markets and pharmaceutical sector. Along with other colonial 
powers, the UK would become a powerful advocate for manufacturing 
nations.103  
Anslinger described the closures of the monopolies and commitments to the 
suppression of opium smoking as ‘the most important developments of all 
time in international drug control’.104 Congress also agreed: such success, 
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combined with previous victories during the war, led to a more aggressive 
US position when discussing the creation of the UN machinery. It 
engendered changes in the chemistry of world drug production. With the 
British no longer defending the ‘quasi-medical’ uses of opium smoking and 
eating, a cleaner division between acceptable uses, a key part of the 
American agenda, was a more realistic prospect. Following this, smoking 
opium became illegal across the world (apart from in Thailand).105 Opium 
production that was not intended for the legal market in semi-synthetics 
could now be considered, broadly speaking, illegitimate, if not illegal.  
The poppy persists: geonarcotic discourse in the Middle East 
In the immediate post-war period, prepared opium was still heavily required 
for the manufacture of codeine and morphine. The geography of narcotic 
production shifted to a group of newly independent Asian and Middle Eastern 
states: Iran, Turkey, Burma, and India, who proved more recalcitrant than the 
British when negotiating with the United States. The FBN complained of 
‘numerous seizures of raw opium in lumps and slabs which because of the 
morphine content of the opium and other factors appeared to be of Indian 
origin.106 Direct appeals to the Indians at the CND had little effect. Threats of 
onerous inspections at US borders were rebuffed by India, who threatened 
the same with American products. The FBN still relied on legal imports from 
the Indian government to bolster its stockpiles, and quietly backed away from 
the issue.  
Other countries toyed with the boundaries of acceptable practice, provoking 
new tactics from the US in response. McAllister believes that when Turkish 
opium production increased, the FBN began to subvert traditional diplomacy, 
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bypassing the Turkish government by dealing directly with the military in 
efforts to stem production.107 However, narcotic policy was often 
subordinated to broader foreign policy. The Indonesians also used opium to 
finance their resistance to the Dutch, and the French continued to sell opium 
through their monopoly, despite their announcements after the War. Walker 
suggests that the importance of the French as allies in the Cold War was 
prioritised over the FBN agenda, thereby preventing any criticism of this 
underhanded continuation of the opium monopoly.108  
While the changing geography of narcotic production between 1940 and 
1960 has been extensively documented,109 the geonarcotic discourses in the 
United States have not. The most astonishing shift in the FBN’s position was 
on China. 
The defeat and exiling of Chiang Kai-Shek and rise of Chairman Mao and the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949 caused great consternation among 
US drug control advocates. In September 1949, China offered to sell opium 
on the open market.110 Anslinger instantly banned all Chinese narcotic 
imports, along with other manufacturing states. He did not want to appear to 
be cooperating with the communist forces. The move also sent a clear signal 
that the United States did not believe that China had a legitimate stake in the 
legal market. Their attempt to sell opium for medical purposes was described 
as ’offering to dump 500 tons of opium along the shores of Western Nations, 
and for no other purpose than to weaken the people of those nations, just as 
Great Britain has done in India and China!’111 In Marshall’s view, China was 
emphasised as a rogue producing nation through the doctoring of reports 
and outright deception.  
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The Sixth Column: communist heroin, the Korean War and Red China 
In the same year, the ‘Big Four’ opium exporting nations (Turkey, Iran, India, 
and Yugoslavia) agreed upon a division of the licit market among 
themselves. It seemed, albeit briefly, that the world had come to a 
geopolitical consensus on the size and proportions of the market for narcotic 
medicine. That market excluded Chinese narcotics. Opium from China and 
Korea was as illicit and dangerous as the communists themselves (it also 
was memorably described as the ‘Sixth Column’ by Commissioner 
Anslinger). It threatened US troops and by extension, the US population at 
large. It became vital to stem the narcotic threat and contain it within a 
specific geographical area. Discourses of containment fused with the threat 
of narcotisation. Much like Japan before it, China became a country that was 
spreading an infection that could reach non-communist nations.112 Where the 
threat of foreign narcotics from Iran was met with assistance and offers to 
purchase licit opium (discussed in chapter three), it was not so with China.  
The FBN’s criticism of China became vitriolic and intense. I suggest this was 
a response to domestic developments concerning drug abuse. From the mid-
1940s onwards, challenges to FBN definitions of drug addiction began to 
gather support as the number of habitual users reached new highs.113 A two-
pronged attack was launched by political and medical detractors of 
prohibition in the early 1950s. Democratic Congressman John Coffee of 
Washington argued the FBN was subverting the original intentions of the 
1914 Harrison Narcotics Act and Supreme Court Justice rulings that 
permitted physicians to provide addicts with small amounts of narcotics. This 
was backed up by Professor Alfred Lindesmith, a medical sociologist who 
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questioned the entire basis of America’s drug laws. 114 In two articles, in 1951 
Lindesmith promoted the successes of the ‘English System’ of prescribing 
heroin for narcotic users.115 To make things worse, a year later the American 
Bar Association began to decry the 1952 Boggs Act that gave birth to the 
controversial ‘mandatory minimum’ sentencing guidelines, as well as the 
death penalty for those who sold narcotics to minors. 
Such criticism against the FBN came at a delicate time. The FBN had 
survived serious attempts at restructuring in the past by appearing extremely 
effective through small appropriations and high arrest rates. It was also a 
small bureau, and was more productive than any other law enforcement 
department (in terms of numbers of arrests per officer). While the voice of 
critics was relatively quiet, Anslinger fought them tooth and nail, writing a 
twenty-five-page response to Lindesmith’s ‘the Dope Fiends Mythology’ 
paper.116 Throughout his career, Lindesmith remained of ‘constant interest’ to 
the FBN. 
One area where the FBN’s expertise could not be easily disputed was 
abroad. Between 1951 and 1960, the FBN opened permanent offices in 
Beirut and Paris and established a training school in Rome.117 It was part of 
an expansive intelligence network developed with the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Many FBN 
operatives were given intelligence-gathering roles during the Cold War. For 
forty years, ‘very little happened in the world of drugs or international affairs 
that Anslinger did not know about’.118 
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To assert the importance of the FBN, the threat of narcotics had to become a 
looming menace. Anslinger leaned on his international credentials in press 
interviews, blaming other countries and smugglers for the supply of drugs to 
the US.119 As domestic policy scuffles grew, Anslinger shifted the attention 
towards the foreign drug problem, an area which domestic dissenters could 
not dispute, not least because smuggling was a large problem. China took 
centre stage, although now as the aggressor, rather than the victim.  
On the first examination, this is surprising. In 1949 the victory of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) against the US-favoured Chiang-Kai Shek and 
Kuomintang led to one positive outcome for control advocates: a complete 
and brutal suppression of all opium consumption and production. James 
Windle has written extensively on the suppression of opium under the CCP, 
particularly the decree in 1950 that all production in CCP areas is 
immediately abolished and that offenders be severely punished.120 Alternate 
crops and tobacco seeds were handed out by CCP officials to local opium 
farmers, and those caught growing or using narcotics became highly public 
prosecutions. Most were imprisoned, but some 880 dealers were executed. 
Production had ceased by 1953 in CCP controlled areas. Officials 
announced the complete eradication of opium in 1960. They had eradicated 
25,000 metric tons of opium in 1949. As Marshall, argues, opium resisted 
depreciation in the hyperinflationary environment of China; it functioned as a 
currency for the nationalists against the threat of warlords and CCP.121 By 
stopping its production and consumption, the CCP benefitted by denying the 
Kuomintang in the South funds for their war effort. 
211 
 
The FBN had to tread delicately. It could not openly applaud such a brutally 
effective approach in which prohibition was enforced via mass incarceration 
and execution, nor could it denounce Communist Chinese tough prohibition, 
lest it received unfavourable accusations of hypocrisy. Worse still, the 
Kuomintang resistance had fled to Burma, and there was some evidence it 
was using opium to finance its resistance to the CCP.122 This sensitive 
information could embarrass the FBN if made public, particularly after its 
support of the nationalist government. Much like it did with Japan, the trick 
became one of directing attention away from China’s domestic policy, and 
towards other nations where a Chinese presence was noticeable. 
Deputy FBN Commissioner G.W Cunningham made an opening salvo 
against China in 1951. He stated that China had produced some 500 tons of 
heroin for sale on the black-market.123 Anslinger himself did not accuse 
China of directly selling narcotics to corrupt individuals, a charge that had 
been levelled at the Japanese. In a television interview in 1951, Anslinger 
was asked: 
Commissioner, do you think that the Chinese communists raise opium 
to increase addiction among the Western powers or their enemies or 
potential enemies or they do it to raise a cash crop? 
He responded 
Primarily it’s to raise a cash crop … Now, I think one of their best 
ways of obtaining American dollars is through the sale of heroin in the 
illicit traffic. Anyone who sells heroin, regardless of whether it’s 
planned or not, creates physical and moral destruction. You sell a 
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poison you can’t get away from the fact you are injuring people when 
you sell heroin especially on the scale of which it’s coming out of Red 
China today.124 
Before exploring the veracity of these claims, it is worth noting the change in 
discourse from opium as a weapon designed to weaken the body to one that 
financially supports the war effort.  
The FBN’s ‘Traffic in Narcotics’ reports indicated seizures increasing from 
13-97 kg from 1951-1952.125 The seizures were from a mixture of countries, 
with Turkish, Italian, Iranian, and French opium being seized along with 
Chinese heroin. The reports also argued that considerable seizures of pure 
heroin had been made on the West Coast and that the source was 
Communist China.126 Marshall argues that Anslinger had CND and 
Congressional reports edited to remove reference to any Asian suppliers but 
China.127 This delegitimised the Chinese attempts to enter the legal market. 
In his view, China was painted as a rogue producing nation through the 
doctoring of reports and outright deception. 
Departing from Marshall’s analysis, I argue two things. First, that the 
geonarcotic discourse was as much about the drugs as it was the sellers; 
Chinese opium had to be painted as an illegitimate commodity on the world 
market. It was portrayed as a weapon, distinguished from other suppliers of a 
globally traded commodity. Second, I suggest the Korean War provided the 
perfect opportunity for deflecting criticism and focussing press attention on 
the seductive and geopolitical narrative of narcotics as both a weapon and 
financial tool of war. The Japanese had turned Korea into an opium exporting 
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nation. ‘From 1937 to 1944 there was an average production of 34.5 tons 
yearly and average exports from 1937 to 1943 of some 33 tons’ in Korea. 128 
After the division of Korea, opium production was banned in the South, but it 
does not appear to have been successful. PCOB documents indicate many 
farmers were illiterate, and perhaps unaware of the edict. The FBN 
suggested narcotics were being used to directly influence the military conflict 
and corrupt American soldiers on the Korean peninsula. To substantiate this 
claim, the FBN circulated reports of Chinese heroin being sold through North 
Korea and making its way across the 38th Parallel to American troops. At the 
1952 CND meeting, Anslinger asserted that China was gearing up for major 
narcotic incursions into Korea. This ‘long-range dope and dialectic assault’ 
was once again defined by Anslinger as the ‘sixth column to weaken and 
destroy selected targets in the drive for world domination.129 The FBN 
identified the Chinese finance minister as a key ringleader who was training 
some 400 agents to sell narcotics overseas.130 
The return of narcotisation discourse proved popular with the press, 131 yet it 
did not flourish until late 1951. Newspapers reported Anslinger’s assertions, 
feeding a wave of fear about teen narcotic use.132 In the press, Anslinger 
was the single hero fighting this trade, with little help from the international 
community who stubbornly refused to recognise the scope of the problem.133 
A sense of the US’s isolation was increased when the Division of Narcotic 
Drugs of the UN (the DND) was moved back to Geneva from its office in 
Washington. This was a precursor to China’s eventual entry into the UN, 
despite protests and dire warning of the US. By 1954, media fury at the 
international community was a notable theme in the US press. One reporter 
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wrote in the Indiana Palladium that ‘somebody should open the big glass 
windows of the United Nations building and let the sickening odour of opium 
politics escape’.134 
The rise of the mafia 
As Jenkins suggests, ‘it is impossible for the twentieth-century historian to 
find an epoch or a region in which Italian organized criminals, often members 
of "Mafia" groups, were not deeply involved in narcotics’.135 In 1920s New 
York, the Castellammarese War had led to the consolidation of power under 
one organisation, led by Charles ‘Lucky’ Luciano, who came to dominate the 
international trade. Charles Siragusa, one of the FBN’s most senior agents, 
spent much of his career trying to impede the Mafia’s distribution of heroin on 
the Eastern Seaboard.136 At the beginning of his tenure, Anslinger struggled 
to find support for his ‘organised crime’ thesis in Washington. Indeed, as late 
as 1962, J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI and arguably the world’s most 
powerful policeman, was denying the existence of the mafia while Anslinger 
was expounding it.137  
Organised crime, particularly the activities of the Sicilian Mafia, had played a 
role in geonarcotic discourse as early as 1937. In November, the Sarasota 
Herald Tribune reported that the brother and wife of infamous mobster 
Charles ‘Lucky’ Luciano – along with a former, unnamed president of the ‘Hip 
Song’ Tong – had been arrested in narcotics raids.138 This created a link 
between smuggling from the Far East and the Italian mafia. When Luciano 
appeared in Cuba in 1946, the United States pressured the government to 
deport him back to Italy. Anslinger stopped shipping medical narcotics to the 
island, arguing that Luciano could easily direct these drugs back into the 
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black market. The move was harshly condemned by the Cuban government, 
who were almost entirely dependent upon the supplies, but the Americans 
held firm, and Luciano was deported in March 1946.139 Charles Siragusa, 
one of Anslinger’s top agents, devoted the latter half of his career to hunting 
down Luciano, even following him to Italy when he was deported from the 
US. This is just one example of legal narcotics playing a critical role in 
advancing the US narcotic agenda. More will be discussed in chapter three.  
It was the mafia link that further tied narcotics to the communists. In 1951, 
the same year China was accused of narcotisation, Anslinger testified before 
the Kefauver Committee on organised crime. The committee’s primary goal 
was to determine whether a single organised body or family-led business 
controlled crime across the country. It was broadcast on live television, 
exposing millions of Americans to the testimonies of famous mobsters. When 
J. Edgar Hoover refused to allow FBI operatives to testify in that committee, 
arguing that such a racket did not exist, Anslinger stepped in, promising FBN 
employees could publicly highlight the link between organised crime and 
narcotic drugs across the United States.140 The FBN identified Lebanon, 
Beirut, and Turkey as entry points for opium making its way into Europe (this 
route became known as the French Connection).141 From there, it was 
transported to Marseilles, converted into heroin and trafficked on to the 
United States. During his testimony, Anslinger argued that FBN agents had 
traced much of this opium to a factory in Tientsin, China.142 These were then 
distributed and sold by the mafia. When directly asked by Senator Estes 
Kefauver if these were ‘Red Chinese supplies’, Anslinger replied ‘by all 
means… we have very definite proof of that’.143 The evidence that this proof 
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rested on was often interpretations of where the seizures had originated 
(discussed further in chapter four). The link between a domestic mafia and 
communist sponsored narcotics became the lynchpin of American 
geonarcotic discourse. 
The result of the Kefauver Committee was the aforementioned 1951 Boggs 
Act. This instituted mandatory minimum penalties for drug possession.144 It 
linked the importance of foreign narcotic policy to domestic fears at home. 
Emboldened by the Act’s passage, Anslinger further explained in a 
newspaper interview that ‘the Reds took over the largest known narcotics 
plant in the world in Mukden, Manchuria … this became the focal point to 
produce morphine alkaloids’.145 By linking the communists to this well-known 
narcotics-producing region, the Chinese eventually replaced their Japanese 
predecessors. One tactic for representing the threat of the illegitimate traffic 
was to compare it to the world’s legitimate needs. Anslinger went on to report 
that the Mukden factory could produce some ‘50,000 kilos of heroin a year. 
The Red’s [CCP] total production could conceivably turn out to be 12,000 
tons a year. The world’s medical need currently stands at 450 tons yearly’.146 
Thus the coastal regions of Tientsin and the Yunnan peninsula became 
centres of narcotic production, entrenching the threat of foreign narcotics in 
specific locales. The message was clear: while the Chinese might be brutally 
cleaning their backyards of narcotic crimes, their actions in supporting the 
mafia and black-market opium consumption in other countries was a threat to 
the United States and its troops.  
Newspapers and politicians seized on the association between communism, 
weaponisation, and the mafia. The co-author of Anslinger’s book The 
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Murderers, Will Ousler, wrote an op-ed for the Chicago Tribune on February 
1, 1953, entitled ‘They Get Rich from Foreign Dope’. The article was taken 
from another book on foreign drugs entitled ‘Narcotics: America’s Peril’ co-
written by Ousler and Anslinger. The book warned that Luciano had 
‘reorganised mafia gangsters into the most powerful and far-reaching 
international drug syndicate in the history of this traffic’. The report fingered 
the Vito Genovese Mob of New York as co-conspirators, who were receiving 
the heroin with Cuban aid. The report alleged that this heroin was ‘stamped 
with the digits ‘999’ and was responsible for infiltrating our military system 
with spies but [also] our economic system with the underworld’. 147 
One key figure who spread discourses of narcotisation was Richard Deverall, 
an ex-civil servant and military officer who had been stationed in Japan 
during World War Two. In 1950, he was employed by the American 
Federation for Labor to help stabilise the region against Communist 
incursions in Japan.148 Deverall was the author of many books and 
pamphlets that documented the dangers of Chinese communism, and two of 
these were devoted exclusively to narcotics. These sported punchy titles 
such as ‘Red China's dirty drug war; the story of the opium, heroin, morphine 
and philopon [amphetamine] traffic’ and ‘Mao Tze-tung: stop this dirty opium 
business! How Red China is selling opium and heroin to produce revenue for 
China's war machine’. Many of the book's sources were testimonials from 
Harry Anslinger, particularly his statements to the CND.  
Deverall noted that India was ‘seriously trying to stamp out the use of opium 
as an intoxicant and that India … is no longer the world problem it was a few 
generations ago’.149 This was a backhanded stab at the British and 
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unsurprisingly invoked their ire. Since closing their opium monopolies, they 
had thrown their weight against the illegal opium traffic. John Walker of the 
Home Office noted that Deverall’s books drew on Anslinger’s regular annual 
onslaughts against Red China at the CND.150 Walker also noted that the US 
Treasury consul stationed in Hong Kong had little proof to back up the 
assertions Deverall and Anslinger were making.  
The New York Times regularly reported on the opium traffic in China,151 and 
the FBN’s appropriation budget was repeatedly raised in the news, as was 
the small size of the FBN force (totalling only 188 agents in 1951).152 Time 
Magazine and The Chicago Tribune interviewed Anslinger or published 
sections of his speeches on communist heroin. 153 One radio address on 22 
July 1951 in San Francisco, stated that ‘against the efforts of such men as 
Commissioner Anslinger, we find walking in our midst the very figure of 
public apathy, a psychological poison almost as dangerous as the narcotics 
itself’.154  
The geonarcotics of the mid-late 1950s 
While he faced many criticisms for his accusations, Harry Anslinger was one 
of the first to highlight the link between organised crime and narcotics 
trafficking in the early 1930s. By 1953, the association between narcotics, 
the mafia and foreign heroin had been well established.155 The Kefauver 
Committee had demonstrated the role of the mafia in narcotics trafficking and 
the 1951 Boggs act had secured mandatory minimums for all drug offenders. 
Geography and materiality striated the new iteration of geonarcotic 
discourse. Heroin — by now the most widely abused narcotic — was linked 
to its geographical production in the Communist-controlled parts of Asia. The 
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Bulletin on Narcotics, in summarising the 9th session of the CND in 1954, 
noted that ‘the United States representative [Anslinger] pointed out that the 
heroin seized in many of the cases reported by governments could be traced 
to the Far East and that most of the heroin entering the western United 
States came from the Chinese mainland’.156 The statement was strongly 
opposed by the Polish and USSR representatives. At appropriations 
hearings from 1951 through 1957 committees heard Anslinger repeatedly 
name Communist China as a primary source of heroin.’157 The Orlando 
Evening Star cited Anslinger, who claimed heroin trafficking was done in a 
‘very big way’ by trafficking opium on mules out of Yunnan, through Hong-
Kong, into Cuba and ultimately into the United States.158  
In 1956, another Senate subcommittee was convened and chaired by 
Senator Price Daniels of Texas. Daniels approved of Anslinger’s CND 
statements about foreign heroin from China.159 He organised the committee 
in response to another subcommittee that had been requested by the 
American Bar Association to review the harshness of the penalties of the 
1951 Boggs Act. The echo chamber of the Daniels Committee reinforced the 
link between organised crime and weaponised narcotics. Anslinger stressed 
that the narcotic problem abroad was no longer one of diversion, but the 
work of international and domestic criminals. Once again, he pointed to the 
narcotics produced in China that made their way to the United States. As a 
result, Anslinger ensured the federal focus shifted from small-time peddlers 
to interstate and international trafficking.160 Off the back of the Daniels 
subcommittee, it was concluded that new laws were required at home to 
tackle trafficking abroad, and Anslinger’s recommendation for stricter 
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penalties at home be put into action. The Narcotic Control Act of 1956 was 
passed and, much to the horror of the ABA, it doubled the penalties laid out 
in the Boggs Act and introduced the death penalty for traffickers. The FBN 
congratulated Congressman Boggs and Daniels on its passage and noted 
that ‘the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 will give us our greatest weapon to 
attack the vicious traffickers and to suppress the abuse of narcotic drugs’.161 
Emboldened by the decision of the Daniels committee, Anslinger continued 
to promote the link between the mafia and foreign dope. This was despite a 
report released in late 1956 by the CIA entitled ‘Examination of the ‘Charges 
of Chinese Communist Involvement in the Illicit Opium Trade’.162 It stated 
there was no evidence to support the argument that the CCP were flooding 
Korea and adjacent markets with opium. Anslinger instead focused on a 
narcotic threat nearer to home. Cuba had been subject to US sanctions 
regarding Charles ‘Lucky’ Luciano in 1943, resulting in his deportation to 
Italy.163 During the 1958 revolutionary struggle in Cuba, Anslinger suggested 
that Luciano was directing narcotics through Cuba from his villa in Naples. 
When a Congressional fact-finding mission travelled to Cuba in that same 
year and found no evidence of such actions, the FBN then stated they had 
accrued evidence showing that Chinese migrant workers were producing 
opium in Cuba.164 The Castro government lodged a formal diplomatic protest 
with the State Department, and this was subsequently rejected by the State 
Department.165 
In 1958, Anslinger testified to a House Appropriations Subcommittee that 
narcotics was ‘unquestionably’ on the agenda at a meeting of powerful mafia 
bosses (the Gangland Convention in Appalachia).166 When Fidel Castro 
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came to power in 1959, top agents at the FBN alleged that the Castroite 
agents used Cuba as a transhipment point for cocaine trafficking into the 
United States. In doing so, they gained foreign currency. This was the same 
charge that had been levelled at communist China in Korea.167 Charles 
Siragusa was quoted in the Chicago Tribune as stating that the Cubans were 
‘pumping cocaine into the United States to weaken and even destroy the 
minds of Americans [this] would certainly be applauded by the dictator 
bosses in Moscow’.168 This charge was broadened to include narcotics and 
was laid out in the News Journal of Wilmington Delaware. Communist opium 
was grown in Cuba so the Chinese could gain foreign currency, disrupt 
Western economies and weaken the American spirit.169 Geonarcotic 
discourse took on a new dimension with an article by Victor Riesel of The 
New York Times, who asserted that Chinese and Russian spies were using 
‘millions of dollars of dope in its espionage against the United States’.170 The 
claim was based on a report authored by Anslinger that stated some 280 
agents had been either arrested or known to travel out of North Korea with 
narcotics amounting to a total of 70kg. The association of foreign narcotics 
with communist foreign policy and domestic organised crime formed the 
backbone of Anslinger’s last charges and captured the attention of the press 
and public. 
Even this could not save Anslinger’s job. He guarded his position at the CND 
until 1970 but was forced from the FBN in 1962. This meant his assertions 
carried less weight, and his influence in the intelligence community waned. 
When relations with China began to thaw, FBN accusations were perceived 
as damaging by the State Department and were formally retracted in 1967. 
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Chinese production was reported at legitimate medical levels in 1971.171 
After Anslinger’s departure in 1962, a series of FBN agents spoke out 
against the baselessness of his anti-Chinese rhetoric. They believed 
geonarcotic hostility towards China was propagated by the Commissioner to 
secure his future employment.172 In war zones where information was 
scarce, but public attention was focussed, narcotics were woven into a 
narrative of anti-Americanism without being challenged.  
The debate over the veracity of the FBN claims is already well-trodden. John 
McWilliams suggests that Anslinger’s claims at the CND were made as the 
world’s foremost expert on opium. He also points to the FBN’s importance as 
an intelligence agency with offices and informants around the world. On the 
other hand, Marshall believes that Anslinger cooked the books, with little 
challenge from the media.173 PCOB reports of the time indicate there was no 
doubt that opium production was taking place in China, particularly in the 
Yunnan peninsula. Addiction in China remained a serious problem, despite 
the PRC’s crackdown.174 While Anslinger did have support from other senior 
sources such as Frank Berry, Assistant Defence Secretary in the 
government, Berry also acknowledged that the only evidence for he had 
seen came from Anslinger, and that he had not seen other credible evidence 
for the political use of opium by the Chinese. Citing the statements of other 
CND diplomats, Chinese based journalist Jack O’ Kearney wrote that while 
China was required to take some of the blame for production, it did not 
support the trade, nor did it have political goals in mind.175 
I am concerned with examining the link between geonarcotic discourse and 
organised crime that developed during the late 1950s, rather than whether 
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Anslinger’s assertions were true or false. The FBN reported that opium 
production in China was used for the explicit purposes of gaining foreign 
currency and weakening the American body politic. My point is to suggest is 
that Anslinger, like Hobson, emphasised the role of geography in his 
accounts of the scourge of narcotics. This was a necessary condition of 
narcotisation. I agree with McWilliams’ statement that Anslinger recognised 
the media as an ‘authoritative source on international relations’.176 
The rise of the transnational mafia did not spell the end for geonarcotic 
discourse based on adversarial nations. It enhanced it. Even as Anslinger’s 
accusations against Communist China were rebuffed by the CIA, the UN and 
other nations, the Sicilian Mafia, through its fecklessness, was painted as the 
domestic cog in the foreign dope machine. In response, domestic legislation 
was toughened and by 1960, newspapers were reporting that senior 
mobsters were looking to ‘get out of the game’ due to the government’s 
aggressive prosecutorial position.177  
Anslinger was replaced by Henry Giordano, an ex-pharmacist who had been 
a top undercover agent for the FBN. With Giordano came a more lenient 
approach to addicts and users, and a tougher approach on the criminal 
overlords.178 Giordano focussed less on the origin of opium, and more on the 
criminals involved in trafficking it. By the mid-1960s, the weaponisation thesis 
(in its traditional form of being instigated by a foreign nation), had lost much 
of its credibility due to China’s impending entry to the United Nations. There 
were also accusations of CIA complicity in the drug traffic in South East Asia 
and leaks of the MK-Ultra experiments. After these events, it was the US 
government that had to defend against charges of weaponising narcotics.  
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Regardless, the fear of foreign narcotics was entrenched in US society by 
1960. Lohman et al., list a set of problems that contribute to opiophobia: 
‘treatment with opioids leads to addiction; that pain is necessary because it 
enables diagnosis; that pain is unavoidable; and that pain has negligible 
consequences’. Many people became suspicious of opiates and opioids, 
even when prescribed by professionals.179 If an opiate-based medicine was 
adopted by a country, it underwent reinterpretation via the LoN, UN, and 
associated discourses. The fear of addiction by any opiate-based medicine 
was particularly acute in developing nations that had recently decolonised. 
As we have seen, the years from 1909–1961 were peppered with 
descriptions of opium and its alkaloids as a weapon of war. Extending further 
back in time brings the Opium Wars and the policy of opium monopolies, so 
often portrayed as tools of colonial domination, into sharper focus. As 
Krauker et al., suggest ‘considering this sordid history, antipathy toward 
opioids in Asia is not surprising’.180 Opiates were portrayed as instruments of 
domination and control and the tool of colonisers, or organised criminals, and 
communists.  
More than this, geonarcotic drug discourse shaped the American diplomatic 
message, making it indisputable and unnegotiable at both the League and 
United Nations. After the Kefauver and Daniels committees, narcotics and 
organised crime became regular bedfellows. By 1961, the legal narcotics had 
been discursively severed from the illegal dope. Through press reporting, 
foreign dope was a weapon of the enemies of the United States, and its role 
as an essential painkiller and vital diplomatic tool was neglected.  
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This chapter has given a critical geopolitical account of the discourses of 
international and American drug control. It focused on the intersection 
between formal and popular geopolitics. This is useful insofar as it points to 
the wider influences upon the ‘grand old men of drug diplomacy’, as 
described by President of the PCOB, Herbert May. We cannot tell this history 
through these men alone. We must include the roles of fringe figures such as 
Elizabeth Washburn-Wright, Richmond Hobson, and Richard Deverall. They 
did much to flesh out the various iterations of foreign drug flows in the US 
Press. But more than this, their actions were influential on diplomatic and 
political proceedings. Geonarcotics territorialised the American towards a 
more punitive configuration and the international assemblage towards control 
at the source. Well-defined geopolitical subjectivities were forged in the 
American press. National drug subjectivities were coded as producers of raw 
opium, manufacturers of synthetic opiates and opioids, and victim nations.  
Even though this discourse failed to completely persuade foreign diplomats, 
it highlights the problems of a traditional analysis of drug diplomacy that 
focuses only on the international sphere. American geonarcotic discourse 
propagated a scalar understanding of the problem of drug control. The 
international system had the responsibility to solve a problem outside of 
American borders. This does not mean that American consumers were not 
punished; they certainly were. Rather, geonarcotic discourse posits 
consumers as the least important part of a supply chain: weak, unpatriotic, 
and unable to resist a foreign supply of narcotics. Geonarcotic discourse 
was, however, hierarchical. It persuaded the League and UN that supply was 
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control was the most effective method of drug control with demand reduction 
remaining in the purview of national and local authorities. 
Pembleton’s study of the FBN’s role in cultural management concludes that 
‘the FBN frequently portrayed narcotics as so dangerous it was as if they 
possessed human agency all on their own’.181 Pembleton does not believe 
narcotics have human agency, but what agency do they possess? While this 
chapter distributes agency among a broader range of human actors who 
connected with the international drug assemblage, it does not go far enough. 
There is no discussion of how ‘decision makers are nudged and pushed in 
various directions by the affects circulating through the diplomatic system’.182 
What follows in the two final empirical chapters is a discussion of the 
narcotics themselves.
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Materiality and Stockpiling 
Having established how geonarcotics subjectivised countries towards 
specific identities in the previous chapter, I delve into the materiality of 
narcotics and their role in the international drug assemblage. I show how 
countries and the international system responded to material changes in 
narcotics and their production. Specifically, I am interested in two things. 
First, the shift in consumption from opium, to opiates, and finally, to opioids. 
Second, the procurement of medicinal narcotics (through stockpiling) and 
their diplomatic uses. I focus on the stockpiling of morphine and opium 
before, during, and after the Second World War. The FBN purchased 
massive quantities of the world’s narcotic painkillers. Here, the US developed 
its geopolitical subjectivity and became the geonarcotic middleman who 
traded in diplomatic opium. 
In most scholarly histories, the different types of opium are not discussed 
beyond their functional value. In the first decade of the twentieth-century, the 
narcotics use was geographically striated. Raw opium was produced in India, 
Persia, China, some Eastern European states, and Turkey. Much of this was 
treated and turned into prepared opium (containing about 8% morphine) 
which was then smoked, predominantly in China, but also in the Western 
United States. South Asia had large opium smoking and opium eating 
populations, and much of its poppy crop was consumed domestically or in 
nearby countries. In India, smoking opium was known as chandu, and 
exported widely across Asia, with the British export of Indian opium to China 
being the most problematic. In some parts of India and the UK, opium was 
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also eaten, as made famous by de Quincey’s Confessions of an Opium 
Eater.1 From 1880 to 1908, imports of opium into China fell to 3000 from 
6500 metric tons. Domestic production filled that vacuum. 584,000 piculs (or 
3500 metric tons) were cultivated in 1906.2 Prior to the first international 
meeting of drug diplomats at Shanghai in 1909, Britain and China were 
already concerned with the scale of the trade. They agreed to a bilateral deal 
of 10% reduction in the trade from India over ten years from 1900-1910 
(known as the 10-year agreements). 
Raw opium was also shipped to manufacturing nations who converted it into 
pure morphine, heroin, and codeine for medicinal uses. This was then 
consumed domestically or sold back to other nations. The colonial empires of 
Great Britain, France and the Dutch enjoyed a lucrative trade with their Far 
Eastern territories in the exchange of spices, tea and opium. The imperial 
nations engaged in minimal manufacturing and almost no raw production but 
imported both raw drugs and opiates in often large amounts for their own 
legally untrammelled usage. Most of the raw opium exported to the West 
went to manufacturing nations. Germany and certain USSR states such as 
Bulgaria, and the Austro-Hungarian empire used high-purity opium to make 
derivatives. These nations boasted well-established chemical industries that 
created semi-synthetic opiates from raw opium. In the early years, yields 
from raw crops were initially low due to inefficient cultivation techniques, and 
pharmaceutical industries used vast quantities of opium and coca leaf to 
synthesise morphine sulphate, diacetylmorphine (heroin), and cocaine 
hydrochloride.  
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At the turn of the century, the United States occupied a unique geopolitical 
position. It consumed enormous amounts of cocaine and narcotics but had 
minimal investment in the opium trade compared to the colonial powers.3 Its 
appetite for narcotics had grown out of domestic conflict. Morphine sulphide 
had been instrumental during the Civil War, thanks to the newly invented 
hypodermic syringe that provided quick pain relief vital to both sides.4 Opium 
was imported as a foodstuff and sold unproblematically across the country. 
Many products, including paregoric (camphorated opium tincture) and 
laudanum (solution of alcohol and opium), were sold as powerful tonics to 
almost every ailment, available as freely as foodstuffs without prescription.  
The first efforts at American drug control were predicated upon information. 
In 1840, opium was listed as a chemical rather than a foodstuff on 
commodity import manifestos.5 Prior to this, many chemists and 
apothecaries had kept their ingredients secret. Information about ingredients 
gave consumers more knowledge of a product. Providing consumers with 
information, however, does not always lead to more informed choices. Nor 
does a standardised dosage lead to a consistent and predictable result. After 
the American Civil War, many soldiers who had been given morphine for 
their injuries started abusing it, taking the habit back into civilian life.  
Accompanying the growth of consumer information was the nascent 
pharmaceutical industry. German patents on coal-based tar medicines 
dominated the European and American markets until the First World War, 
but American chemists had been creating alkaloids, most importantly 
morphine, quinine, and strychnine since the mid-1830s. Recall that in 1903, 
the APhA had proposed selling opium and cocaine with a prescription. When 
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the 1906 Pure Food and Drug Act was passed it was not a prohibitive 
measure, but a labelling measure. It was also less strict than the Canadian 
Proprietary or Patent Medicine Act of 1908, since this forbade remedies 
containing cocaine. The 1906 Act’s main purpose was distinguishing medical 
practice from quackery. To do so, the purity and consistency of medicines 
were tested by biological assays, and the science of dosing was developed 
by famous chemists such as Eli Lilly and William Upjohn. They created 
steady-release medicines that did much to regularise how often patients 
needed to take narcotics. 
While Barry’s interpretation of informed materials applies to the science of 
contemporary drug discovery (or, as he calls it, invention), I apply it to 
historical narcotics. The chemistry and pharmacology of opium and opiates 
were central to debates at the 1909 Opium Commission. To understand why 
the chemistry of the poppy mattered, we must first examine how opium was 
extracted from the poppy crop. Traditionally, the buds of papaver 
sominferum, or opium poppies, were lanced (scored with a knife). Gum 
would drip from inside the bud and dry on the outside of the bud. This dried 
gum would be scraped off the buds and compacted into small cakes of 1-4 
pounds, which were then left to dry before being sold as raw opium. It was 
morphine, along with other naturally occurring alkaloids (papaverine, 
codeine, papaverine, narcotine and thebaine) in opium, that were valuable. 
Opium alkaloidal content ranged from 10-20%, depending on the region and 
quality of the harvest.6 Geographical variance also led to changes in the 
quality of the opium due to differences in climate and soil. The method of 
cultivation impacted the eventual product. Here, the way a poppy was lanced 
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and the climate within which it was grown were vital to how it was treated, 
discussed and subsequently used. If opium was lanced more than once, the 
morphine content would be lower. This lower quality opium would be mixed 
with tobacco for smoking or turned into morphine base for synthesis into 
morphine hydrochloride or other opiates. 
As Barry notes, this knowledge was part of the informed materials of 
narcotics. There was no such thing as a pure, distinct molecule of opium. In 
the early 1900s, this geography of production mattered. A crude distinction 
was made by geographical origin. If raw opium was sourced from India or 
China, it tended to have a low proportion of morphine (known as white 
opium) and was turned into smoking opium (for domestic consumption in 
China) or eating opium (for domestic consumption and smoking in India). 
Black opium came from Turkey, and was chiefly exported to manufacturing 
nations. The division between these two opiums had been noted as early as 
1748, when Monsieur Pomet, chief druggist to Louis 14th of France, wrote 
‘there are two kinds of it [opium] the Thebain [black] and Indian [white]; but 
they are both produced by the same species of poppy. The Indians prefer the 
Bengal [white] Opium to the Thebain, but we always account the Thebain 
better than the Indian’.7  
American hostility towards white opium and its trade (administered by 
imperial powers) grew much quicker than black opium. This is evident from 
the Smoking Opium Exclusion Acts of 1909. The US focus at the Opium 
Commission was on the export and smuggling of white opium from its source 
regions, namely China and India.  
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At the 1909 Opium Commission, both the British and Americans tried to 
multiply the categories of narcotics that existed. As mentioned in chapter 
one, colonial powers did not like the demands laid out by Dr Hamilton-Wright 
for a clear division between medical and recreational uses of opium.8 The 
British proposed a different definition of legitimate use that included the 
‘quasi-legitimate’ practices of opium smoking and eating. Their point wasn’t 
altogether inaccurate: just as it had in the US, Indians had long used opium 
in preparations, tinctures, and remedies for medical purposes. They stressed 
that making these activities illegal would push the opium trade away from 
regulated government control towards smugglers. The British and other 
producing nations also raised the issue of morphine and heroin abuse in the 
Far East, a strategy that deflected attention towards Germany and Austria-
Hungary. Both had well-established manufacturing industries for opiates. 
They, in turn, protested any changes that would damage their lucrative trade 
in important painkillers. Negotiations faltered on the question of legitimate 
use, which quickly became shorthand for much broader debates regarding 
sovereignty, colonial influence, and the type of narcotic under question. This 
first meeting of nations was less concerned with controlling drugs and more 
concerned with establishing what constituted an illicit drug or drug use. The 
Commission eventually agreed that the practice of opium smoking should be 
reduced.  
When the nations met again in 1912 at the Opium Convention, they made 
headway on defining their substances in-depth, thus enriching the 
informational environment of narcotics. Raw opium was defined as the 
‘spontaneous coagulated juice obtained from the capsules of the papaver 
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somniferum’.9 Prepared opium was defined as ‘the product of raw opium, 
obtained by a series of special fermentations, especially by dissolving, 
roasting… designed to transform it into an extract suitable for 
consumption’.10 Finally, and most importantly, was the definition of ‘medicinal 
opium’, which was ‘raw opium heated to 60 degrees centigrade and contains 
not less than 10% of morphine, whether it be powdered, or granulated or 
mixed with indifferent materials’.11 The chemical space of opium was defined, 
albeit within a spectrum. While chemically similar, the distance between 
prepared opium and medicinal opium was geopolitically significant. The 
foundations of a legal market for medicinal narcotics was developed with an 
appreciation that opium was multiple. 
While the international assemblage was partially territorialised by 1912 
Convention definitions of narcotics, one setback came from Russia, who 
rejected any form of opium production control. Indeed, their argument was 
predicated on an even broader material basis. They cultivated poppies not 
just for narcotics, but for the oil and seeds for culinary markets. This 
agricultural argument, based on the many properties of opium, would rear its 
head again in the US (discussed in the next chapter). Nations and farmers 
would use the multiple materialities of opium beyond medicine (its use as a 
foodstuff) to undermine American attempts to control the production of 
poppies in 1942. 
Most importantly, the formal, legal division between the raw, prepared, and 
medicinal opium created by the 1912 Convention was not supplemented with 
any stipulation on the legitimacy of use. What happened to these substances 
after export was a domestic concern for the recipient nation. This meant calls 
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to reduce the production of morphine and heroin were defeated, and the 
issue of opium poppy production was ignored. Furthermore, the Convention 
would not come into force unless all 34 nations agreed to ratify. As Berridge 
suggests, control was ‘an all or nothing affair’.12 A nation was still free to 
produce as many narcotics as it wished, and refrain from enacting legislation 
that limited their consumption.  
The Harrison Narcotics Act 
As mentioned in chapter one, the Harrison Act made the federal government 
the arbiter of defining drugs. The Act successfully divided narcotics into 
medicinal and recreational categories. Many of the medicines and drugs 
were imported from manufacturing nations, making the United States 
dependent upon the regular and regulated flow of legal narcotics. Since the 
Harrison Act was primarily a tax, it was run by the Treasury’s Narcotic 
Division, the precursor to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Much of the initial 
policing was done by the pen rather than the baton, as accountants and 
bureaucrats patrolled those who sold narcotics. Drug dispensers were 
required to pay a nominal fee of $1 for certification and worked within some 
ambiguous but discernible limits upon how much opium they could 
prescribe.13 The Act provided medical professionals with authority to practice 
and dispense their trade but this freedom was dependent on the type of 
substance being used. Pharmacists had little use for raw opium or opium 
prepared for smoking. Their trade was in tinctures and opiates.  
As well as defining the difference between licit and illicit uses, the Harrison 
Act was important for pharmaceutical companies. Limon suggests that it 
allowed them to focus on the positive aspects of drug control (research and 
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profiteering) where the government focused on the negative aspects of drug 
control (policing and compliance).14 While she is right to point to these 
dimensions, she misses the productive linkages between the government 
and pharmaceutical companies. To understand how both groups benefitted 
from the other, we must focus on the substances themselves.  
So far, we have seen that opium was divided into two broad chemical-
geographical types (black and white opium), and that the US goal of banning 
certain flows of white opium resonated with the professionalisation of 
medicine. Many countries supported a healthy flow of medical opiates 
sourced from black opium, particularly manufacturing nations such as 
Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire. Shortages during the War, 
however, meant both the US government and pharmaceutical industry would 
explore the value of narcotics more broadly. World War One would 
precipitate changes in drug control that would benefit both the government 
and the pharmaceutical industry. 
World War One: chemical combat and opioid shortages 
World War One was a war of chemical experimentation. Mustard gas, new 
explosives, and chlorine gas clouds dramatically altered battlefield tactics.15 
With over twenty million causalities, global conflict alerted all nations to the 
problem of drug shortages. Much like the American Civil War before it, 
morphine was indispensable on the battlefield. When intravenously injected 
with scopolamine, it was known as the ‘twilight sleep’.16 Aside from 
amputations and pain relief, there are documented cases of doctors 
administering morphine for shell shock, diarrhoea, and dysentery.17 
Morphine, more than any other substance, became the drug of war.  
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During the War, the United States experienced shortages of morphine. 
Turkish opium and German morphine was cut off from the US and Europe, 
and the prices for raw opium began to rise. Pharmaceutical company Merck 
reported changes in prices for opium and morphine sulphate ($16.50 and 
$7.50 per ounce respectively) from April 1916 to January 1917 to $18.75 and 
$9.30 per ounce. By April 1917, Merck had no morphine left to sell.18 This 
made the Indian (white opium) profitable. India was one of the few remaining 
places the US could source opium for morphine manufacture.  
The value of narcotics was not lost on Harry Anslinger. At the time of the 
First World War, Anslinger was employed in the Efficiency Board of the 
Ordnance Division of the War Department, a position which remains under-
discussed regarding its influence on his tenure as Commissioner. After the 
war, Washington created programmes to secure analgesic stockpiles by 
stimulating the private sector’s output of opiates. The US stopped short of 
producing their own opium crops en masse. This would have undermined the 
narcotic exceptionalism the US had advocated at the 1912 Opium 
Convention. The Eli Lilly pharmaceutical company ramped up morphine 
production with tight, regular, and intensely supervised production lines to 
supplement the shortfall.19 Around the world, pharmaceutical companies 
turned over massive profits and were supported by their respective 
governments.  
Outside of the US, many countries scrambled to better account for the 
dwindling chests of legal opium and morphine entering and leaving their 
shores. In the UK, regulation 40B of the Defence of the Realm Act of 1918 
gave the Home Office complete control over drug policy, a principle that 
243 
 
remains to this day.20 The UK introduced import and export certificates to 
better track shipments, as much of its exported morphine was being diverted 
into China via Japan. In turn, Japan ramped up its production in efforts to 
become self-sufficient and developed a formidable pharmaceutical industry.21 
It also provided subsidies to farmers and continued to rely on its opium 
monopoly in Formosa, a move popularised by Japanese Home Minister Gotõ 
Shinpei.22 Rather than reducing the amount of opium and morphine, the 
world increased its output. 
It makes no sense to think of the international drug control solely through the 
lens of prohibition at this point in history. Nations were far more concerned 
with provision, and, by extension, the limiting of precious supplies into the 
black-market by prohibiting specific types of non-medical use. The issue of 
‘ambivalent materiality’ is important here. An international legislative 
framework did not yet exist to account for narcotics in their many forms, and 
national governments had decided they should retain the power to regulate 
opiates. The type of narcotic, the morphine content, the seller, and wider 
geopolitical context all influenced whether a narcotic was deemed licit or 
legal. While prepared opium for smoking was banned from American shores, 
the production of manufactured morphine and heroin was encouraged. 
The next round of international negotiations would be met with a sober 
evaluation of the emerging complexity of new substances, and a massive 
upsurge in drug abuse following the end of World War One.  
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Definitions and quantities at the 1925 Conventions 
If the 1912 Convention defined narcotics, the 1925 Conventions tried to 
quantify them. Specifically, delegates argued over how much of the world’s 
opium and morphine could be defined as legitimate. The problem was 
definitional. You could not decide how much of the world’s supply was 
legitimate until you were certain which drugs should be counted as 
legitimate. To do that, the League decided to further expand the definitions of 
what constituted legitimate and illegitimate drug use. The 1925 Conference’s 
work had been split into subcommittees dealing with various aspects of the 
world drug problem. The work of subcommittee F is of interest. It focused on 
the definitional aspects of the drug question: namely, which substances 
should be considered problematic and why.23 British delegate John Campbell 
was a member of subcommittee F that provided the OAC with critical 
definitions and technical information about the world drug problem. At the 
1925 conventions, the committee was tasked with defining what constituted 
drug abuse, and how it could be prevented. The definitions it produced would 
be used to underpin any future system of regulation. Two American 
proposals were rejected. The first was the suggestion that, opium and coca 
leaf derivatives be subject to the same control as morphine and cocaine and 
that the manufacture of heroin be prohibited (derivatives were drugs that had 
other ingredients mixed with an opium-based alkaloid such as morphine, 
thebaine or most commonly, codeine). Campbell refused to include quasi-
medical uses that were prominent in Asia, as they were long established 
cultural behaviours. This resulted in the League estimating a figure for the 
world’s legitimate use of opium that was much larger than American 
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delegates would have liked.24 Although Blue, Brent, and Porter of the 
American delegation eventually succeeded in having the definition changed, 
they eventually withdrew from the proceedings altogether.  
The second proposal was that the ‘morphine and cocaine content of 
preparations dispensed without medical prescription [should] be reduced to 
¼ grain to the ounce’.25 By reducing the strength of over-the-counter sales, 
the US would see more substances subject to prescription. This was also 
rejected by the committee. They were protecting manufacturing and 
producing nations by rejecting a proposal that would require medical 
preparations with higher concentrations to require a prescription. The 
decision to not ban heroin, instead allowing nations to adopt their own 
regulations, resonates to this day. Whereas it is entirely illegal in the US, 
medical heroin remains legal in many other nations. In the UK, a medical 
version of heroin (known as diacetylmorphine) remains an important 
analgesic. By rejecting these two provisions, the subcommittee was 
acknowledging the diversity of opiates that could be considered legitimate. 
Attempts to give the League authority to declare substances dangerous, and 
thus pursuant to international control, were stalled by political disputes - a 
decoding of the assemblage. In 1924 the Egyptian Government introduced a 
resolution that sought to make the determinations of the Health Committee 
binding upon all signatory nations. Arguments against the position were 
made on geopolitical grounds. Those nations protesting Egypt’s proposal 
described it as an ‘unreserved surrender of sovereign authority’. The vote 
lost by 17-2. 26 Here, national concerns trumped international goals. 
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This point is critical for thinking through how the definitions of narcotics 
territorialised international control. The definitions adopted by the League did 
not provide the radical shake-up that the US had wished for. If anything, it 
weakened drug control due to the rejections of the American and Egyptian 
proposals. They only referenced heroin and morphine, whereas the 1912 
Convention had referenced all ‘new derivatives of morphine, cocaine and 
their respective salts’.27  
The conference ended on the 2nd February 1925, and passed into law on the 
25th September 1928. It is worth noting the conference proceedings barely 
mention the illicit traffic or illicit cultivation – such issues were yet to be 
established as threats. Instead, they emphasised the limits on the legal 
production in narcotics and set definitions for what constituted the legitimate 
trade and use. In assemblage terms, a weak degree of territorialisation was 
achieved, but at the cost of coherence and stricter drug control. This points 
to another important point that is worth restressing: diplomats were 
concerned with quantifying what the world needed, rather than reducing what 
it did not.  
The 1925 Convention was weak on new substances, and this quickly 
showed in what would be the first of many battles against synthetic 
substances. By 1928, Benzoyl-morphine, an ester of morphine, highlighted 
the problems of leaving chemical innovation in the hands of individual 
nations. Because it was not a traditional derivative of opium, and because 
nations had jurisdiction over which substances they produced, Benzoyl-
morphine was being manufactured and sold in place of traditional morphine, 
free from any international control. The League were compelled to introduce 
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a resolution making nations aware of the need to pass national legislation for 
Benzoyl-morphine as rapidly as possible.28 The minutes of the 11th Session 
of the OAC, held in 1928, recalled that  
‘Manufacturers hastened to manufacture another narcotic which might 
escape the consequences of these provisions, at any rate 
momentarily. Thus they had adroitly taken advantage of the fact that 
Article 4 of the 1925 Convention related only to morphine and its salts 
to put on the market a product which was not a salt of morphine but a 
derivative of it, and which, as such, was not under control.’29 
Thus, ‘the decade of the 1920's came to an end before the flood of poison 
was stopped in all the manufacturing countries’.30 
Drawing on Alfred North Whitehead, Andrew Barry describes the molecules 
that make informed materials as an event or ‘historical route of actual 
associations’.31 Benzoyl-morphine is an example of a material that became 
informed. The League realised it was unequipped to deal with new 
substances, and the informational framework to account for new narcotics 
did not exist. The League’s Health Committee produced a series of three 
resolutions that included Benzoyl-morphine and other substances (Dilaudid 
and other morphine esters) as dangerous substances. This process took five 
years, and in that time over six tons of Benzoyl-morphine had made their 
way into China.32 The blame was mostly laid at Germany’s feet, where some 
18,620 kg of drugs ‘not covered by the convention’ made their way onto the 
world market. It was only with 1930 that these drugs were subject to the 
controls of the 1925 Convention. Furthermore, it was only with the passage 
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of the 1931 Conventions that a workable schedule for controlling new 
substances was created (discussed in chapter four).  
Benzoyl-morphine was not the only change that led to deterritorialisation, or 
radical changes in drug law. New technologies for harvesting poppy crops 
pushed the international assemblage towards stricter control. 
New technologies for a new decade 
The 1925 Conventions had focussed the world’s attention on the global trade 
but rendered the issue of cultivation strictly off-limits. This was exactly where 
the next problem emerged. New advances in the technology of opium 
production were changing the geography of poppy cultivation. In 1925, a 
Hungarian pharmacist named János Kabay created a new method of 
extracting alkaloids of morphine, codeine, and thebaine directly from the 
capsule and stem of the dried poppy. Kabay described the process as 
follows.  
The poppies are cut shortly after flowering. The usual method of 
harvesting is for the plants to be mown down and sheaved. The 
extracting machine is carried wherever the harvesters go, so as not to 
have to move the whole crop. The plants are weighed, then finely 
chopped and crushed. After a preliminary pressing these are fed into 
the extracting machine, where they are continually mixed with the 
extracting liquids. The extract and the juice emerging from the press 
are carried in barrels to the factory, where the liquid is concentrated 
into a soft extract and is stored in barrels. This pasty substance has a 
morphine content of 0.4% to 0.8%; there is no risk of deterioration, 
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because it contains preservatives in sufficient quantity, and it can 
therefore be stored without loss.33  
The method removed the need to harvest the raw opium and was far more 
efficient than lancing the buds (scoring with a knife and collecting the sap). It 
became known as the poppy straw method. In 1927, Kabay set up a factory 
and company named Alkaloida committed to harvesting poppy crops.34 The 
method took off. Firms could now grow the hardy poppy crop and synthesise 
narcotics directly from their own stocks rather than importing raw opium.35  
This material change in the science of poppy cultivation remains understated 
in the literature. It is important due to the hope that supply control advocates 
placed in it and also the legitimacy it gave to European producers. With 
manufacturers producing and manufacturing their own raw opium, there 
would be fewer chances for diversion into the black-market. In Europe, the 
poppy was also grown as a food crop for both human and animal 
consumption, along with soaps, oils and varnish products.36 It was hard to 
distinguish between poppy cultivation for narcotics and poppy cultivation for 
other uses. The poppy straw method changed this. It was extremely efficient 
when adapted on a large scale by pharmaceutical companies and was 
viewed as a positive step towards international regulation. The method could 
not be used for illegal cultivation. It required expensive machinery, masses of 
storage for harvested poppy straw, and extensive time commitments. It 
required 16 railcars of poppy capsules to create just 10 kg of morphine.37 
Poppy straw was ‘virtually useless as a raw material for illegal opiates 
manufacturers. They should, therefore, be viewed quite differently from 
opium for control purposes’.38 
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Farmers who continued to grow narcotic poppies were thus deemed 
illegitimate. The method was implemented in European countries that had 
ratified the drug conventions. It allowed firms to furnish the League with 
clearer and more accurate data on yields, imports, and experts. Today, the 
poppy straw method accounts for 90% of the production of the world’s legal 
morphine.39 
Poppy straw, the newest addition to the assemblage, was not adopted 
universally. While it improved the situation in Eastern Europe and Turkey, it 
did not replace traditional cultivation methods or the trade in raw opium trade 
in the Far East. Raw opium was still cultivated for eating in India, and the 
problem of prepared opium smoking remained largely unsolved across the 
Far East. The 1931 Conventions made some inroads into controlling supply 
at the source, but strict controls for manufactured opiates shifted illicit 
consumption eastwards. The Far Eastern market continued to hoover up the 
surplus crop. These crops were not accounted for in PCOB estimates, unlike 
those that had been grown for legal purposes. This unexpected 
consequence gave the League less control and knowledge over the scope of 
the illicit trade. The poppy straw method led to a change in how the 
international system viewed cultivation practices. Poppy straw was modern, 
efficient and legitimate, whereas lancing was backwards, inefficient and often 
used to supply the illicit traffic. 
The PCOB had been calculating the world’s narcotic needs through 
estimates and statistics on exports and imports since 1925. With poppy 
straw, the price of licit raw opium in the 1930s was one-quarter of what it was 
in the late 1920s.40 Neither the 1925 or 1931 Conventions had mandated 
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limits on the purchase of opium for military purposes, and countries were free 
to source the opium without notifying the League. This was deliberate. World 
War One had shown that nations did not want to find themselves without a 
regular supplier of narcotics if they went to war. 
Harry Anslinger knew hostilities had dire implications for the licit flows of 
analgesics, and that the German and Japanese, with their advanced 
pharmaceutical markets, were likely to cut off supplies. Without German and 
Japanese production, the supplies in the licit market would shrivel. Having 
learned the lessons of World War One, Anslinger made every effort to secure 
America’s supply of licit narcotics in the build-up to conflict. Once again, 
provision would prove central to securing prohibition.  
Preparations for war: diplomatic opium is stockpiled 
When Harry Anslinger died in 1975, The New York Times, eulogised him by 
suggesting he believed ‘all dope from marijuana to morphine, was equally 
dangerous’.41 If that was true, he also believed all narcotics were valuable. In 
remarks to the International Association of Chiefs of Police in Florida in 1931, 
Anslinger acknowledged there were two sides to the opium narcotic 
problem.42 One was the issue of regulation; the other was prohibition. In this 
section, I argue Anslinger’s grasp of opium’s value played both a vital role in 
commerce, military strategy, and diplomacy. It was just as significant as his 
castigation of its debilitating, criminal, and addictive capacities of foreign 
dope.  
With the war on the horizon, the League’s drug operations were threatened 
by the dominant German pharmaceutical market and the Nazi’s disposition 
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towards drug control. German authorities ostensibly refused to send statistics 
to the League because such information was commercially sensitive and 
would threaten their economic markets. Worried that an uncooperative 
Germany threatened the whole edifice, the League agreed not to publically 
publish the German figures but kept them for private analysis. To placate the 
Nazis further, Herbert May declined the position of PCOB chairman due to 
his Jewish heritage.43  
In 1936, German interest in the poppy straw method was noted by the DSB. 
German production of morphine was already well beyond their estimated 
requirements and raw opium exports to Germany were increasing. This 
worrying development was taken as a precursor for war; there was simply no 
other reason for such large annual surpluses of narcotics. The Americans did 
not criticise the Nazis for their narcotic policy in the 1930s. The FBN, like the 
League, was more worried about the impact that German non-cooperation 
might have on legal markets. In 1938, Anslinger and Colonel Sharman of 
Canada praised the German crackdown on narcotics in Austria after the 
Anschluss.44  
The FBN did pay attention to the Nazi’s increased orders of morphine; they 
decided to mimic them. In 1935, Anslinger reported to Secretary of the 
Treasury Morgenthau that the US stockpile of narcotics, at its current 
holdings, would only last until 1937. On 10th October 1942, ten months after 
the bombing of Pearl Harbour, Directive 10 was ordered by the chairman of 
the War Production Board. The Commissioner was given full authority over 
the ‘production, manufacture and distribution of narcotic drugs to authorise 
their allocation in the manner and to the extent deemed ‘in the public interest 
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and to promote the national defence’.45 The last phrase is perhaps the most 
important and misunderstood part of the directive. It is also the part which 
Anslinger exploited most fully. Anslinger was authorised to stockpile the ‘war 
materials’ that had been designated by Congress as vital to the war effort in 
1936.46 
The certainty of war meant narcotics became ‘critical war materials’. The 
Office for Emergency Management defined these as ‘materials required for 
essential uses in a war emergency, the procurement of which in adequate 
quantities, quality, and time is sufficiently uncertain for any reason to require 
prior provision for the supply thereof’.47 They broke this category down into 
two subgroups: ‘strategic’ and ‘critical’. Critical materials were defined as 
‘essential to the national defence, the procurement of which, while difficult, 
are less serious than those of strategic materials’.48 Strategic materials were 
‘materials which were essential to the national defence for the supply of 
which in war dependence must be placed in whole, or in part, on sources 
outside the continental limits of the United States and for which strict 
conservation and distribution measures will be necessary’.49 Strategic 
materials were further divided into three subgroups of A, B and C. Group A 
materials were those for which stockpiling was the only realistic means of 
supply. Group B referred to materials where stockpiling was ‘practicable’.50 
These resources could be stimulated by production in North America. Group 
C referred to materials where stockpiling was not practicable, often due to 
deterioration or biological decay. Instead, every effort would be made to 
ensure adequate supplies continued to flow into the USA. Opium was placed 
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in group A, and Anslinger increased the procurement nationwide (Figure 11) 
as well as those needed for emergency stockpiles (not shown in figure 11).  
 
FIGURE 11: MANUFACTURER’S IMPORTS OF CRUDE OPIUM IN KG 1925-1943. 
GOVERNMENT IMPORTS ARE NOT INCLUDED. 1942 IS LOW DUE TO THE CLOSURE 
OF THE MEDITERRANEAN FOR SHIPPING: SOURCE: FBN.51 
Anslinger initially wished to stockpile some 30,000 pounds of opium in 
London or Amsterdam; such was his distrust of his own agency’s employees. 
Anslinger knew the surplus opium would not need to be in the United States 
to supply troops; it just needed to belong to the US, and be easy to transfer 
within Europe.  
It is worth thinking about the market, or what Andrew Barry calls the ‘calculus 
of the market’ with reference to stockpiling opium.52 Information and 
projections about markets are not neutral information. They can influence a 
market’s trajectory. Anslinger knew that the FBN’s actions could shape the 
global opium market. The FBN decided to secure these supplies without 
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raising suspicions from other countries. Using a loophole in the 1931 
convention, they kept governmental imports secret; Anslinger could not 
afford for producing and manufacturing nations to be aware of his country’s 
appetite for narcotics, lest they raised prices and increased production, two 
things that were anathema to the US approach to drug control. Furthermore, 
increased production would dilute the diplomatic value of the stocks bought 
by the FBN. McWilliams suggests that Morgenthau approved the purchases 
of 130,000 pounds (58 tons) of opium to be distributed among retailers and 
30,000 pounds (13.6 tonnes) to be held in the vaults in Washington in 
1939.53 McAllister estimates that the US acquired some 600,000 pounds 
(272 tonnes) of opium or the equivalent of a four-year supply by 1940 (most 
of these were stored at Fort Knox).54 Others estimate a much higher figure of 
300 tons.55 In 1980, the Washington Post reported that there were still some 
60,000 pounds (27 tonnes) of narcotics across the US government vaults. 
A simpler method of procurement would have been to grow opium in the 
United States under strict medical conditions. Anslinger discussed this with 
George Morlock from the State Department (Morlock had taken over from 
Stuart Fuller in 1938). Both agreed that Congress and the State Department 
could not countenance large-scale growth of the opium poppy in the US. The 
option was politically unpalatable. The FBN would struggle to police the 
production by small farmers. While the federal government dictated who 
could grow opium, they could not easily enforce it.56 Much of the crop could 
find its way into America’s black-market. Furthermore, it was estimated that 
13,000-22,000 acres would be needed to supply the entire country along with 
7,800,000 pounds of poppy seed.57 Many smaller pharmaceutical companies 
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dotted across the country stood to profit from the lucrative industry. But it 
was small companies that presented the biggest risk for diversion (discussed 
further in chapter four). Plans for experimental and small-scale production by 
pharmaceutical companies were thus rejected due to economies of scale. It 
made no sense to invest in cultivation unless large-scale, secure production 
could be authorised. Even if domestic crops were grown in large-scale 
government facilities, the bright red poppy crops would be noticed by the 
press. More embarrassingly for Morlock and Anslinger, the amounts being 
grown would ultimately have to be reported to the PCOB and published for 
the world to see. This would be a humiliating climb down from the anti-
narcotic cultivation position the US had maintained since the early 1910s. 
Domestic production plans (for 30,000 acres) 58 were developed, but kept as 
an ultimate last resort. 
As Commissioner, Anslinger had the discretion to buy as many narcotics as 
the FBN saw fit. This was a more attractive solution both politically and 
materially. Stockpiling narcotics made sense based on the expiration of 
narcotics: the quality of raw opium and morphine sulphate only deteriorated 
slowly over a period of two years, long enough to fight the war. Furthermore, 
Anslinger recognised that cornering the narcotic supply in the Western 
Hemisphere would provide a strong negotiating position with Mexico and 
Canada. After cross-border alcohol smuggling during Prohibition, Anslinger 
knew that Mexico and Canada would need to adopt drug policy in line with 
that of the US. The US-Mexico border was rife with smuggling, the prospect 
of the United States facing an onslaught of cheap opium from the South 
galvanised Anslinger into action. Just as he increased the imports of raw 
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opium and morphine into the country, he increased the exports. Anslinger 
promised his Mexican and Canadian counterparts a reasonable price for 
narcotics if the conflict in Europe raised demand. In return, he secured 
promises from each country to prohibit the cultivation of poppies, relying 
instead on the US as its supplier. 
As Gray notes, Anslinger entirely controlled the domestic market, admitting 
only eight companies: ‘Merck, Mallinkrodt, Hoffman La Roche, New York 
Quinine, Parke-Davis, Sharp and Dohme, Eli-Lilly, and Squibb’ to the 
lucrative legal drugs industry.59 By granting these eight companies licenses 
to manufacture pharmaceuticals, Anslinger commanded their loyalty, 
support, and their lobbying of Congress. In return, he ensured a flourishing 
wartime business. As other nations ordered their opiates from the US, these 
companies rushed to fill the orders. The demand for narcotics in Europe, 
Canada and Mexico (Figure 12) kept them operating. 
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FIGURE 12: AVERAGE US EXPORTS (KG) FOR KEY NARCOTICS 1931-1960. NOTE THE 
SPIKE FOR ALL THREE DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR TWO. SOURCE: FBN. 60 
Anslinger was also able to monitor the pharmaceutical organisation’s sales, 
ensuring they travelled where he wanted. The FBN made sure Hoffman-
LaRoche’s subsidiaries in South America did not supply Axis powers with 
narcotics. In the immediate post-war period, the FBN refused licenses to 
other US competitors looking to muscle in upon the lucrative pharmaceutical 
market, appeasing the eight companies he had already licensed. With 
Anslinger limiting the number of legitimate manufacturers, they could operate 
without fear of new companies or organisations stealing their profits or 
products. 
We should not attribute Anslinger’s successes entirely to his persuasive skills 
as a diplomat (although these played an important part) but also to his ability 
to enrol other actors and actants in the American drug assemblage. He 
pushed the pharmaceutical industry towards a strictly controlled system that 
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contributed to the war effort. To further bolster his position, Anslinger 
secured legislation that would legally prevent the US from supplying needy 
nations with medicines unless they ratified both the 1912 and 1931 
Conventions. Under this process of certification, countries had little choice 
but to ratify the conventions if they wanted American aid. In my view, there is 
no clearer example of the relation between provision and prohibition. Where 
countries had already ratified, Anslinger extracted further commitments in 
different countries that had little to do with the trade or trafficking in narcotics. 
He threatened to suspend painkiller exports to Mexico unless they 
abandoned a maintenance programme that used US narcotics to wean 
addicts of illegal narcotics. Mexico conceded the point after some mild 
protest.61  
In 1943, Anslinger testified before the House Appropriations Committee that 
the US was supplying the Netherlands, Russia, South America, Canada, and 
Mexico with narcotics.62 This was just one year after the Mediterranean Sea 
closed for shipping.63 He told Congress that ‘being the only manufacturing 
nation in this hemisphere, we are able to keep international control 
functioning on this side of the Atlantic’.64 He received a mention in the 
Congressional Record for his foresight.65  
Diplomatic opium played another important diplomatic role in the war years. 
One critical problem was transiting key league personnel to Washington who 
were fleeing from Europe. League personnel would need to be issued travel 
visas through Spain. The Franco government initially refused to provide 
travel visas for these employees. Anslinger threatened the withdrawal of 
legal narcotics to Spain, and eight staff members were eventually allowed to 
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transit through Spain to the US.66 This skeleton crew continued to operate 
the League machinery. Wartime conditions meant many nations were 
suspicious of submitting statistics that would reveal sensitive information 
regarding their manufacturing capacities to the enemy (and even allies). 
While the temporary move to Washington was to ensure the survival of the 
international system, communications with Geneva were hindered. Apart 
from Sweden, Switzerland, and the Baltic states, all other nations 
communicated with the new Washington offices. This was an act of 
territorialisation in the international assemblage. With the League staff living 
and working in Washington, Anslinger could keep a watchful eye on them. 
I wish to stress the distributed agency of these achievements. Without a 
massive supply of opium and morphine, full political support from the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Colonel Sharman of Canada, and a specific set of 
geopolitical factors (the warring producer nations and increased demand for 
narcotics due to injuries), the drug control assemblage might have changed 
dramatically. Furthermore, buying up the world’s opium was fraught with 
virtual problems that – had they actualised – could have deterritorialised the 
international assemblage rapidly, with catastrophic consequences for the 
FBN. 
The problems of diplomatic opium 
The calculus of the opium market brought some certainty and power to the 
FBN, but it also created geopolitical problems about the near future. With so 
much narcotic stock in hand in 1941, the Commissioner wanted to reduce 
the rate of import. Large stockpiles were valuable and vulnerable to theft. 
Any changes in narcotic policy had to be considered through wider foreign 
261 
 
policy considerations. The State Department ordered the FBN to continue 
with purchases. The preclusive buying of stocks from non-combatants such 
as Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan aided the Allied cause by starving the Axis 
powers of much-needed medicaments. Germany was the exception. The 
Third Reich had adopted their Opiumgesetz (opium laws) from the Weimar 
Republic. These policies meant that the Germans manufactured their own 
analgesics and were unaffected by America’s efforts to starve them of 
painkillers. The German occupation of Eastern Europe, particularly in 
Hungary where Kabay was perfecting the poppy straw method, meant their 
production remained unhindered. They tightly controlled their markets and 
borders, sealing off any potential diversion. 
Germany’s low addiction rate suggested their black-market was not nearly as 
problematic as that of the US. Nearly all morphine and heroin produced was 
consumed by those who needed it.67 Uncertainty over the extent to which the 
Germans were self-sufficient was compounded by contradictory information 
emerging from London. The British stated that the Germans held insufficient 
supplies and that the Turkish opium should be pre-emptively purchased by 
the Americans to stop the German’s buying it. Sharman and Anslinger 
suspected the British wanted to artificially lower the supply of narcotics in the 
market and create demand for their own exports. Despite these suspicions, 
the ‘Office of Production Management, the Board of Economic Warfare, the 
Defence Supplies Corporation and the State Department all indicated their 
desire to [continue to] purchase’.68 Thus continued the policy of buying a 
substantial chunk of the world’s opium, opiates, and coca leaf.69 
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Anslinger eventually reduced the import rate in 1944, but the sheer amount 
of potent painkiller held by the US posed problems. Much of it was 
disseminated into the various branches of the US military. This came with its 
own unintended consequences. The FBN found narcotics quickly went 
missing, were illegally sold to pharmacies, or cropped up in the black market. 
In one instance, the US Army sold thousands of lifeboats to the public 
complete with first aid kits stocked with vials of morphine, causing the FBN to 
scramble its agents and launch an investigation. Not all the lifeboats were 
recovered.70 
How to conceptualise the impact that narcotics had on the international 
system? As Dittmer suggests, Bruno Latour’s notion of poviour and 
puissance are helpful. Pouvoir refers to the exercise of observable, tangible 
power that causes change. While holding narcotic stocks was a concrete 
example of pouvoir, it led to puissance, which refers to the power to ‘affect 
and be affected’.71 The US tied itself to legislation that only allowed it to 
supply narcotics to nations that had signed specific international treaties. As 
Dittmer says, the whole point of ‘entering into assemblage is to re-work 
states assemblages through technical means rather than traditional ones’.72 
The end of the war did not entirely end the US strategy of mass imports of 
opium for the manufacture of semi-synthetic medicines. Imports increased 
again in the early 1950s (Figure 13). 
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FIGURE 13: FBN FIGURES FOR TOTAL US IMPORTS OF OPIUM AND COCA LEAF (KG) 
FROM 1925 TO 1960. THE SPIKE IN THE COLD WAR AMOUNTS SHOWS HOW 
IMPORTANT THE STRATEGY OF STOCKPILING REMAINED. THIS FIGURE INCLUDES 
GOVERNMENT STOCKS NOT INCLUDED IN FIGURE 11. SOURCE: FBN.73 
With the end of hostilities and the re-opening of transport links in the Atlantic 
and Mediterranean, shipping and smuggling increased to pre-war levels. 
With the PCOB receiving statistics from most of the opium-producing world, 
a clearer picture of the complexity of opium’s chemistry also emerged that 
replaced black and white opium. For example, within Turkey, there was ‘soft’ 
opium that had morphine content ranging from 10-15%, depending on which 
region you were in (the vilayets of Amasya, Chorum and Tokat produced 
high quality, whereas Malatya produced the lower quality).74 This recognition 
of opium’s different chemical profiles would be used by the UN at their 
Narcotic Laboratory Section in later years (discussed further in chapter four).  
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Decolonisation also influenced the politics and geography of narcotic 
production. Newly independent India and Pakistan, along with Iran, 
continued to produce opium for both manufacture and opium smoking, 
inheriting the ire the United States had previously held for the British. In 
Hungary, the poppy straw method turned the country into an exporter of 
opiates rather than exporter of opium. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria continued to 
produce opium for export and produced reliable figures that did not trouble 
the PCOB. Poor harvests in the USSR meant that they often did not produce 
enough opium for their medical needs. Turkey continued to grow massive 
raw opium crops for legitimate export. Despite the official closures of the 
opium monopolies, Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina grew illicit opium 
illegally for their smoking populations.  
Poppy crops bloomed in Mexico in the state of Sinaloa. The town of Ciudad 
Juarez functioned as a node in the cross-border illicit trade. These poppies 
were grown, turned into morphine, and smuggled into the US. There was 
little interest from the Mexican government in the problem.75 The Nationalists 
in China ramped up production in the south to procure funds for their 
campaign against the CCP in the North. In 1948 they were driven into newly-
independent Burma’s Shan region, where opium production was further 
encouraged. Along with Laos and Thailand, Burma proved unable to 
exercise control over poppy crops and black-market street heroin produced 
in the mountainous region now known as the Golden Triangle.76 As the trade 
in black-market poppy cultivation, opium and opiate production boomed, all 
involved in the legal trade looked to the newly created UN for guidance. 
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Despite the threat of illegally produced opium, a new challenge in the form of 
legally produced synthetics narcotics would quickly occupy the nascent 
United Nations. 
The post-war years and synthetics: shifting narco-geographies 
In 1924, biochemist Gordon Alles had discovered amphetamines.77 This 
heralded an era of drug discovery. The first synthetic narcotic was 
synthesised in 1939 when Otto Eisleb of I.G. Farben created the 1-methyl-4-
phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid ethyl ester. Other substances quickly 
followed, most notably Demerol (meperidine).78 Synthetic opioids could be 
manufactured without raw opium, and were not included in any of the 
previous treaties. This would shape the United Nations’ drug control agenda 
most decisively, with important ramifications for the provision of medicines 
around the world.  
Health officials and drug control advocates were initially hopeful about 
synthetics. They were seen as a silver bullet. If chemists could synthesise a 
painkiller that mimicked opiates and was not dependent upon poppy crops, 
then eventually, the need for poppy crops could be eradicated, thus ending 
diversion into the black-market. Others hoped chemists could design 
synthetics that would not cause addiction. This did not come to pass for three 
reasons. First, new synthetic narcotics offered no reduction in abuse 
potential. They were often more potent than their natural counterparts and 
users could easily switch from semi-synthetics to synthetics. Second, 
demand continued to support the growth of illegal opium that was destined 
for the black market. Third, there was no synthetic version of codeine, the 
mild and popular painkiller for which most legal raw opium was grown. Poppy 
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crops continued to dominate both the legal and illegal trade, particularly in 
the Middle East.  
From 1943 to 1953, changes in the production and type of narcotics 
dramatically influenced international policy. In the immediate post-war period, 
however, a more pressing geopolitical development also brought the problem 
of synthetics to the forefront of UN debates. 
The breakup of Axis pharmaceutical cartels 
Before the war, US medicinal innovation was ineffective. Many new 
substances were simple variations of previous products. In 1938, one 
hundred people had died due to the poisonous toxin diethylene-glycol in 
Elixir Sulfanilamide, a medicine made by Massengill. This led to the passage 
of the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act which stipulated that a medicine 
must be proved safe before it could be sold (the precautionary principle). 
There was thus little incentive to invest in new expensive drugs, but large 
penalties for mistakes. In 1940, there were still plenty of pharmaceutical 
companies across the United States, and none had a market share larger 
than 3%. During the war, this very quickly changed. Many American firms 
incorporated and merged, and those with bigger budgets for research and 
development began questing for lucrative ‘big hitters’ that could then be 
patented. Along with antibacterials such as streptomycin, aureomycin, 
chloromycetin and steroids such as prednisone,79 nations searched for the 
holy grail of non-addictive powerful painkillers. 
International shortages during the war had led many nations to galvanise 
research into synthetic narcotics. 80 Penicillin was brought to the masses 
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through the Anglo-American Penicillin Project. In 1942, the Office of Science 
and Research Development (OSRD) nominated fifteen firms to work on 
penicillin production. OSRD provided federal assistance to chemical firms 
and elevated an ‘un-innovative industry into the most profitable, stable, 
innovative industry of the past fifty years’.81 By 1950, consolidation had 
meant these fifteen firms dominated the US landscape, and eight had been 
chosen by Anslinger to produce narcotics.82  
The UK, France, Germany, and Japan had already developed significant 
pharmaceutical industries and interests. The German conglomerate I.G. 
Farben had formed in 1925 and was a world leader in chemical innovation.83 
Well-known companies such as Bayer (which had first marketed heroin) and 
Hoescht belonged to I.G. Farben. During World War Two, the cartel had 
created dolophine (methadone) as a synthetic solution to Germany’s opium 
shortages.84 They had also experimented with many illegal chemicals on 
perfectly healthy prisoners in concentration camps. Some of these horrors 
came to light at the Nuremberg trials in 1947, yet many I.G Farben 
employees were quickly released and went on to work in the post-war 
pharmaceutical industry.85 I.G Farben itself was broken into four new 
companies by the allies in 1941, one of which is Bayer, a world leading 
pharmaceutical supplier today. A similar break-up occurred in Japan with the 
dissolution of the Zaibatsu or business cartels that were accused of peddling 
opium in China during the 1930s. These chemists did not fare so well as their 
European counterparts. 149 Japanese were executed on drug-related 
charges by the Guandoming government at the Tokyo War Crimes 
Tribunal.86 
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The breakup of these cartels is important if one is to understand the 
relationship between post-war geopolitics, materiality, and drug diplomacy. 
Strict control advocates wished for special restrictions on Japan’s ability to 
create and produce drugs due to their history of narcotisation. A ban on 
Japanese exports was suggested, along with the draconian policy of 
prohibiting domestic manufacture in Japan. Its economic recovery was 
deemed more important; allowing Japan to develop its manufacturing 
industry was vital to its swift re-entry into the liberal world order. On top of 
this, the country suffered from a massive public health crisis in the form of 
leprosy, tuberculosis, and sexually transmitted diseases.87 Medicines were 
badly needed, and the Public Health and Welfare Section of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) allowed Japan and Germany to 
manufacture narcotics in joint ventures with foreign firms, despite Anslinger’s 
vehement protests. The professional branches of medicine and chemistry 
were separated by SCAP in 1946 to match the practice in the US.88  
As Barry notes, the legal spaces of chemical innovation matter. Companies 
do not just produce molecules in isolation, but send new medicines into the 
‘legal and economic environment of other molecules developed by other 
companies’.89 I would add they also had to contend with a geopolitical 
environment. When I.G. Farben was disbanded after the War, SCAP allowed 
the firm’s patents to be abrogated and made public. This meant that German 
secrets were shared, and in the late 1940s numerous firms in the US applied 
for permits to manufacture Nazi narcotics such as methadone. Anslinger 
denied many of these permits, but European nations were not so strict.90 
Even so, the promise of synthetic narcotics, not to mention a whole new 
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generation of other chemicals, seemed closer than ever. The domestic 
output from all manufacturing nations increased, including the US (Figure 
15). 
 
  
FIGURE 14: US DEMEROL CONSUMPTION FROM 1944-1951. THE US CONSUMED MUCH 
MORE THAN IT EXPORTED. FIGURES IN AVOIRDUPOIS OUNCES OF ALKALOIDS 
SOLD: SOURCE: FBN.91 
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FIGURE 15: US DOMESTIC SALES VS EXPORT OF DEMEROL, PAPAVERINE AND 
METHADONE IN AND FROM THE US. AMOUNTS ARE IN AVOIRDUPOIS OUNCES. 
SOURCE, FBN.92 
The US engaged in synthetic research just as heavily as its allies, but 
synthetics posed a unique dilemma: if research progressed too quickly and 
successfully, synthetic opioids would obviate the need to stockpile opium and 
remove the central diplomatic tool of the US. Nevertheless, the synthetic 
market boomed.93 Research into synthetic narcotics produced many new 
substances that fell outside of the purview of the international treaties.  
In 1946, the US passed legislation to deal with synthetic substances. These 
came through revisions to the Harrison Act and the Synthetic Substitutes for 
Morphine Act,94 yet even this legislation threw up material ambiguities. In one 
1952 court case in New Orleans, a local chemist wrote to the FBN for 
271 
 
clarification as to whether other plants could yield heroin aside from the 
opium poppy. A defence attorney had asked him this question based on a 
definition in the 1943 Webster Dictionary Definition that erroneously stated 
heroin was sourced from three other plants aside from the opium poppy. The 
chemist worried that he would not be able to say with certainty that morphine 
or heroin seizures were made from the opium poppy due to new synthetics. 
Charles Fulton, an FBN and then UN chemist, responded by stating that 
synthetic morphine was, at its current stage, a ‘laboratory curiosity’ and that 
‘you may be quite certain that any morphine or heroin in your cases was 
derived from the opium poppy’.95 
By 1951, the Durham-Humphrey Amendment of the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act had made a permanent distinction between medicines 
(excluding narcotics, which as we have seen, had already been controlled in 
the US) that could be sold over the counter and those that required the 
approval of a physician. Synthetics fell almost exclusively into the latter 
category. Government funding fuelled widespread synthetic innovation, with 
over forty laboratories looking to understand and reproduce the chemical 
structure of key narcotics without opium. 
Synthetic narcotics and the 1948 Protocol 
In the immediate aftermath of the war, the first task for the United Nations 
was to restore national drug controls to ravaged European nations, it then 
had to legislate against synthetics. The profusion of synthetic substances 
worried control advocates at the UN just as Benzoyl-morphine had.  
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The ‘ambivalent materiality’ of narcotics had been recognised by the framers 
of the Opium Convention in 1912. They had decreed that governments 
should decide which substances could be deemed ‘addictive’. The 1931 
conventions amended this so that responsibility lay with the now defunct 
League Health Committee, who would make advisory recommendations to 
both the League and signatory parties about new substances.96 The 
shortfalls of this approach quickly became apparent. Neither the 1912 or 
1931 treaties managed to produce an agreement on a satisfactory balance 
between economic interests, pharmaceutical innovation, and regulation. UN 
personnel feared a return to the Wild West of the 1900s, with little regulation 
and less evidence that these new substances were non-addictive, or even 
beneficial for health.  
In 1948, the newly formed UN decided to bring the world’s nations together 
to discuss the growing problem of synthetics. Debates for a new narcotics 
protocol began at its first session in Paris in June 1948. At the second 
session held in November of 1948, United States public health professionals 
testified about the addictiveness of methadone, a German creation that is a 
popular medical substitute for heroin users today. They warned that 
methadone could (and was) being created in large quantities with no legal 
ramifications for unscrupulous chemists. One chilling estimate stated that 
one factory devoted to producing methadone could easily flood the world 
market. The issue was summarised aptly in the Bulletin on Narcotics 
New addiction-producing drugs are constantly being added to the 
physician's arsenal of analgesics, and since international conferences 
cannot remain in permanent session, some other way must be found 
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to determine which new drugs are addiction-producing and to bring 
them under international control with a minimum of delay. 97 
The problem lay with each signatory nation’s sovereign ability to determine 
which substances could be labelled addictive. With the passage of the 1948 
Paris Protocol, that power was transferred to the WHO, who would then 
make a recommendation to ECOSOC on the need for a new substance’s 
control. If approved, the DSB and PCOB would add these substances to the 
1931 Convention. Nations would have to furnish statistics on their import and 
export of synthetic narcotics, just as they did with opiates.98  
It was not just narcotics that were being synthesised. Powerful 
pharmaceutical markets responded with pills for pain, weight loss, and 
psychological disorders such as anxiety, depression, and poor concentration. 
As companies sought returns on these costly investments, the advertising of 
synthetics continued to grow and so did their abuse. The international 
system struggled to keep pace with innovation in the legal market. While 
twenty new narcotic drugs were placed under international control from 
1951-1954, others slipped through the net.99 Meaningful discussions of 
synthetic narcotics became regular at the CND.100  
Even with pharmaceutical companies heavily researching synthetic 
narcotics, their role in the world medical markets was negligible compared to 
morphine and codeine. Pethidine consumption rose to 13 tons in 1955 but 
dropped to 14 tons in 1957. Furthermore, synthetic consumption was 
geographically concentrated. Propoxyphene and normethadone were only 
consumed in the US and Germany respectively and under a ton in each.101 
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Of the 37 synthetic narcotics controlled by the UN in 1956, only 
Propoxyphene was consumed at anything above a single metric-tonne 
(7,470 kg in 1956 and 4,140 kg in 1955).  
Even though the quantities of synthetics paled when compared to the trade 
in opiates, the PCOB still struggled to exercise control over these new 
substances. The example of normethadone shows this aptly. Manufactured 
in Germany under the tradename of Ticarda, it was brought under control 
through the schedules of the 1931 Convention. Problematically, Germany 
had not ratified the 1948 protocol and therefore was not bound to bring the 
drug under national control. The PCOB wrote to the German government 
informing it that some 1571kg of normethadone had been exported in 1956. 
The PCOB also attempted to obtain the export figures for 1957, but the 
Germans did not furnish them. The Board analysed figures from 1956 and 
learned that normethadone, regarded no less dangerously than morphine, 
had been shipped to some 56 nations. The PCOB noted, ‘several of these 
governments replied that the transactions had taken place without their 
knowledge.’102  
Drugs such as normethadone can be treated as an event: they catalysed 
discussions at the CND and led to debates for new international legislation. 
However, these debates were held against the backdrop of a drastically 
altered political geography of narcotic production.  
Iran and the legal market 
The start of the Cold War forced the United States to continue stockpiling 
painkillers. This placed the FBN in an awkward position, just as it had at the 
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end of the Second World War. They had to decide which nations they would 
become reliant on for regular imports, but they were once again limited by 
wider geopolitical considerations. One choice was Iran, a nation that 
continued to produce well over the global legal requirements and estimates 
(despite repeated PCOB warnings). However, some two-thirds of seized 
opium in the US in 1942 was of purported to be of Iranian origin.103 In the 
1944 Traffic in Narcotics report, Anslinger had stated 
There were various cases in which it was not possible to determine 
definitely the source of the opium seized because of lack of identifying 
marks, labels or wrappings, and other information. In such instances 
reliance, must be had [sic] upon itineraries of vessels, statements of 
defendants, and chemical analysis of the opium seized.104 
The morphine content and shape of the opium were circumstantial evidence 
for the countries culpability in the opium traffic. In several cases, ‘the opium 
[seizures] appeared in stick form and because of this fact and its morphine 
content was logically presumed to be of Iranian origin’.105 The issue of 
culpability will be discussed in much greater depth in the next chapter, yet it 
is worth noting how quickly the FBN’s attitude toward Iran changed. Usually, 
Anslinger would criticise producer nations formally at the OAC or CND, but 
he was overridden by the State Department, due to the fragile state of Iran’s 
government. They did not want to push the Iranians towards the USSR (who 
had also offered to buy a two-year’s supply of opium from Iran). The FBN, 
however, did not want to import opium from a nation which continued to 
support the black market. If its purchases were made public, the FBN would 
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have to explain why it was now eagerly buying a surplus of opium from a 
country that it and the UN accused of producing a surplus of opium. 
Anslinger made quiet moves at the OAC, showing his willingness to buy 
Iranian opium for the US stockpile. As part of the 1931 Convention, keeping 
the price for opium supplies as low as possible had functioned as a deterrent 
to increased opium production. The US did not want to be accused of 
facilitating an increase in prices by artificially dampening the supply of opium. 
Furthermore, if other producing nations got wind of the US strategy, there 
was a fear that price, and production could rapidly increase around the world. 
This would harm pharmaceutical companies’ ability to sell competitively.  
It is interesting to compare how geopolitics and economics influenced the 
FBN’s approach to opium purchases from different countries.106 Marshall 
argues that Anslinger had CND and Congressional reports edited to remove 
reference to any illegal Asian suppliers but China.107 He alleges that 
Anslinger did so to delegitimise Chinese attempts to enter the legal market. 
The FBN’s ‘Traffic in Narcotics’ reports indicated that seizures from China 
increased from 13-97 kg in from 1951-1952, even though the seizures were 
from a mixture of countries, with Turkish, Italian, Iranian, and French opium 
seized along with Chinese heroin. The reports also argued that considerable 
amounts of pure heroin had been seized on the West Coast and that the 
source was Communist China.108 By emphasising China’s illegal traffic and 
delegitimising its offers to sell opium on the market, the FBN was able to 
harmonise its policy with foreign policy. 
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Despite its prominence in the illegal trade, Iranian opium became part of the 
US stockpile. To purchase it discreetly, Anslinger made large-scale 
purchases through US pharmaceutical companies, masking the 
governmental need and plans to stockpile.109 The FBN also made purchases 
through agents they had stationed in Iran. Two important figures are George 
White – who would go on to have a critical role in the MK-ULTRA 
experiments of the late 1950s – and Garland Williams who would go on to 
serve on the State Department’s Office of Public Safety’s Mission to Iran.110  
Garland Williams’ assessment of the importance of Iranian narcotic policy to 
United States’ foreign policy demonstrates how closely the two areas 
aligned. Iranian opium was central to Iran friendly relationship with the US. 
Williams believed in a version of ‘domino theory’: an acquiescent Iran would 
cause other producing states such as Turkey, India, Pakistan and Thailand 
to follow suit. By bringing these countries into line, the blame could be solely 
laid at the feet of the newly communist China. It would also provide a bulwark 
against communist influences. As one FBN agent stressed to his superior, ‘a 
deteriorating narcotics situation in Iran could affect both our own narcotics 
problem directly and our national security, since a weakened Iran might fall 
prey to Communism’. 111 
With plenty of American troops and bureaucrats stationed in Iran after the 
signing of the Treaty of Amity in 1955, Williams wasted no time in trying to 
influence the country’s narcotic policies. The US provided funds and troops 
to help Iran deal with smuggling inside and outside of its borders. American 
naval patrols doubled up as interdictors, and Iranian operatives were sent to 
the FBN’s anti-narcotic training school in Italy.112 In 1955, after the overthrow 
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of Mohammad Mossadegh, opium production was banned in Iran to deal with 
the 2.8 million addicts in the country. The announcement surprised 
diplomats.113 Suspicions were raised, and only slightly assuaged, when Iran 
ratified the 1953 Opium Convention in that same year. Afghanistan soon 
followed suit, banning opium production in 1957. The diplomatic reasons for 
the bans are clear. Both looked to receive technical assistance from the UN 
to help stem addiction and smuggling problems.114 Per McAllister, these 
nations wanted to show that producing nations could not ‘shoulder the 
burden alone’ and that manufacturing nations should provide financial 
assistance for public health initiatives, crop substitution and the training of 
police and technical staff.115  
The US approach in Iran reveals a policy not dissimilar to that of communist 
containment, encapsulated in President Truman’s speech to the United 
Nations regarding Greece’s civil war on 12 March 1947.116 The FBN’s 
policies tackled both legal and illegal opium in efforts to bring the opium-
producing world into the capitalist and regulatory sphere of the US. By 
investing in anti-narcotic policies in Iran while buying their legal opium, it was 
hoped the country would act as a barricade against both the influence of 
communism and traffic in narcotics. These strategies were focussed on the 
legal market. The preclusive buying of opium, coupled with the training of 
Iranian operatives, were touted as successes. A year later, Anslinger 
reported the number of addicts in the country had dropped dramatically from 
200,000 to 500.  
These successes turned out to be pyrrhic. Accusations of high-ranking 
Iranian officials benefitting from opium smuggling plagued the FBN’s efforts. 
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Investigations into smuggling were repeatedly dropped or put on hold by the 
Iranian government. In the years between 1949 and 1969, Iran changed its 
position on the legality of opium three times. First, cultivation was legalised in 
1949 for tax revenues and because Iran claimed it had the legitimacy to 
cultivate the crop under the 1912 International Opium Convention. It was 
banned once again in 1955 when these costs were offset by petroleum 
revenues during the overthrow of Mossadegh, and once again legalised in 
1969.117 Even when production was banned, Afghan opium quickly picked up 
the slack from Iran, crossing the border into Afghanistan in Northern 
Badakhshan. Efforts to include Afghanistan in a more regional anti-opium 
agreement faltered. The country was excluded from the 1953 Protocol as 
one of the seven producers.118 Post-1961, Afghanistan would go on to 
increase its prominence as an illegal opium-producing region, along with 
Thailand, Laos and Burma. It would become the world’s biggest producer of 
illegal opium in 1992.119  
Opium shortages 
As amphetamines became part of the medical arsenal, the importance of old-
fashioned narcotics did not diminish. When conscription swelled the size of 
the US army, stockpiling continued to buffer against narcotic shortages. A 
drop in Turkish production of 249 tons from 1953-1954 caused problems due 
to a bad harvest (Figure 16). When coupled with the Iranian ban in 1955, the 
price for narcotics rocketed as the amount on the world market shrank.  
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FIGURE 16: PRODUCTION OF LEGAL RAW OPIUM FROM 1953-1957. TURKEY 
DROPPED 248 TONS FROM 1953-1954. GREY SHADED AREA SHOWS WORLD TOTAL 
IN THAT YEAR. SOURCE FBN, 1960.120 
Demand for raw opium for manufacturing purposes increased. Fifty more 
tons of raw opium were converted into morphine and codeine in 1955 (659 
tons) than in 1954 (609 tons). Another 17 were added in 1956 and another 
209 tons in 1957.121 Countries began increasing and over-estimating their 
requirements (Figure 17) in the hope that this would stimulate production, 
causing the PCOB to issue a stern rebuke against the practice.122 
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FIGURE 17: WORD ESTIMATED REQUIREMENT FOR NARCOTICS IN 1957 VS 
PRODUCTION IN 1955. CODEINE AND MORPHINE WERE STILL DOMINANT 
COMPARED TO OTHER ALKALOIDS AND SYNTHETICS SOURCE: FBN 1960.123 
Increased demand and shortages made opium production more important in 
the late 1950s. Opium shortages ensured that raw opium remained vital to 
the legal market and that producing nations had a powerful voice in both the 
1953 Opium Protocol negotiations and 1961 Convention negotiations. This 
caused a change in the geopolitical subjectivity of producer nations; they 
began to work closely with the UN. Turkey was attempting to establish itself 
as a producer with honourable intentions, despite the illicit opium continued 
to pour out of its borders. Turkey did not want to risk its position as a supplier 
and made efforts to secure its role by cooperating with international law, 
short of ratifying the 1953 protocol.124 This did not give Turkey carte blanche 
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to dictate diplomatic proceedings. Between 1931 and 1941, it had enacted 
regulatory systems that were symbolic but largely ineffective. Control was 
limited to ‘gradually restricting permissible production to areas where the 
state possessed the greatest authority and away from areas with easy export 
access’.125 
Turkey also diverted attention from its opium production by repeatedly 
pointing to the problems of synthetics at the annual meetings of the CND. It 
did so due to a fear that synthetics might eventually replace the need for raw 
opium. The more control that synthetics were placed under, the less likely 
they were to replace morphine and codeine.  
In the late 1950s, US Aid programs became part and parcel of drug 
control.126 They represented a shift in the US approach to narcotic policy. By 
1962, aid for anti-narcotics purposes had been delivered to China, Iran, 
Greece, Spain, Thailand, Turkey and the United Arab Republic. By the 
1960s, many nations had established strong controls on their opium markets 
and taken similar steps to Turkey. In 1971, external pressure, coupled with 
funding to replace poppy crops from the Nixon administration, caused Turkey 
to enact a ban on opium production across the nation.127 By doing so, 
everyday access to opiate-based pain relief was all but removed, a system 
that remains in place today.  
In the late 1950s, American actions had helped deterritorialise the 
international assemblage. Their aid packages meant that producer nations 
were increasingly required to tackle the illicit trade. This set the scene for the 
negotiations of the Single Convention. The Single Convention incorporated 
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elements of the nine previous treaties (excluding the 1936 Convention). 
Although the Single Convention represented a degree of consensus on the 
illegal smuggling of drugs, the debates over the legal trade were not 
resolved. Producer nations tried to direct attention away from coca and 
opium towards synthetics. They insisted on controls on poppy straw and the 
termination of the 1953 protocol. Manufacturing nations defeated attempts to 
have psychotropic substances placed under control.128 The treaty also 
required each producer nation create a government agency that licensed 
growers, bought narcotics from them and sold them on the international 
market. Furthermore, producer nations had to submit statistics on their 
requirements for poppy crops to the newly created INCB.  
The single most important step was the international consensus on the 
definition of which activities were licit and illicit. This enshrined the aim of 
ending all non-medical and scientific drug use that characterises the global 
system today. However, the goal of strict control at the source (as the US 
envisioned it) had not been achieved. That chance had been lost when the 
1953 Protocol was axed. The final draft of the Single Convention was 
approved on the 30th March 1961. It represented an uneasy compromise 
between manufacturing and producer nations and something of a travesty for 
Anslinger and the prohibitionists. 
Assemblage analysis forces us to reconsider the FBN’s actions in a broader 
geopolitical context. While stockpiling was a strategy, it could not have been 
achieved without the aid of a much wider network of actors (pharmaceutical 
companies) and actants (new substances, SCAP mandates and 
organisational changes to pre-war conglomerates). Geopolitical subjectivities 
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were performed, particularly by of producer nations who wanted to justify 
their crops as legitimate. Both Turkey and Iran had producer identities that 
were not so much crafted, but emergent from the conditions of the world 
market. 
In assemblage terms, we see that narcotics have relations of exteriority. That 
is, their ability to make connections. They were multiplicitous, depending on 
where they came from and who they were sold by. Hoovering up much of the 
world’s supply was a successful strategy that territorialised the assemblage, 
but it was always invested with the virtual possibility of failure.  
To suggest that key diplomats orchestrated the changes to the international 
system is to neglect distributed agency. The importance of this conclusion, 
following Bruno Latour’s reading of Gabriel Tarde, is that ‘if there is 
something as special as human society it is not determined by any strong 
opposition with all the other types of aggregates … which will put it apart 
from mere matter’.129 As I have shown, agency cannot be boiled down to 
individuals or materials, but rather the relations between them. Of course, it 
is only humans that exert a conscious effort upon diplomatic proceedings: it 
took a diplomat as savvy as Anslinger to realise that morphine could be used 
to ensure the security and dominance of the US. Without stockpiles in Fort 
Knox, the international assemblage may not have been territorialised 
towards prohibition. 
In this chapter I have shown how drug diplomacy was influenced by a wide 
range of non-human and wider geopolitical forces. The final chapter 
examines another neglected aspect of drug control: the technical, 
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administrative activities that tried to pin down and determine the materiality of 
narcotics.  
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Determining Narcotics 
In this final empirical chapter, I revisit Latour and Woolgar’s argument that ‘to 
concentrate only on the ‘social’ rather than ‘technical’ aspects of science 
severely limits the range of phenomena that can be selected as appropriate 
for study’.1 I show that the technical governance of narcotics was not 
apolitical; it had consequences on the formal diplomatic debates at the LoN 
and UN.  
This chapter explains the ways scientists and drug diplomats attempted to 
‘determine’ narcotics. My use of the verb determine is specific: The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines determining as an action ‘that decides, or leads to 
a decision; that fixes the course or issue’.2 Determining a narcotic did not just 
involve establishing what it was, but also establishing the most appropriate 
way to regulate narcotics. Determining opium is thus an apt phrase for the 
three case studies in this chapter. These are the international schedules 
introduced in the 1931 and 1961 Conventions, the so-called ‘poppy rebellion’ 
of early 1942, and the scientific endeavour of opium determination (inferring 
the geographical origin of smuggled opium by testing its chemistry). Opium 
determination was a technical solution to a fundamentally political dispute. 
To explain this, I follow the work of Shapin and Schaffer to explore how ODP 
chemists constructed a boundary between their work and the geopolitics of 
opium.3 
In the previous chapter, I showed how the associations between narcotics 
and American diplomats were productive; they helped Americans further 
their aims. In this chapter, I show how they were problematic, unexpected, 
and – to use the language of assemblage – deterritorialising. Two of the 
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three examples in this chapter catalysed radical changes in the way drug 
control was conducted (Scheduling and the ODP). The poppy rebellion did 
not. The UN did not adopt the US style of prohibition, but a new, hybrid 
approach to drug control. Ultimately, the ODP did not provide proof of a 
seizure’s geographical origin; the methods were repurposed. In the same 
way, the schedules introduced to classify narcotics were problematic, and 
continually had to be updated by new international laws. The reasons for this 
are both technical and political. Any attempt at standardisation and 
classification, following Shelia Jasanoff, has implications that are profoundly 
political.4 
I conceptualise the relations between materiality and drug diplomats through 
Barry’s interpretation of Bensaude-Vincent and Stenger’s idea of informed 
materials. Opium was ‘constituted in relation to [its] complex informational 
and material environments’.5 That the opium itself was addictive was only 
part of the problem. Who and where it was shipped to, and from, also 
influenced early diplomatic progress. The informational environment of 
narcotics would become an important part of whether they were deemed 
safe/dangerous or licit/illicit. An opium-based product was never an a priori 
object that could be perceived ‘from a viewpoint external to it’. Narcotics 
acted in ‘a living labyrinth [the human body] whose topology varies in time’.6 I 
also draw on Barry’s notion of the technological zone. For those working in 
the middle of a technological zone, they experienced a smooth, functioning 
system bounded by shared standards of uniformity. This was the experience 
of FBN employees. At the edges of the zone, the experience is very different. 
Not everyone agreed with the ODP, nor, as we shall see, did they agree on 
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the appropriate way to deal with farmers who refused to stop growing 
poppies. There were ‘different perspectives, and uncertainties and anxieties 
about what may be possible or desirable, and different accounts of where the 
ends exist…. Whether or nor not they are solid or permeable, contestable or 
non-negotiable’. 7  
Early narcotic determination 
As mentioned in chapter one and three, the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 
was the first American legislative act to provide consumers with information 
about their medical remedies, requiring manufacturers to label their 
ingredients in their products. Smugglers of opium did not provide the same 
courtesy. US customs agents and the Narcotic Division developed methods 
to determine where seizures of smuggled opium that reached American 
shores came from. They would use crude proxies of the seizure’s purity, 
appearance, packaging, the testimony of crewmen, and the suspect ship’s 
itinerary.  
The informational environments of narcotics became important as early as 
1908 when smoking opium was outlawed. Seizures had to be distinguished 
from legal imports. In 1914, the Harrison Narcotics Act provided the 
Narcotics Division of the Treasury with a tool for tackling foreign seizures. 
While this Act had secured a relationship between the pharmaceutical 
industry and the enforcement arm of the government, it also helped 
distinguish, materially, between illicit and licit opium imports. This 
demarcation was not dependent upon the chemical itself, but its attendant 
information. Licit opium would be marked, whereas illicit opium would not. It 
was not illegal to possess or trade narcotics; it was illegal to not pay taxes on 
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them. Of course, only official importers were granted this right by the 
Treasury, so violations of the Harrison Act were not due to possession, but 
the avoidance of tax. The act was an ‘excise tax … to be evidenced by 
stamps affixed to packages or container and payable by the importer, 
manufacturer … i.e., the first domestic handler’.8  
Stamps played an integral role in delineating the opium and opiates arriving 
at American shores. Narcotics that entered the country and did not have the 
correct stamps were understood to be trafficked. The ‘mere possession of 
drugs in unstamped containers [was] prima facie evidence of a violation’.9  
These early attempts at determination were not concerned with the origin of 
a substance. Rather, customs officials and FBN agents used stamps to 
decide whether a substance had been legally imported. In these early years, 
illicit cultivation was negligible, and seizures came from countries that had 
not criminalised narcotics. This meant narcotics were often marked with 
stamps from other countries. It became difficult to tell which stamps were 
lawful in the US, and which were lawful elsewhere. The criticism of the 
established opium trades, particularly the monopolies in the British and 
Dutch territories, was that they facilitated the flow of legal substances into the 
black market. It is partly for this reason the US delegates pushed for a clear 
division between medical and scientific usage and recreational and habitual 
usage. If the international system had uniform definitions of what was 
legitimate use, then all seizures would be equally illegal.  
The typology of opium types features in the American argument against the 
opium monopolies. The black opium of Turkey was of higher morphine 
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content and often used in opiate production. This meant that in the early 
years of the twentieth-century, seizures of high morphine opium were 
generally associated with those crops that were destined for licit market, 
whereas white or prepared opium may have been grown explicitly for the 
illicit market. There was plenty of crossovers, however, as prepared opium 
for smoking was often traded through monopoly systems and found its way 
into the illicit market. Seizures could be used in international debates to 
stress either the problem of diversion, illicit growth or both. Early 
determination was ‘a political argument which [was] articulated by technical 
means’.10 The evidence it provided played a part in League debates ethics 
and morality of different approaches to drug control.11 At the 1925 
Convention proceedings, progress was held up by a geopolitical dispute 
between Japan and Britain.12 Japanese smugglers were using Japanese 
import certificates to smuggle opium into China through British territories. 
The British had begun denying all opium shipments with Japanese 
certificates in response. Denying any wrongdoing, the Japanese refused to 
partake in international negotiations until the British relented. Eventually, 
both countries agreed to inspect all certificates before shipping or allowing 
any shipments.  
We will return to opium determination shortly. The intervening years from 
1918-1931 are of interest for another type of determination: the international 
scheduling of narcotics by their addictive potential and value. Schedules 
were a logical extension of determining narcotics by proxy. They represent a 
partial shift from information regarding a narcotic to the chemistry of the 
substance itself. For the first quarter of the twentieth-century, the chemistry 
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and addictiveness of narcotics were not included in international law. When 
discussions of narcotic chemistry and pharmacology did start at the League, 
they tangled with differing social and political attitudes towards drug 
consumption.  
The 1925 Geneva Convention was the first time that the materiality of semi-
synthetic narcotics (morphine, heroin, and codeine) were discussed. Articles 
10 and 11 of the Convention stipulated that the League’s Health Committee 
would advise and recommend to the Secretary-General that a substance be 
subject to international control. The Health Committee would place a 
substance into a list of controlled substances. The idea behind this system 
was that the list would provide a neutral way of classifying narcotics that 
circumvented arguments about the morality of drug use, thereby offering ‘a 
technical solution to the management of affect’.13 Disagreement within the 
scientific community, however, stopped any consensual agreement about 
addiction being reached. The case of heroin is instructive here. The UK’s 
Rolleston Committee was formed to tackle precisely this question. It was led 
by Royal College of Physicians president Humphrey Rolleston to establish 
whether the UK should prescribe morphine and heroin to addicts.14 It 
affirmed the right of doctors to do so, the opposite of laws introduced into the 
US. This disagreement was once again aired at the 1931 Convention, which 
sought to establish definitive schedules that could classify narcotics once 
and for all.  
Scheduling and the 1931 Convention 
The 1931 Convention’s specific directives have been discussed in chapter 
one. It should be noted that schedules were one of the earliest political 
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technologies for regulating drugs. The UK Pharmacy Act of 1868 regulated 
the sale of poisons by a two-part schedule.15 The 1931 schedules are unique 
in that they were the first time anyone had sought to regulate substances for 
an international trade rather than a domestic market. They were also the first 
laws that had a geopolitically disputed purpose. 
The 1931 Convention placed supply reduction and regulation at the centre of 
the League’s operations. All nations agreed that a steady flow of medicines 
was vital and all nations should be able to stock up on painkillers. To help 
with this task, the 1931 Convention created the DSB (Drugs Supervisory 
Body). This technical body performed administrative work for the PCOB. It 
would examine the needs of an individual country and, if necessary, provide 
estimates for usage if a nation failed to submit, or provided grossly 
exaggerated estimates. It would also examine underestimates, rectifying 
them upwards. This would ensure the supply of legal medicines did not run 
out, particularly during wartime. Finally, it would carry out an Annual 
Statement of World Requirements of Drugs. 
Melissa Bull16 has referred to the DSB as a centre of inscription, borrowing 
from the work of Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar,17 Michel Callon,18 and 
Michel Foucault's work on governmentality and objects of calculation.19 She 
suggests that the DSB, together with the PCOB, were ‘centres of calculation’, 
or organisations that governed through the ‘accumulation and distribution of 
information’.20 For Bull, the DSB and PCOB embodied Foucauldian values of 
self-government. She reveals how Bertil Renborg, Chief of the Drug Control 
Service (formerly the opium section of the OAC) in 1931, viewed the 
international drug machinery as the path towards a planned economy of the 
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world, extending its influence across the globe by covering every poppy 
lanced, every batch of morphine produce, every shipment of codeine and 
every ampoule of morphine dispensed.21 At the heart of this aim was a desire 
for an entirely regulated market in which smuggling would wither away as 
there would be no surplus narcotics to smuggle. 
However, Bull’s use of governmentality limits her analysis to the orderly and 
successful mechanisms of the 1931 Convention. Power closed down 
materiality by categorising it, ultimately making ‘the supply of opium stable, 
mobile, comparable and combinable’.22 Bull thus points towards the success 
of the DSB as a technology of government. In assemblage terms, like 
Renborg’s scheme for a planned, global drugs market, this is too simplistic. 
As Protevi puts it ‘Deleuze and Guattari put the line of flight first, with power 
chasing after, while for Foucault, power and resistance are co-constitutive’.23 
The schedules were always provisionally working, with the potential for 
failure always virtual (in the Deleuzian sense) as new elements joined the 
assemblage. A planned global drugs market could not account for 
externalities that impacted the assemblage. International schedules were 
constantly adjusted to deal with new substances, changing attitudes, and 
changes in the science of addiction.  
For example, Bull notes that the success of the 1931 Convention led to a 
reduction in drugs that were diverted into the black-markets. She does 
concede, however, that this had an unexpected effect: an increase in the 
production of black-market opium. In emphasising the rise of the illegal 
traffic, Bull portrays it as the driving force for stringent drug control in later 
years. This misses the importance of licit uses of narcotics in later years of 
298 
 
drug control. She does not consider that narcotics occupied the blurry 
position between legal and illegal, a binary that assemblage theory can 
circumvent. To understand how the international system juggled this 
blurriness, we must further examine how the 1931 Convention system of 
scheduling tried to accommodate the multiple materialities of narcotics. 
The desire for scheduling came from the worrying growth of derivative 
production (the example of benzoyl morphine), but it also came from the 
problematic, habitual consumption by habitual users. Consumption had gone 
unaddressed at the 1912 and 1925 Conventions; it was a matter for domestic 
law. In 1929, Ellen Newbold La Motte, an American nurse and journalist, 
published an article in The American Journal of Nursing suggesting 
American morphine addicts consumed up to 125 grains a day24 on 
average.25 During World War Two, anaesthetists provided American soldiers 
with 1/8 - 1/4 of a grain of morphine for sedation.26 Today’s National Health 
Service (NHS) Guidelines recommend a maximum of 20-30 mg for someone 
suffering chronic pain. A dosage of 125 grains is nearly equal to a single 
gram of morphine, up to three times the NHS recommendation. If La Motte’s 
findings were correct, they indicated some users had built up massive 
tolerances that were fuelling the rise in black-market morphine. As the US 
had enacted strict controls upon its imports and exports in 1922 with the 
Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act, the price of morphine in the illegal 
traffic had risen from $12-$13 an ounce in 1927 to $90 per ounce in 1929. By 
1934, heroin was priced at $50-150 an ounce.27 
 In 1931, the US only exported about half a percent of the total narcotic drugs 
it manufactured: the rest were kept under lock and key by pharmaceutical 
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companies, pharmacists and the FBN. With such strict control over the legal 
trade, lawmakers were fully aware that the demand for morphine and heroin 
in the US would prove irresistible for potential smugglers. They feared 
manufacturing nations would export massive quantities of legitimate 
morphine and heroin, but much of which would be smuggled to the shores of 
the Eastern seaboard. If the League could introduce schedules that 
categorised substances by their addictive potential, then heroin and 
morphine would be the most regulated, making it harder for smugglers to 
divert them to enter the black market. New substances could be added to the 
schedules by the League’s Health Committee as and when they were 
discovered.  
The pharmaceutical companies played a significant role in the debates over 
scheduling. They supported the 1931 Convention for economic reasons. If 
their drugs were deemed less dangerous than their competitors; they would 
occupy a different schedule, gaining a comparative advantage. In 1932, a 
conference of delegates representing various areas of the drug industry 
adopted a resolution supporting the 1931 Convention as it was being 
considered by the Senate.28 In the US, the pharmaceutical industry had risen 
from a quirk of industrial chemistry to a well-defined lobby in 1928. It became 
the sixteenth most profitable in the country by 1934.29 The industry grew 
concurrently with the number of new medicines produced for domestic 
consumption and export (table 5). With the unchecked growth of the industry, 
the market could quickly become crowded out. Schedules would deter 
would-be competitors who would have to prove their medicines were safe. 
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TABLE 5: TOTALS OF SELECTED NARCOTICS PRODUCED BY AMERICAN COMPANIES 
FROM 1935-1955 (AMOUNTS IN AVOIRDUPOIS OUNCES). MORPHINE AND OPIUM 
WERE PRODUCED IN LARGE AMOUNTS DURING THE WAR, WHEREAS SEMI-
SYNTHETICS WERE PRODUCED MORE HEAVILY AFTER THE WAR. SOURCE: FBN.30 
Medicine Period Average 
Production 
Average 
Export 
Medicinal Opium 1931-1935 147159 342 
1936-1940 157550 1637 
1941-1945 202009 10689 
1946-1950 146642 10911 
1951-1955 150438 3993 
1955 121860 2068 
Morphine (opiate) 1931-1935 107445 646 
1936-1940 100650 429 
1941-1945 112491 2019 
1946-1950 90448 6930 
1951-1955 54363 552 
1955 49062 521 
Papaverine (semi-synthetic) 1931-1935 5331 0 
1936-1940 7257 142 
1941-1945 33612 10002 
1946-1950 241862 97269 
1951-1955 135676 22559 
1955 152887 9599 
Hydrocodone (semi-
synthetic) 
1931-1935 0 0 
1936-1940 0 0 
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1941-1945 452 19 
1946-1950 8342 231 
1951-1955 18508 674 
  1955  0 1242 
 
At the 1931 negotiations, the US and Canadian delegations pressed this 
point upon the Germans and their advanced pharmaceutical market. Any 
legislation that forced their European competitors to adhere to standards as 
strict as the US Import and Export Act of 1922 would be beneficial to North 
American markets.  
Predictably, the German industry did not want international control to be as 
strict as the US was suggesting. They secured another concession at the 
1931 conference: that the schedules would not apply domestically, thus 
allowing countries to sell new substances as they pleased within their own 
markets.31 This was viewed as critical for research and development, as a 
‘guilty until proven innocent’ approach of blanket regulation would stifle 
pharmaceutical innovation, one of the few successful industries during the 
Great Depression. 
The key question the 1931 Convention had to resolve was whether all drugs 
should be subject to the same onerous provisions. Many countries did not 
want to limit their profitable industries, many doctors complained about overly 
bureaucratic processes for dispensing narcotics and diplomats felt 
considerable pressure to show the international system was making progress 
(talks on disarmament had failed at the time).32 A wide-ranging debate on 
how to regulate the trade in licit drugs followed. Germans pointed to the 
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differing composition and strengths of opiates. Restricting codeine as 
stringently as morphine made no sense, they argued. The restrictions would 
confuse doctors, who might worryingly view codeine as interchangeable with 
morphine or heroin. As a compromise, delegates agreed the schedules 
would evaluate substances by two criteria. The first was the degree of 
danger (in terms of addictive capacity), and the second was the value of the 
drug to medical professions. Here, the production of information on addiction 
gained geopolitical significance. Codeine sat at the centre of a debate on 
addictive potential. Germans vetoed all attempts to include codeine in the 
1931 treaty altogether. The Americans and the League relented and agreed 
to create a set of schedules that recognised the differing addictive potentials. 
This meant that narcotics fell into three schedules. The first was for morphine 
and other dangerous substances that received the most stringent controls. 
The other schedule was for codeine and less dangerous drugs such as 
dionine. Heroin, deemed highly dangerous and less useful, was placed in a 
separate schedule and banned from export in all but the most special of 
circumstances. 
The 1931 schedules were far from watertight. Companies could manufacture 
and sell what they wished to domestic populations, provided they adhered to 
national law. Elizabeth Washburn-Wright summarised the situation aptly, ‘the 
administration of world legislation respecting narcotics depends mainly on 
the care with which national governments license drug manufacturing and 
trading concerns’.33 While the League was, in principle, more powerful a 
legislator than individual countries, drug control was ultimately the purview of 
individual nations. 
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At the 1931 negotiations, the problems of Benzoyl-morphine had not 
disappeared, and the assembled nations accepted a German proposal 
whereby ‘a new narcotic could not be manufactured unless the government 
found it to be of medical value and notified the League’s Secretary-General 
accordingly, in order that the Health Committee make its finding as rapidly as 
possible’.34 The US proposed another amendment where a new drug that 
had yet to be proved to be non-addictive could not be manufactured beyond 
its scientific and medical needs. This was accepted by the conferees, and 
provided protection against the unfettered production of new substances (it 
became known as Article 16). It only, however, applied to ‘any product 
obtained from any of the phenanthrene of opium or from the ecgonine 
alkaloids of the coca leaf’.35 It was by no means comprehensive, and new 
substances still escaped control. These lines of flight led to 
deterritorialisation where the assemblage was changed by a new connection, 
revealing a new pathway for the system of control. New narcotics did not 
work against the control system, but away from it, constantly causing it to 
adapt and develop. 
In the previous chapter, I showed how the proliferation of new substances 
quickly outpaced the schedules. Scheduling led to more actors becoming 
part of the assemblage of international drug control. By 1931, there were five 
different international bodies involved with the League’s official activities of 
drug control. The OAC, the PCOB, the DSB, the League Health Committee, 
and the League Secretariat. However, assemblage analysis points to the 
wider players that influenced proceedings; pharmaceutical companies had 
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‘no choice but to insinuate themselves into the process of implementing and 
modifying the regime’.36  
I wish to introduce a new set of players involved in the drug control: scientists 
who believed that chemistry could help solve the political problems of drug 
control. 
The origin of opium and the quest to combat narcotic trafficking 
In the early 1930s, there was no method for scientifically proving the origin of 
seized opium that had been diverted from the legal trade. Nor were there 
methods of identifying seizures of produced opium that did not enter 
regulatory channels. As mentioned, official stamps indicated a substance 
might have started its journey in the legal traffic, but this was not always the 
case. Governments relied upon ‘such things as the port at which a vessel 
last called, or wrappings of newspapers, poppy leaves, or oiled paper’. The 
US was fully aware that ‘such evidence may be lacking or unconvincing as 
concerns the origin’.37 When Mrs Hamilton-Wright travelled to the Philippines 
to evaluate the opium monopoly and asserted that the opium in the 
American-occupied Philippines was of Yunnan or Persian origin, she had 
little way of proving so, aside from the testaments of residents or smugglers. 
This problem presented itself to Harry Anslinger in 1934. In the annual Traffic 
in Narcotics report of 1934, Anslinger describes some common patterns. The 
general location of opium could be inferred from its colour, shape and 
texture. Indian and Iranian opium, for example, were known by their stick 
form, smooth and clean fracturing, whereas Turkish opium was higher purity, 
coarse and irregular.38 He noted ‘approximately 228 pounds (102) kg of raw 
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opium were seized in the continental US. Of this total, over 79 pounds 
(34Kg) of raw opium were identified as being of Indian origin’.39 The FBN 
would often infer geographic origin from the appearance of a seizure.  
There were numerous seizures of raw opium in lumps and slabs 
which because of the morphine content of the opium and other factors 
appeared to be of Indian origin.40 
There were, however, various cases where it was not possible to determine 
the source from identifying marks, labels or wrappings and other information. 
In such instances, the FBN and Bureau of Customs made inferences from 
the ‘itineraries of vessels, statements of defendants and chemical analyses 
of the opium seized’.41 
These basic attempts to analyse seizures satisfied the Congressional 
committees to which Anslinger testified but vague recourse to ‘other factors’ 
would not help in international negotiations. With so little proof or origin, the 
ambiguity surrounding the source of a seized narcotic allowed nations to 
circumvent culpability for opium the FBN believed came from their country. A 
trafficker of a specific nationality could be dismissed as a bad egg, the 
testimonies of arrested traffickers could themselves be false, doctored, or 
given under duress, and opium could be wrapped in foreign newspaper to 
deliberately deceive customs officials.42 By determining an actual 
geographical origin through chemical means, the FBN believed their claims 
would be irrefutable. 
The most worrying seizures were opiates and opioids that had not been 
diverted from the legal traffic, but grown and manufactured illegally. With 
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almost no identifying characteristics, these types of seizures gave customs 
agents at the borders and FBN agents within the US even less to work with, 
particularly if they were not found on traffickers, but hidden within vessels. As 
the 1949 Bulletin on Narcotics noted,  
Factory-made products, such as the pure salts of morphine or heroin, 
show few points of difference, no matter where they are made. 
although the products made in clandestine laboratories or factories 
are not wholly pure and still show some ‘marks of origin’, frequently 
including characteristic adulterations.43  
Characteristic adulterations of opiates included the presence of sugar and 
other inert substances used to dilute a narcotic for unscrupulous drug 
dealers. These adulterants were found further along the supply chain when 
drugs had been widely dispersed to small-time dealers. They did not help 
authorities locate the powerful smugglers who traded in bulk. 
In the 1937 Traffic in Narcotics report submitted to Congress, Anslinger 
admitted the shortcomings of the traditional methods of identification. He 
tried to triangulate his findings by relying on multiple inferences. He wrote 
that 
A total of 344 kg and 205 grams of smoking opium was seized and 
confiscated during the calendar year 1937. The exact origin of this 
smoking opium could not be determined, but the great bulk was 
undoubtedly manufactured and packed somewhere in the Far East, 
since it was seized from vessels arriving directly or indirectly from 
Eastern ports.44  
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A more reliable indicator was the labelling on the tins, packets, and 
containers in which seizures were found. The report continues  
The greater portion of the prepared opium seized came by ship from 
the Far East. The most common marks were “Am Kee” (Rooster and 
Elephant), “Yick Kee” in the Atlantic and Pacific coast areas; “Lam 
Kee” in the Hawaiian Islands and “Lion” and “Tonggee” in the 
Philippine Islands. A notable feature in 1937 was the increased extent 
to which there appeared in the illicit traffic prepared opium labels not 
hitherto met with. Labels not previously encountered in the United 
States were the “Running Deer” “Lion Brand Special” and the “Three 
Coins” or “Three K’s”.45  
Prepared opium seized at Seattle, New York, and Boston bore narrow strip 
labels bizarrely purporting to be tax stamps issued by the Shanghai Opium 
Suppression Monopoly. These labels indicated where seizures had been 
sourced from and where increased scrutiny from the League might be 
focused, but they problematic. Other labels such as ‘TaiKeeCo ltd 
Manufacturing Chemists’ and ‘Bremen-Shanghai’ were believed to be fakes 
attempting to hoodwink customs agents into believing they were legitimate 
imports. In the 1940 Traffic in Narcotics report, Anslinger wrote  
On September 17, 1939, 1 kilogram of heroin was purchased by 
narcotic agents in the United States … it bore the following legend: 
Manufactured by the “Tai Kee Company, Ltd, Manufacturing 
Chemists, Bremen- Shanghai”. This label is believed to be false since 
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the evidence available indicates that the heroin was manufactured 
and packaged in the Japanese quarter of Tientsin.46 
With so little certainty over whether the labels were genuine, stolen, or 
outright fakeries, the FBN could not use them as robust evidence of a 
seizure’s geographic origin. To compound this problem, the geography of the 
illegally produced opium was just as complex.  
All available information indicates that illicit traffickers continue to rely 
on the Far East for supplies of prepared opium, while France, 
Yugoslavia and Italy were used as bases for smuggling of raw opium, 
and heroin into the US. It was likewise evidence that Australia was, for 
a time, at best, the base for smuggling of prepared opium into the 
Hawaiian Islands.47 
It was around this time that the FBN’s interest in alternate methods of opium 
identification grew. By 1940, chemists knew different countries had well-
established types of opium. Korean opium was described as ‘rubbery’ and 
Japanese opium as ‘coarse and blocky’ with high morphine content, whereas 
Indian opium was dark and oily.48 It was these material characteristics that 
became geopolitically significant. 
In 1940, the US had also established itself as a world leader in scientific 
research. It had the most Nobel science laureates and powerful universities 
which had specialised scientific knowledge in specific disciplines.49 The 
science of organic chemistry had support and funding from large companies 
investing in new medicines and techniques for identifying and synthesising 
new substances. Chemists looked for a molecule that would mimic the 
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painkilling function of opium, morphine, and heroin without the addictive side 
effects. 
Previous work had examined the crystalline structure of opium and its 
derivatives and the difference of morphine purity between Indian and Turkish 
opium.50 The results pointed to a cultural factor: how opium was extracted or 
lanced. Indian opium was often lanced twice, allowing for a greater yield but 
a reduced purity, whereas Turkish poppy capsules were lanced once, 
resulting in higher purity. Higher purity opium was used by manufacturing 
nations, and Turkey and India had long supplied the opium for this purpose. 
Another identifying characteristic was how oily the opium was. Indians 
tended to add oil to their poppy crops and opium harvests requiring analysts 
to conduct further tests to determine whether the oil was naturally occurring 
or artificial.51 Gradually, these studies painted a general picture of the basic 
chemical profile of opium’s geographical variance. 
The most effective methods for confirming an origin had long been 
questioning traffickers and analysing packaging. Determining opium by 
chemical means was, theoretically, a beguilingly simple prospect. A seizure 
would be chemically analysed for the proportions of ash, organic material, 
and alkaloids within the sample. These would be compared to a compendium 
of known samples, and the determined samples would corroborate a 
customs agent’s assessment of its surface appearance. As we shall see, in 
practice, the process was complex and ultimately subjective. The technical 
and scientific expertise required to analyse opium was an expert skill but also 
an art form; interpreting the colour, texture and granularity of a piece of 
seized opium was not simple, and experts could disagree.52  
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As the poppy straw method and synthetic production led to new substances 
entering the illicit traffic, diplomats contemplated whether the science of 
pharmaceutical evidence could be used on new drugs to ascertain 
geographic origin. This aim wasn’t formally stated until 1949, in the first issue 
of the Bulletin on Narcotics issued by the newly created United Nations 
It will be much more satisfactory if some characteristics of the drug 
itself can be used to tell its origin – at least to supplement and confirm 
the other evidence – possibly to show in some cases that suspicions 
may not be correct, in other cases to establish the truth beyond a 
reasonable doubt.53 
As war broke out, all progress in narcotic determination was halted, and the 
problem remained dormant until the end of the war and the establishment of 
the United Nations. Before exploring how the science of opium determination 
advanced after the war, it is necessary to detour through a domestic dispute 
regarding the materiality of the flowering opium poppy and its non-narcotic 
cousins. 
The 1942 Poppy Rebellion: papaver somniferum vs papaver rhoeas 
The FBN did not just focus on foreign narcotics for opium produced outside 
of the United States. The stockpiling of opium led to other worrying 
possibilities for advocates of staunch drug control within the US.  
One problem stemmed from agriculture. The 1942 Poppy Control Act was 
passed in response to an extraordinary dispute over the legality of non-
narcotic poppy crops. Poppyseed was consumed heavily in the US, and non-
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narcotic versions of the flower were harvested by approved farmers for the 
seeds and oils. This led one expert to conclude that  
There is no good reason why the extremely widespread cultivation of 
the poppy, which has been practised for centuries and is intended for 
the production of poppy seeds, should - merely because of the 
incidental production of poppy capsules - be subject to the same 
control measures as the cultivation of poppy in opium-producing 
countries.54 
This is exactly what happened in the US after the Poppy Rebellion in 
California. Prior to 1942, poppies were grown for agricultural rather than 
narcotic purposes. They replaced the poppy seed crops that had previously 
been imported from Europe but had been cut off during the war. In 1938, 
some 4,400 tons of poppy seed had been imported into the United States. 
Consequently, the value of poppy seed increased from 7 cents a pound to 50 
cents a pound.55 American farmers picked up the slack. The FBN was fearful 
of widespread non-narcotic poppy growth. Opium poppies could be hidden 
among the normal flowers. They also worried that opium could be extracted 
from some other poppies in much smaller yields by traditional methods of 
lancing. The farmers disputed this was possible. So worried were the FBN 
that they did not publicise or act when made aware of families growing 
poppies in their garden. They did not want to draw attention to the potential 
of poppy growth. 
Widespread poppy crop growth across the United States would not only risk 
supplying the black-market but could also undermine the US’ geopolitical 
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subjectivity at the League. For opium to remain a diplomatic tool, Anslinger 
had to retain complete control over the American market, lest other 
arrangements undermined his ability to negotiate painkiller supplies. After 
passing these reservations to Congress, the 1942 Poppy Control Act was 
passed, giving the FBN license over who could grow any type of poppies and 
how much they could grow. This further enamoured the FBN with large 
pharmaceutical companies, who benefitted from large-scale poppy growth 
that the FBN licensed to them.  
The threat of rampant, unchecked poppy growth was always virtual. It never 
occurred, but the FBN had to constantly act to stop the threat materialising. 
The biggest challenge the FBN faced was in California; many poppies were 
grown with the approval of the State Legislature, and the Department of 
Agriculture.56 The variety of poppies being grown ranged from the signature 
state flower (California Poppy) to the ‘Tall Paeony Flower Double’. In 1941 
the FBN collected samples from the region’s growers to determine which 
poppies contained opiate alkaloids. Chemical tests revealed every crop 
belonging to the family of papaver sominferum was found to contain minute 
amounts of morphine (including ‘Holland Blue’, ‘Mikado Carnation’ and 
‘Persian Poppy’) whereas the California Poppy belonged to the non-opiate 
family of papaver rhoeas. The FBN asked the California companies to 
discontinue the growth of these flowers. Most companies agreed. Some 
small-scale growers abjured the FBN, arguing that it was unfair that Northern 
and Mid-western growers were permitted to plant their seed before the act 
came into law in February 1942. Because of the difference in climate, 
Californian growers didn’t plant their seeds until February had ended.  
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The FBN agreed to authorise a single year’s growth of seeds and then 
expected all growers to desist in the following year. In 1943, the California 
state attorney general then issued a decision obliging the state’s narcotics 
division to license permits to farmers. The FBN reported the infraction to 
Congress, but growers from the Santa Maria Valley farmers filed a lawsuit 
arguing the 1942 Act did not apply to them, as the poppies were used as a 
foodstuff rather than narcotics. 
Once again, the question was whether the flowers were legal, based on the 
materiality of the substances. The morphine content of the poppies was high 
enough to warrant a threat to the nation’s security. Once again, narcotic 
agents gathered samples for the impending court case. These were sent to 
three separate chemists, one in Washington DC, one in San Francisco, and 
one in St Paul, Minnesota. The results conclusively proved trace amounts of 
morphine within the flowers (table 6).57 
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TABLE 6: ADAPTED FROM 1953 RESULTS OF THE SAMPLES OF FLOWERING POPPY 
PLANTS AND CAPSULES. ALL CONTAINED MINUTE AMOUNTS OF MORPHINE. 
SOURCE: BULLETIN ON NARCOTICS.58 
  Washington chemist Saint Paul chemist 
Case No. Exhibit no. Morphine (%) Exhibit no. Morphine (%) 
Young plants 
3327 5 0.051 6 0.043 
3330 5 0.062 6 0.047 
3343 2 0.072 3 0.040 
3344 2 0.052 3 0.040 
3345 2 0.048 3 0.039 
3346 2 0.056 3 0.035 
3350 2 0.056 3 0.052 
Capsules 
3327 13 0.18 14 0.19 
3330 14 0.18 13 0.27 
3343 8 0.17 9 0.23 
3344 8 0.18 9 0.23 
3345 5 0.25 6 0.19 
3346 8 0.24 9 0.23 
3350 8 0.17 9 0.19 
 
Even these minor amounts, hardly enough to yield a marketable crop, were 
deemed a threat to national security by the FBN. The growers stood firm, 
arguing that 
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all poppies produce opium and morphine, including the California 
poppy (eschscholzia californica), the state flower of California; and 
that innumerable other agricultural plants produce poisons in some 
part of the plant or at some stage of growth, so that there was no 
more reason to prohibit the cultivation of poppies for food purposes 
than of tomatoes, potatoes, lima beans, rhubarb, lettuce, tapioca, 
apricots, and cherries.59 
The FBN flexed its geopolitical muscles in response, arguing the growers 
were impeding their ability to uphold the 1912 International Opium 
Convention and destabilising America’s diplomatic reputation as a leader in 
global drug prohibition. The US was one of the few countries which strictly 
controlled opium production. These trace amounts of morphine jeopardised 
that position. This argument was enough to convince a Statutory Emergency 
Court in 1942. When the verdict was handed down in favour of the FBN, the 
farmers decided not to appeal to the Supreme Court. With this decision, the 
US rid itself of the last vestiges of poppy production. 
As Bewley-Taylor rightly argues ‘the United States consistently put its faith in 
a policy that held control at the foreign source to be the most effective way to 
halt drug use within its own borders’.60 The rebellion indicates how this 
discourse failed to appreciate the complexity of poppy consumption within 
the country. Entirely innocent agricultural practices threatened to 
deterritorialise the American drug control assemblage.  
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The Opium Determination Programme: chemistry, modernity, and 
geopolitics 
Opium determination grew out of a belief in science and the scientific 
method. Krige & Wang suggest that science and technology, emerged from 
WWII as ‘major forces for destruction – and liberation – [and] propelled their 
practitioners into positions of influence’.61 They go on to suggest our 
knowledge of technocratic lobbyists and their role in steering policy is not 
well-known. This section offers a contribution to scholarship on that problem 
in the context of opium determination. 
As Malleck suggests, early twentieth-century pharmacists contributed to a 
Canadian ideal of national integrity where ‘the proper and improper use of … 
substances was but one part of a broader vision for the future of Canada’.62 
The same holds true for the US and opium determination. In 1951, the 
president of the AAAS (American Association for the Advancement of 
Science) Rodger Adams described a vision of the future global order where 
the chemically sophisticated nations prospered. He did not want the US to 
become ‘technologically unsuited to a future in a strictly chemical world’.63 As 
Reiss suggests, ‘Adam’s geopolitical hierarchy was shaped by a faith that the 
capacity to chemically alter raw materials was a marker of national 
superiority, and the ideal relationship between powerful and weak nations 
was one that ensured a steady flow of raw materials into US industrial 
laboratories’.64 The developed markets of the European and American 
manufacturing and pharmaceutical industries were deemed superior to the 
opium cultivating regions of the world. This narco-geography was marked by 
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technological superiority and adherence to international law. The hinterlands 
of opium production remained dangerous, wayward, and unregulated.  
The scientific process achieved during this era reflected the dominant liberal 
order of the time.65 The ODP was no exception. Even if its work was deemed 
apolitical, its purpose was markedly geared towards preserving the integrity 
of the international system. This was not just through the desires of 
prohibitionists. The ODP was viewed as a place in which information about 
the trade could be exchanged, and the UN could use its findings to improve 
the situation for all.  
Diplomats were interested in the secrets that opium seizures might provide 
about the scale and nature of the trafficking problem. How much opium was 
being syphoned off into the illegal traffic? At what stage in a country’s control 
mechanism was there a lack of scrutiny? Most importantly, as the Bulletin on 
Narcotics put it, ‘where does all the opium come from that provides the illicit 
traffickers with their wares and the clandestine factories with the raw material 
for the manufacture of drugs for the illicit market?’66 
So began various investigations into methods to determine the origin of 
seized opium — what I am referring to broadly as the Opium Determination 
Programme (ODP). In 1938, the League’s Health Committee had compiled a 
report on the ‘Determination of Morphine Content in Raw Opium’ which had 
reached Anslinger by 1939.67 The method was quickly re-appropriated to 
supplement methods of determining the source of opium. Yet the method 
needed samples upon which it could be tested. In 1948, two resolutions were 
adopted by ECOSOC. The first invited governments to send samples of 
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legally produced opium to the US and also asked participating governments 
to encourage and offer scientists and laboratory space for opium 
determination. The second resolution allowed the Secretary-General to 
accept facilities offered by the US.68 The FBN provided labour and access to 
laboratories, to investigative methods of opium determination.69 Much of the 
work undertaken by the UN was done in New York in laboratory space 
owned by the Treasury Department (of which the FBN was a division).  
Initially, ECOSOC requested that governments submit samples from the 
legal traffic to the laboratories.70 If opium determination were to be credible, it 
would need to be a uniform and thorough practice that could be repeatable 
and replicable. It would code the drug production assemblage through a 
shared commitment to the scientific method. As Barry reminds us, standards 
are cultural values that have to be imposed upon unruly elements.71 On 27 
May 1952, the CND tried to do just this to opium. After some early 
successes, this remit was expanded to include illicit seizures in 1952, and a 
second laboratory was set up in 1953 in Geneva.72 The CND adopted a 
resolution that put research into the origin of opium squarely within the 
purview of the international community. The CND 
Noting the progress made in research work into the origin of opium, 
Desiring to extend the research to cover all types of opium produced 
in the world, 
1. Requests governments to send to the United Nations Research 
Laboratory for analysis samples of all opium seized in illicit traffic; and 
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2. Instructs the Secretary-General to study and submit to the Council, 
at its fifteenth session, a detailed estimate of the cost of preparing and 
equipping a laboratory, preferably in the Secretariat building of the 
United Nations, large enough to handle the increased research 
work.73 
Governments were thus requested to submit samples of seizures to the US. 
These were meant to be clearly identified substances that would be used to 
catalogue the various types of opium around the world. Proxy methods such 
as labelling, ship’s itineraries and suspect testimonies could then corroborate 
findings from the lab.  
This work yielded promising results in the identification of known opium 
samples, primarily through their morphine content. Researchers found 
similarities in their results when testing various samples and optimism for the 
programme grew. On 5 May 1948, Charles Fulton, the chemist who was now 
working with the Internal Revenue Service, FBN and Narcotic Division of the 
UN Secretariat, submitted one of the first reports to the CND outlining a 
scientific method for determining opium origin through microscopy.74  
The UN solicited many countries, but also chemists, and corporations to aid 
the US chemists in analysing, categorising, and cross-referencing seizures 
with industry-standard opium. One such chemist was Charles Farmilo of the 
Organic Chemistry and Narcotic Section, Food and Drug Laboratories, 
Department of National Health and Welfare in Canada. Pharmaceutical 
companies provided the industry standard samples from which standardised 
tests could be developed. 95 substances with many different trade names in 
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different countries were submitted to the FBN. The FBN procured 
substances from as far as Rangoon (Yangon) in Burma for the chemists to 
work with.75  
Interoperability between the US and UN in opium determination became a 
key goal. For Dittmer, interoperability is the ability of different organisations, 
nations, and military forces to function together, conducting joint operations 
and sharing common doctrines.76 Dittmer sees this as strikingly similar to 
DeLanda’s definition of an assemblage, where parts of the assemblage may 
leave and join another. Despite the aims of interoperability, the movement of 
one element into another assemblage rarely produces the desired effects. 
This is obvious in the attempts to try and harmonise the process of opium 
determination across multiple laboratories. If a determination were to be 
credible, results produced at one laboratory would have to be repeatable at 
another, using the same methods and equipment. 
The latter years of the ODP demonstrate just how deeply entrenched supply-
focussed policies were at the UN and CND. Through opium determination, 
the FBN and UN became interested in technical solutions to an essentially 
geopolitical problem: persuading nations to suppress the production of 
narcotics. They desired an apolitical method of proving that illegal opium 
reaching the US came from a specific nation. For the FBN, opium 
determination was indifferent to politics. It did not account for the nationality 
of a smuggler or vessel, nor did it point fingers at governments. It could not 
lie, nor could it deceive. It simply pointed to a geographical region of the 
planet where that opium had originated. Because it was perceived as 
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apolitical, it became the perfect political tool for prohibitionists navigating the 
sensitive world of Cold-War diplomacy.  
Scholars have used different theoretical models to explore how scientific 
knowledge is created. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar refer to the 
enrolment of different materials within actor-networks77 Michel Callon has 
explored how individuals with diseases research their conditions to gain an 
active stake in the naming and treatment of it.78 Both have their merits as 
they draw attention to a process of construction, but Barry, drawing on 
Foucault’s notion of ‘the gaze’, sees knowledge production as a process of 
demonstration, where an object is made visible to an audience in a 
technological society. Barry’s notion is useful as it points to the blurring of 
scientific and political debate at the UN. While standards have the benefits of 
creating a homogeneous zone in which geographical or social difference can 
be eradicated, they necessarily lead to abstraction. A demonstration, be it a 
political rally or a scientific experiment, legitimises the person or group that 
speak about an object authoritatively, often out of the context within which an 
object or issue is encountered. By implication, it de-legitimises others. The 
ODP was a demonstration of opium to the audience of international 
delegates. As Barry notes: ‘in those international political arenas in which 
consensus might be difficult to reach … science and technology can have a 
large role to play’.79  
In 1954 Paul Martin, Minister of Health for Canada, announced a provisional 
way to determine opium’s origin.80 The 1953 Protocol did not enter law until 
March of 1963 and then was soon supplanted by the 1961 Conventions entry 
into force in 1964. As both were being debated in the early 1950s, seizures 
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had increased in the post-war years (Table 7, reprint of Table 4). The PCOB 
and DSB continued to serve out their functions by reducing diversion but 
could do little to tackle smuggling and illegal production. While the 1956 
Narcotic Control Act gave the US more powers to tackle international 
trafficking, the UN remained hamstrung by the bitter debates over the 1953 
Opium Protocol and 1961 Single Convention. The ODP produced 
encouraging results at a geopolitically salient moment in the development of 
drug diplomacy. The only area of drug control showing a measure of 
progress was the ODP. Anslinger vigorously supported the research of the 
ODP chemists. Customs agents, chemists, and the FBN had long identified 
narcotics by their colour, texture, and alkaloid content. The ODP promised 
them confirmation of these conclusions.  
TABLE 7: GLOBAL POST-WAR OPIUM SEIZURES. SOURCE: BULLETIN ON 
NARCOTICS81 
Year Kg 
1946 22,413 
1947 18,389 
1948 17,948 
1949 20,503 
1950 46,286 
195l 39,492 
 
In 1954, the US seized a variety of opium that was of high enough quality for 
chemical analysis (seizures from street level sellers had usually been 
adulterated and were useless for identification). Most of these seizures came 
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from the East Coast and New York (Table 8), then the heroin capital of the 
world. The FBN chemists had performed basic tests on their purity and 
heroin content, but analysing them would prove useless unless a chemical 
standard against which they could be judged was produced. As we shall see, 
the UN had to intervene to make this happen. 
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TABLE 8: AVERAGED CHEMICAL PROPERTIES OF US SEIZURES IN 1954 BY 
LOCATION. THE EAST COAST, PARTICULARLY NEW YORK, HAD BECOME THE 
HEROIN CAPITAL OF THE USA. SOURCE: FBN.82 
Name Number of 
Samples 
Total 
Weight (g) 
Anhydrous 
Heroin (%) 
Purity 
(%) 
Boston 29 37.43 10.2 11.75 
New York 508 349.7 42.71 49.01 
Philadelphia 23 393.17 6.22 7.12 
Baltimore 67 114.14 4.84 5.55 
Atlanta 4 121.5 6.75 7.72 
Louisville 11 230 4.86 5.58 
Detroit 166 175.85 7.57 8.69 
Chicago 116 12.24 16.42 18.84 
Kansas City 64 35.6 5.31 6.08 
Minneapolis 3 138 3.25 3.64 
San 
Francisco 
48 171 61.23 70.27 
Seattle 14 163 31.38 36.01 
Hawaii 5 79.3 74.03 85.35 
 
On January 24, 1955, Anslinger received a letter from a Mr K. Hossick of the 
Canadian Division of Narcotic Control, discussing a paper he observed at the 
Pittsburgh Convention on Analytical Chemistry. This paper dealt with 
measuring the content of ash in opium seizures, but like Anslinger, Hossick 
looked to expand the purpose of opium identification. Hossick suggested ‘in 
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order to control the international drug traffic, the geographical source of the 
illicit opium must be known so that supplies of the drug may be cut off at the 
start’.83 This suggests that Hossick, a scientist, felt that the ODP would help 
tackle the illegal trade in smuggled narcotics, rather than just highlighting it at 
the CND. In other words, he was suggesting that the scientific findings of the 
ODP could benefit the process of drug diplomacy in other ways.  
The basic tests analysed the alkaloid and organic composition of opium 
samples along with atomic absorption spectronomy.84 Many hoped that once 
a set of techniques had been found to effectively determine opium, they 
could also be applied to other opiates found in the illicit traffic. By 1955, the 
FBN had recorded a decrease in opium smoking of 60-80%. The narcotic 
threat now existed in the form of opiates and opioids.85 Some 10% of the 
global traffic was reaching the US shores, and smuggled heroin and 
morphine had taken over as the drugs of choice. They were less bulky than 
opium and captured a much wider market. 
In 1955 morphine’s stereochemistry (the spatial arrangement of a molecule’s 
atoms) was confirmed in 1955 by Dorothy Hodgkin of Oxford.86 This was 
useful for ODP researchers. It let them study the molecule in the abstract, 
divorced from the context of chemistry and geography. Farmilo published 
many of his findings in the Bulletin on Narcotics, 87 as did assorted ODP 
researchers.88 Most of their findings were positive and seemed to suggest 
that a county or region could be inferred due to the opium poppy’s 
geographical adaption to specific soil and climate. These two factors 
remained constant, whereas other factors affected the chemistry: storage, 
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the number of times a bud was lanced, and crop age would confound any 
single clear determination.  
The UN established a ‘committee of experts’ to determine whether the 
laboratory methods had applications in the field. This committee was made 
up of chemists from around the world, including Axel Jermstead of the 
University of Oslo, Ps Krishnan of the Indian Government’s laboratories and 
Lyndon F Small of the US National Institute of Health. They were so 
impressed with the progress made by the FBN that in 1956, the UN’s 
Division of Narcotic Drugs established its laboratory for determining the 
origin of opium under the moniker of the Opium Research Project, directed 
by the Norwegian Scientist Olav Braenden.  
It is at this point that the value of the project to international diplomacy was 
first discussed publically. In 1952, in one report sent to the FBN on the 
progress made by the DND, a series of FAQs were answered in detail. One 
of these questions was ‘what is the value of determining opium to law 
enforcement?’. The report responded by noting that it would ‘cut down the 
source of supply’. It would do so by alerting ‘governments of producing 
countries to greater precautionary measures and suppressive measures… 
and also to alert the victim countries as to the source of danger’.89  
The ODP was only ever designed to provide intelligence in the broader fight 
against the illicit traffic, rather than evidence for securing convictions for 
specific cases. Charles Fulton wrote 
I find that there is a lot of misunderstanding and that even people who 
approve of our programme tend to leap to the idea that it is intended 
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to lead to the conviction of the particular purveyors in the country of 
origin. On the contrary, as I see it, our programme is intended to 
convince any producing country concerned, or alternatively the 
community of nations as a whole, that we know where the opium is 
coming from, and — if it leaks out in any quantity—that something 
must be done about it on the home grounds.90 
If control advocates felt that the opium determination might aid in capturing 
smugglers, they were broadly mistaken. The report noted that ‘probably, it 
would not help at all’.91  
The ODP was methodologically complex. There were many competing tests 
that offered contradictory results. The UN’s DND laboratory specialised in 
‘routine chemical analysis, paper chromatography, paper electrophoresis and 
equipment for opium ash analysis using spectrographic and 
spectrophotometric methods’.92 Ash determination had the most potential 
and garnered plenty of interest. 
It is here that opium is best thought of a multiplicity which has ‘no need 
whatsoever of unity in order to form a system’.93 For every sample that was 
successfully documented and tabulated, a thousand variations in the 
chemical composition of actual seizures and ash content could confound any 
certainty over its origin. Furthermore, the methods were unreliable. Titration 
– one of the main methods for determining yields from opium that was not 
included in the unified method – often produced inconclusive results when 
countries estimated their requirements for the PCOB. The French had 
conceded that this required that the utmost confidence ‘be placed in the 
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manufacturers and that this confidence must rest on a solid basis. The 
standing of the licence holders should be unquestioned’.94 The results could 
vary drastically on the same sample. With such variations it could be difficult 
to ascertain exactly how much product a batch of opium would yield, and 
therefore how much a country would produce and subsequently export. 
Determining the morphine content of a sample via titration for the ODP also 
yielded inconsistent results when the same sample was measured twice.95  
On 15 March 1955, Anslinger received a letter from Dwight Avis of the 
Alcohol and Tax Division. Avis had presented a paper on ash seizures to the 
American Chemical Society. In it, he counselled against any premature 
enthusiasm regarding the ash method: factors affecting both the ash and 
metallic compounds had not yet been evaluated to reveal any substantial 
conclusions.96  
As such, no single chemical test was designated as sufficient for opium 
identification. Instead, the DND laboratory developed a ‘single unified 
method’, comprised of multiple methods developed by a variety of 
governments and organisations). 97 
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There were many problems with the unified method. First, was procurement. 
The ODP was entirely reliant on samples supplied by producing nations and 
pharmaceutical companies. Most pharmaceutical companies obliged, and 
medical grade samples from pharmaceutical companies were useful, but 
researchers required reliable samples from the illicit traffic from across the 
world.  
Many producer nations were hostile or indifferent to the programme. Some 
even tried to sabotage it. One simple method of discrediting the ODP was 
non-compliance. Producer nations could withhold samples or make their 
transit onerously difficult. This was not hard to do. US law had made shipping 
narcotics so difficult researchers found it difficult to transport samples to one 
another anyway. Simple noncompliance was also effective. Some nations 
deferred on sending regular samples.98 Even if they did submit a sample, 
they could cause further confusion by forgetting or omitting to send 
accompanying information. One undated report from the CND noted ‘the 
inadequacy and often even contradictory nature of the information obtained 
and supplied’.99 Such problems forced the CND to pass a resolution in April 
1958 where it 
Urged the Governments of the following countries: Bulgaria, Greece, 
India, Iran, Japan, Pakistan, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics and Yugoslavia, to provide or continue to provide the 
United Nations Laboratory with sufficient authenticated opium 
samples from the various regions of production inside the country over 
a period of years covering possible fluctuations in local production, 
accompanying each sample with the following information: year of 
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production, precise locality of production, details of harvesting - e.g., 
first or second lancing, weight of the sample, whether it is opium from 
one cultivator or several neighbouring cultivators, local name of the 
variety of poppy and other relevant data.100 
Second, researchers were dismayed to learn that the number of variables 
that could change the chemistry of a seizure kept growing. Research was 
undertaken on fertiliser,101 soil, slope, latitude, and also the variations in each 
alkaloid found within a sample.102 With such variation, cataloguing the full 
spectrum of results was a daunting task. DND researchers estimated that 
three different sets of samples would be needed to produce a dataset 
comprehensive enough for comparing seizures against. The first was a set of 
the salts of the opium alkaloids of accurately known composition; the second 
would be exported opium where the composition had been determined, 
including major and minor alkaloids (there are twenty in raw opium) in the 
opium and ash. The third was a set of ten authenticated blocks of opium 
unknown to the laboratory, who would then use their methods to see if their 
conclusions matched the authenticated samples. 
The third set of problems in the ODP were technical and financial. 
Cataloguing the sheer variety of chemical compositions that opium could 
take required a substantial investment of time, money, and equipment, often 
well beyond the limited budget of the ODP.103 There were only three full-time 
chemists in the DND laboratory,104 and the US laboratory was ill-equipped to 
perform the unified method. Furthermore, scuffles about the make-up and 
financing of the team hindered progress. The FBN lobbied for the inclusion of 
Dr Eimar Brochmann-Hansenn, a professor of pharmaceutical chemistry at 
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the University of California Medical Centre. Brochmann-Hansenn wanted to 
extend the project to include the alkaloids of opium: morphine, narcotine, 
papaverine, thebaine, and codeine. If the program could offer determination 
on these substances, it would be useful to the FBN. Other chemists wanted 
to focus exclusively on opium determination. These disagreements 
hampered the hiring process at the bureaucratic UN. 
Finally, using the unified method on just one sample could take weeks. 
Whereas the first half of the unified method gave a rapid screening and 
indication of the profile of a substance, it could not provide the detailed 
information or a conclusive or definitive origin without further, extensive 
analysis. The first half was also unreliable. The latter, more accurate 
methods, particularly spectrographic methods and electrophoresis, required 
expensive laboratory equipment, technical know-how, and time. Worse still, a 
single part of a larger seizure might not be consistent with other parts of the 
same seizure. A seizure could often contain a composite of different types of 
opium. The two assumptions made by the FBN – that samples would display 
uniform materiality and that a single seizure would contain opium from a 
single location – turned out to be problematic. 
To tackle these problems, the expert committee on the unified method broke 
down the testing into two groups, one that could be applied in labs across the 
world (including micro and macroscopic analysis of appearance, unified 
analysis, and the punching and sorting of samples). The more specialised, 
secondary methods were to be performed by another group at the UN lab, 
whose work was considered ‘highly essential’.105 If a sample did make it 
through the method – and the steps were fully followed and corroborated in 
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different laboratories – an origin might be provisionally determined. It could 
not, however, be located to anything smaller than a region or country. There 
were many cases were two possible locations were submitted to the CND. 
This meant that the conclusions reached by the DND were easily disputed by 
an accused nation. In a telling letter from Charles Farmilo to Anslinger in 
1958, Farmilo disclosed that an unnamed embassy had protested the results 
of some of his findings. They did so by suggesting ‘the sample I considered 
to be of X origin the opium (in their opinion) did not present any similarity of 
characteristics with opium of X origin’.106 Farmilo confessed he ‘sometimes 
got discouraged by these continuing setbacks’.107 With recalcitrant nations 
able to quash findings, it appeared that the material profile would not provide 
the certainty control advocates sought. As the ODP stalled, Anslinger would 
not be discouraged. He urged Farmilo on.108 He wrote 
I feel that the availability of more comparative samples from the 
various opium producing regions of the world will be advantageous in 
securing wider acceptance of the validity of the laboratory 
determinations of origin … I hope that this will not result in a 
discontinuance of the splendid research efforts that, in my opinion, 
have had such valuable results.109  
As the world’s appetite for morphine and heroin dramatically outweighed that 
of raw opium, the traffic and seizures of these alkaloids increased, the 
progress made in opium determination became less important. As early as 
1953, diversion was almost zero in the United States. By 1963, heroin had 
become ‘by far the most important drug of addiction, at least in the Western 
world’.110 As it became clear that more opium was produced and 
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manufactured entirely outside of governmental control and national 
legislation, instead of being diverted from legal stocks, many states began to 
admit they had little capacity to control criminal activities within their borders. 
As mentioned in chapter three, countries such as Iran and Turkey reached 
out for help and technical assistance. Coupled with a drastic reduction in 
diversion and increase in illegal cultivation, the geopolitical value of the ODP 
declined.  
The findings of opium determination had no identifiable impression upon 
nations, who were then gearing up for a long and arduous debate on the 
1961 Convention. When Harry Anslinger retired from the FBN in 1962, so did 
the fervent desire for origin determination for diplomatic purposes. The DND 
shifted towards opiate analysis and identification in the field. Analysts 
focused on the substance and its toxicity rather than the country of origin.111 
With that shift, the search for scientific evidence for diplomatic claims died. 
Progress into the science of drug identification continued, and the DND 
laboratory became a hub for regional training and reference samples around 
the world.112 It went on to have many successes, particularly for the rapid 
identification of unknown substances.  
The Opium Determination Programme could only emerge from the specific 
geopolitical context that saw supply control as equivalent with drug control. It 
was only when the world largely agreed that opium smuggling was a problem 
that the UN provided resources to analyse it. Ironically, as more nations 
agreed to tackle the illegal production and trade of narcotics, the ODP 
became less relevant.  
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The failure of the ODP came from misunderstandings about the materiality of 
opium. Whereas Anslinger saw an ironclad, irrefutable honesty in 
determination, the materiality of opium complicated the act of truth-telling. 
Demonstrating an origin meant creating instruments, methods and expertise 
that could demonstrate truth and make it visible. Furthermore, Andrew Barry 
distinguishes between political and anti-political actions. A political action 
may seek to open ‘new sites and contestation’,113 whereas an anti-political 
action would seek to close it down. The ODP was an attempt to reduce the 
space for politics. By bringing the scientific method into opium determination, 
drug diplomacy was turned into a technical practice of government. If there 
were no dispute over the origin of a seizure, then ending opium smuggling 
itself might become a technical strategy rather than a political goal. However, 
by placing faith in organic chemistry, the technical and scientific arena within 
which opium was analysed was politicised. States began to disagree about 
claims to truth and question the value of the programme altogether. In the 
US, disagreements over funding and staffing were as much political as they 
were technical. With Anslinger keeping a close eye on the programmes, 
geopolitical aims were imbued into scientific ones. 
The next part of my analysis examines the mediums on which the ODP’s 
truth claims were carried: documents were not simple conveyors of truth, but 
themselves agentic in that they conditioned the conclusions that the ODP 
offered.  
Documents and agentic capacities 
For Barry, the production of ‘information has complex and often unexpected 
implications for those involved in its production’.114 Here, I would like to 
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discuss the materiality of information production: the paper on which the 
ODP findings were communicated. While these documents might seem 
insignificant, a flat ontology does not hold any entity in the assemblage as, 
conceptually, more important. Instead, the relative importance of elements 
emerges from specific interactions rather than any notion of human agency. 
The term agency itself is somewhat problematic since it indicates a quality 
that is possessed, rather than shared, distributed or generative. As Coole 
has argued, the phrase ‘agentic capacities’ is more useful in considering how 
processes unfold (in this case, knowledge production).115 I argue agentic 
capacities help us understand how the materiality of opium influenced 
Anslinger’s political aims. This means paying careful attention to the role of 
documents in the ODP. 
It is the capacity of the documents to enter new relations in the assemblage 
that makes them agentic, and ultimately impactful upon drug diplomacy. 
They provide an insight into the failure of the ODP that does not rest on 
funding, staffing, or a lack of political will. As Dittmer has convincingly argued 
in his case study of the Foreign Office, paper documents shaped diplomatic 
practice by their capacities. He notes that its capacity to catch fire and its 
weight made it cumbersome and difficult to store in the Nineteenth Century 
Foreign Office. Because of this, the problems of storing paper formed part of 
the bid for a new governmental building.116 
The documents I analysed are formal, technical records of seizures and their 
chemical profiles kept by analysts in the ODP. They also include instructions 
for undertaking narcotics tests, receipts for seizures, and of monetary 
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transfers made to the DND and ODP staff. I believe they became agentic in 
two ways.  
The first obvious point here is that the paper medium functioned as recording 
devices. The ODP documents were ultimately meant to provide a 
compendium of opium samples that were chronicled so that standards for 
each nation’s opium signature could be deduced. It was only when these 
samples were chronicled and recorded in concert, that such measurements 
could be made.  
Conceptualised thus, the absolute value of a sample’s morphine content, its 
colour and microscopic profile were worthless: if all opium contained 16% 
morphine, there would be no point in measuring it. The samples became 
both scientifically, and subsequently geopolitically, meaningful when the 
differences in relative values of morphine content were recorded on paper. 
Second, the paper documents were replicable and easy to transport. They 
could be appended to reports to UN funders to demonstrate progress, and 
most importantly, they provided a solution to the problem of posting seizures 
through the mail. Fulton often attached summary reports of seizures in his 
correspondences with Anslinger. Paper was not subject to the same onerous 
legal requirements for transportation that seizures were beholden to. Every 
sample that was transferred to the US ultimately had to be authorised by 
Anslinger, and chemists had to make their case before he would approve a 
transfer. Before posting a seizure from the FBN – or shipping samples 
entering the US – to the UN laboratories, a paper summary of the basic 
chemistry of the sample could be sent to determine if the sample was of 
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interest to the researchers. If a paper description of a sample was deemed 
important, a request for the sample to be securely posted could be made to 
the FBN. The converse was also true. One seizure named the ‘Contini 
sample’ was unusual in that it exhibited abnormal levels of porphyroxine and 
codeine. This made it similar to opium produced in Malatya, Zaire in Turkey, 
and the Punjab region of India. Fulton believed it was not from India, but was 
nonetheless worth ruling out chemically. He asked Anslinger for more time to 
study the sample.117 To keep his missive brief, Fulton included technical 
details of the differences in codeine and pophyroxine. Technical documents 
were informative, but also authoritative; they ‘manipulated an object into a 
more or less standardised form’118 that made the work of the ODP possible. 
It was not just technical reports or samples that had to be posted, but 
academic articles, procedural documents and of course, permits and 
permissions for working with seizures. Charles Fulton had to order seven 
new copies of the ‘The Determination of Codeine, Narcotine, Papaverine and 
Thebaine in Opium’ for his laboratory so he could continue with his work and 
train other chemists. 
Documents were not infallible, nor did they always accurately reproduce the 
information that was sent. The reliance on forms that described samples at 
the ODP made them indispensable and this could be problematic for 
researchers if the information sent did not match a sample. Honest mistakes 
from customs officials also caused problems. It was also often the case the 
photographs of seizures were included with letters and reports, but these 
photos, taken in black and white, were somewhat unhelpful when trying to 
compare opium-based on one of its basic defining characteristics: colour.  
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If documents were incomplete or absent, opium determination was 
impossible. An FBN chemist named Fuller became increasingly irate due to 
the lack of information he received with the samples. The competition 
between the FBN and the Customs Agency is well-known among 
historians.119 In one instance, a customs agent sent Fuller a thin sliver of 
opium and asked him to identify it. It was a ‘thin slice … with no 
accompanying information as to morphine content or anything else.’ Fuller 
told the Bureau of Customs that he thought it was from Turkey, and asked 
them to ‘resubmit a sample from the seizure, namely, one complete piece, 
together with information as to the morphine content or anything else already 
determined on this opium, that might bear on the origin, including particulars 
as to where the vessel was from, statements of defendants if any were 
made’.120 What this shows is that the minor successes of the ODP hinged 
upon the clear and standardised classification of seizures as they linked to 
one another, but these were ultimately reliant upon the relationship between 
two competing government agencies. 
It is here that insights from Actor-Network Theory are useful. When thinking 
through how the OPD progressed, we cannot boil agency down to individuals 
who worked in it or funded it. Neither does agency exist in the technical 
documents themselves. Instead, it is their ability to be enrolled into the 
assemblage for productive purposes (their agentic capacities). The most 
accurate and substantial determinations were not solely made from 
chemistry but were confirmed by the traditional proxies for identification. In 
peering into the black box of the ODP, we are immediately encouraged to 
look beyond its employees to a much wider set of associations between 
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humans and non-human actants. Agentic capacities of technical documents 
played a significant role in the opium determination programme. On the one 
hand, they allowed for the translation and standardisation of the complexity 
of variable samples to be displayed uniformly and compared. On the other, 
they were at best, a mediocre replacement for the sample. The problems of 
enrolling other actors to their cause, as Fuller found with the lack of 
documents submitted by the Customs Bureau, could hinder progress. By 
examining the ‘circuits through which matter flows’121 we can begin to 
understand how the geopolitical aims of supply control advocates were 
hindered by the technical documents of the ODP.  
Schedules and the 1961 Convention 
The final section of this chapter returns to the issues of narcotic scheduling. 
When it entered force in 1968, the Convention carried over the complicated 
system of estimates and import and export licensing established by the 1925 
and 1936 conventions, transferring the regulatory functions of the PCOB and 
DSB to the newly created INCB.122 In Article 3 of the Convention, the INCB 
was also given authority to schedule substances based on World Health 
Organisation (WHO) recommendations. These came from the WHO’s Expert 
Committee for Drug Dependence which has the formal responsibility for 
classifying narcotics under the global drug policy regime today. The WHO 
could classify drugs into four schedules, two more than the 1931 Convention. 
These were 
Schedule I – The substance is liable to similar abuse and productive 
of similar ill effects as the drugs already in Schedule I or Schedule II, 
or is convertible into a drug. 
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 Schedule II – The substance is liable to similar abuse and productive 
of similar ill effects as the drugs already in Schedule I or Schedule II, 
or is convertible into a drug. 
 Schedule III – The preparation, because of the substances which it 
contains, is not liable to abuse and cannot produce ill effects; and the 
drug therein is not readily recoverable. 
 Schedule IV – The drug, which is already in Schedule I, is particularly 
liable to abuse and to produce ill effects, and such liability is not offset 
by substantial therapeutic advantages.123 
The difference between schedule I and II is that in schedule II, substances 
could be accumulated by governments and medical prescriptions were not 
obligatory for them to be dispensed. Schedule I substances required these 
measures, plus had their amounts and estimates submitted to the INCB. 
Schedule IV substances were to have an extra set of regulations attached for 
countries that continued to use them, and many countries abolished their use 
entirely.124 Over 100 substances were regulated by the 1961 Act. Heroin, 
morphine, and their derivatives were both categorised into schedule I, the 
schedule that deals with medicines most important for the twin goals of 
provision and prohibition. Codeine was categorised into schedule II, and 
heroin was also categorised into schedule IV, a class reserved for the most 
dangerous and least useful of substances. That heroin could enter two 
schedules is an example of its multiplicity. The 1961 schedules territorialised 
the assemblage towards prohibition. Narcotics were ‘dangerous first and 
foremost, hence postponing the acknowledgement of their other – in this 
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case, medicinal – advantages as only the second step in line with the overall 
effort to exert control and securitize’.125  
Schedules were designed to streamline the international system and 
eradicate irregularities between states, creating a smooth space. They were 
a blueprint which could be adapted by UN member-states. Adherence and 
adoption of UN schedules was a technical procedure that masked a political 
argument in favour of prohibition. This was made flagrantly clear when Article 
3 of the 1988 Convention Against the Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychoactive Substances required states to take criminal action against 
people who obtained or sold scheduled substances.  
Schedules, as an instrument of regulating drug control, form a technological 
zone in which standards were made uniform and consensus was reached. 
They smoothed over the messy materiality of substances (which we have 
seen, can vary within one small sample). They are not, however, watertight. 
They created new opportunities for political contestation. The schedules of 
the 1961 Conventions remain in use today, and many countries have 
adopted models based on them. States are judged on their ability to create 
legislation that mirrors the UN schedules and meets international standards. 
In the UK, drugs are classified as either A (highly dangerous with higher 
penalties for trafficking and possession) to C (lowest penalties and least 
danger). In recent years, some substances have changed schedules, to 
some protest and controversy (marijuana from class C to class B in the 
United Kingdom). The UK also has the Misuse of Drug Regulations 2001 that 
provides a scheduling system for companies wishing to import controlled 
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substances into the United Kingdom. This is based on the 1961 schedules. 
The US uses a system ranging from schedule I (no medical use, high 
penalties) to schedule II- V (decreasing penalties and potential for abuse).  
The architects of the 1961 convention left the definition of ‘medical and 
scientific’ usage vaguely defined. Like their predecessors, they recognised it 
would mean different things at different times.126 Today, the UN system is 
still reflective of the spirit of the 1961 conventions: substances are tightly 
controlled with clear blueprints for tackling the illegal drug trade provided to 
signatory nations. The medical capacity of substances remains important, if 
not secondary, to the international drug control regime. This has meant that 
when it comes to demand reduction, nations have more freedom to 
experiment with domestic policy; thus, the prescription of heroin, needle 
exchanges, and therapeutic uses of MDMA and LSD all have their places in 
the international schedules, but are theoretically and simultaneously 
permissible under 1961 Convention’s provision clauses.127  
However, UN law is not self-executing; it is not enforced, nor can it be 
enforced, by the INCB.128 The decriminalisation of cannabis for personal, 
non-medical use is exemplary of the fuzzy limits of the GDTR. The GDTR 
does not require a state to criminalise use per se, which was one of 
Anslinger’s problems with its passage. While the INCB considers non-
medical, personal use contrary to the spirit of the conventions, a nation-state 
which does permit personal possession of small amounts of cannabis has a 
variety of ways of doing so. Non-enforcement, decriminalisation, and 
technical arguments are used to stretch the schedule boundaries. In some 
Indian states, Bhang is made from the leaves of cannabis, but the 1961 
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schedules only cover the flowering buds and resin of the plant.129 Just as it 
was in the 1920s, claims about the legality of drugs, at least in the 
international sphere, are political claims that are made on technical grounds. 
It is the flexibility of provision that allows nations to circumvent the prohibitory 
aspects of international control. If a country chooses to abjure international 
law by scheduling substances differently to the UN, there is little that the 
international community can do but raise formal complaints. As Barry might 
say, the edges of the GDTR’s technological zone provide opportunities for 
political and geopolitical flexibility. 
This was just as true in the first half of the twentieth-century as it is today. 
Much of the work of the LoN was a geopolitical struggle towards defining 
medical and scientific usage; countries could signal a change in geopolitical 
allegiance by their adherence or rejection of the drug treaties, and mask 
these political changes with recourse to technical disagreements about 
narcotics and their ambivalent materiality. It was this ambivalence within the 
technological zone that Anslinger and his allies were trying to eradicate. 
Aftermath: killing painkiller access 
The provision of painkillers around the world was a critical goal of the 1961 
Convention. It is stated in the preambular paragraphs of the treaty. 
The parties: concerned with the health and welfare of mankind, 
recognising that the medical use of narcotic drugs continues to be 
indispensable for the relief of pain and suffering and that adequate 
provision must be made to ensure the availability of narcotic drugs for 
such purposes.130 
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It is therefore ironic that provision, which had done so much to secure 
narcotic prohibition, would be neglected by differing interpretations of the 
1961 Convention. To ensure a system of adequate provision, the Single 
Convention required each signatory country to take four steps when creating 
a regulatory system for medicinal narcotics. First, individuals dispensing 
narcotics must become members of a professional body. Second, movement 
of narcotics must travel between authorised bodies only. Third, a prescription 
should be required for medical opioids in schedules I and IV of the 
convention. Fourth, countries also had to institute a regulatory framework 
that could estimate a country’s needs and submit these to the INCB. These 
factors were designed to maximise provision where needed and reduce 
diversion to the illegal trade. 
For some countries, the technical, legal and financial resources required to 
implement the basic four-step regime of control did not exist. Other countries 
created regulatory systems so difficult to navigate that hospitals, pharmacists 
and doctors did not bother stocking certain narcotics.131 A simple ban on 
schedule IV substances was easier, cheaper, and satisfied the INCB, a 
situation redolent of debates over medicinal value.132 If developing nations 
hoped their salvation would lie with new non-narcotic synthetics from 
manufacturing nations, they were wrong. Developing nations struggled to 
procure new synthetic narcotics such as oxycodone, dihydrocodeinone, and 
dihydromorphinone. Many were too expensive to buy from developed 
nations. In 2003, it was estimated that morphine costs in middle-income 
countries were twice as high as in developed countries ($112 against 
$56).133  
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In some ways, the perversity of the Single Convention is its success. Even 
with its pre-ambulatory statement, the Single Convention did not put 
provision of medicines on an equal footing with the illegal traffic. The noble 
goal of a controlled world market for medicines led to some nations instituting 
regulatory systems so strict that gaining a narcotic almost improved 
impossible. This led many nations to woefully under-assess their narcotic 
needs. The INCB and WHO have constantly reminded nations of this 
pressing requirement of the treaty, yet millions continue to suffer 
needlessly,134 although some scholars argue the INCB could re-balance its 
focus back towards provision.135 
The years beyond 1961 represent the modern era of drug control, governed 
by the Single Convention and its sister treaties. Iran legalised opium 
production in 1969 and Turkey signed the Single Convention in 1967. In 
doing so, Turkey gained status as a legitimate opium producer.136 However, 
the Convention’s shortcomings in the face of rising drug abuse became 
apparent as illegal production rose to meet the demand. The problems of 
synthetic substances in the 1940s portended future problems. As 
amphetamines and barbiturates became part of the medical arsenal, their 
abuse exploded around the world, followed by international legislation (the 
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances and the 1972 Conference to 
Consider Amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs). The 
1972 debates caused bickering over the familiar issue of materiality. By 
signing the 1972 amendments into law, ‘manufacturing states conceded an 
essential point – at least some non-narcotic substances were liable to abuse 
and should be treated accordingly’.137 
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Conclusion  
What is the value of this alternative, material history of narco-diplomacy to 
critical geopolitics? From this thesis, I have drawn the following conclusions. 
First, that a traditional, geonarcotic perspective highlights issues which are of 
longstanding interest to political geographers: identity politics, popular 
geopolitics, diplomacy, and the everyday experience of geonarcotic 
discourses. Second, there is value in examining the materiality of narcotics. 
Third, by combining these two insights, we can begin to conceptualise the 
history of drug control differently; the geopolitical subjectivities of producer, 
consumer, and manufacturing nations were socio-material. Fourth, there is 
methodological value in adopting assemblage theory when studying 
international objects in the archive. 
Before reviewing these conclusions individually, I wish to note a general 
conclusion. Geographical research is strengthened when it considers a 
broad range of human and non-human influences. One challenge for 
researchers is finding a way to conceptually link seemingly unrelatable 
phenomena. In my study, I wished to conceptualise the disjuncture between 
materiality and discourse when it came to narcotics. This disjuncture 
emerged between public knowledge of what a narcotic was (a weapon of 
war) and expert practice of what a narcotic could do. The opium evil 
discourse pushed for prohibition, repression, control at the source. 
Diplomatic opium pushed for contradictory actions: regulation, procurement, 
and a well-regulated trade in vital painkillers.  
When thinking through the relationship between geonarcotic discourse and 
materiality, it is tempting to see the two as opposed. The medicinal story 
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provides the gritty truth of drug diplomacy, whereas geonarcotic discourse 
portrayed put the US on an inexorable march towards international 
prohibition. This would be a mistake. Assemblage analysis suggests that 
prohibition and provision were complementary concepts. In an assemblage, 
things are not defined by an essence, but their capacity to connect. For most 
of the early twentieth-century, a legal narcotic was simply a narcotic being 
used in a specific way in a specific place and time; legality was dependent 
upon who was talking, testing or trying to legislate against them. A clear 
statement on the legitimate uses of opium was what the US desired most. 
They felt it would help ensure narcotics were administered and used by 
those who needed them most, while also stopping those who did not need 
them. 
This did not however, translate into the public sphere. Geonarcotics did 
discursively divide between legal and illegal narcotic, and the public was 
much less informed about the trade in licit narcotics than the opium evil. 
Public discourse about weaponised opium had significant impacts on 
diplomatic debates. Geonarcotics was more than a discourse. Geonarcotics 
was a terrifying threat, and when combined with a public that was distrustful 
of the League, it conditioned the actions of diplomats and led to the US 
withdrawal from the 1925 and 1936 Conventions. The US rejection and 
subsequent reporting of the rejection of the 1925 Convention attest to this.  
This, I feel, is the value of using assemblage theory: to reconcile new-
materialist and discursive account of narcotics. As Barry tells us, a chemical 
isolated in the laboratory is not the same as that same chemical in the real 
world. This holds true for narcotics. Two substances may share the same 
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chemistry, but they were differently adulterated and occupied entirely 
different roles because of the informational and material environments within 
which they circulated. These informational accounts complimented and 
contradicted each other, leading to changes in narcotics policy. It is these I 
turn to now. 
Significant findings: geonarcotics 
In the introduction, I set out to answer the following question 
What is the relationship between geonarcotic discourses and geopolitical 
agendas from 1909-1961? 
Geonarcotics draws our attention to the ways discourses about drug 
production are spatialised, rather than the spatialisation of drug use and 
users. My first conclusion is that narcotics, unlike alcohol and then 
marijuana, were understood as external threats to the United States. Of 
course, petty dealers perpetuated the trade within US borders, but the roots 
and route of the problem were the focus. Narcotics were not just 
geographically distant, but geopolitically distant. Countries that perpetuated 
the trade held views on narcotics and political governance that the US 
viewed as anathema. It is from these roots the subjectivity of the US as a 
victim of the international opium trade grew. 
Second, and following on from this, is that the weaponisation of narcotics 
grew out of the victim subjectivity that the US press and diplomats wilfully 
adopted. By setting itself up as a victim of the trade, the US also became the 
warrior that protected other nations against the opium evil. Geonarcotics was 
more than a discourse. It was a socio-technical imaginary that demonstrated 
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the narcotic exceptionalism of the US. By assuming the role of the world’s 
leading proponent of drug control, the US rallied China to its cause and 
established a link between colonialism and narcotics. While the US and 
China renounced the lack of progress at the League and blamed the 1925 
and 1936 Conventions for this, they strongly supported the 1931 Convention 
that established controls upon producer nations but protected the world’s 
legal supplies.  
This geopolitical subjectivity was dependent on domestic US policy. Flurries 
of national legislation were enacted to convince the world the US was both a 
victim of, and leader, narcotic control. The idea that opium was a foreign 
weapon threatening the US only gained prominence when the US had its 
own legislative house in order. When Harry Anslinger entered the scene in 
1930, he presided over massive punitive shifts in US drug law and led 
numerous drug delegations at the League and UN. With support from 
Richmond Hobson, Stuart Fuller, and Alfred Blanco, the US became David in 
a fight against the Goliath of opium. As conflict began to engulf Manchuria, 
this geopolitical narrative extended to include China and Japan. In the late 
1930s, the weaponisation discourse came to full fruition. With evidence that 
the Japanese were trafficking in Manchuria, US newspapers reported on the 
horrors of the opium evil as a prominent part of the conflict. By the time the 
Second World War was underway, the trade in narcotics was used as an 
example of how the Japanese subjugated China, and indeed the US, with 
opium.  
After World War Two, the weaponisation discourse, mirroring dominant 
geopolitical concerns, shifted to accuse China, North Korea, and eventually, 
356 
 
Cuba. The contours of geonarcotics changed slightly: there was a stronger 
emphasis on using narcotics to finance communist military operations. 
Eventually, as fewer nations actively supported the trade in raw and smoking 
opium, this position became less tenable. Instead, the transnational mafia 
became an existential threat to the United States, with the occasional help of 
rogue communist nations. When it became clear that drug trafficking was 
squarely in the hands of organised criminals – rather than any communist or 
recalcitrant states – the weaponisation discourse lost potency.  
This story matters, because the grounds of today’s opiophobia are rooted in 
the weaponisation thesis. Domestic controls in countries are rooted in a 
discourse based on fear of invasion by a foreign enemy. After 1961, many 
nations made narcotics harder to access, even for legitimate purposes. 
Unearthing the foundations of opiophobia is important preparatory work for 
tackling the ‘tragedy of needless pain’.  
Third, geonarcotics stresses the chequered history of foreign policy and 
narcotic policy. Scholars have highlighted this link,1 but my significant finding 
is to suggest that drug diplomats do not just harmonise their goals with those 
of foreign policy. Their goals were multivalent, and the FBN would 
occasionally overstep the mark, supporting a nation or leader that were at 
odds with State Department directives. In other cases, narcotics policy would 
be deferred for more important policy, as Anslinger found when the State 
Department reigned his virulent criticism against China or ordered him to 
continue stockpiling. Yet for all these territorialising affects, we cannot argue 
that words, affect, and discourse totally shaped the international 
assemblage. These findings point towards the need for a more 
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comprehensive account of drug diplomacy that can explain how agency was 
distributed. 
Significant findings: materiality 
The second question I set out to answer was 
How did the materiality of narcotics shape American attempts to create 
international narcotic legislation? 
The alternative history told here reveals much about the importance of 
materiality to American drug diplomacy and the legacy of the contemporary 
international system. I believe three significant findings have emerged. First 
is the importance of technological changes in shaping diplomatic debates. 
This can be seen in almost every decade examined in this project, most 
obviously through changes in the use and production of opium, opiates, and 
opioids. The latter two substances were easier to conceal, quicker to 
manufacture, and far more profitable per kilogram. By the 1950s, their 
demand far outstripped raw opium. The growth of poppy straw technology 
vastly improved the negotiating position of the Eastern European nations, 
giving them a legitimate slice of the poppy cultivation pie.  
Second, just as technology influenced drug diplomacy, the converse is also 
true; diplomatic decisions altered technological progress. The first synthetics 
were invited by the powerful German industries of I.G. Faber and the 
Japanese Zaibatsu. Their proliferation was accelerated by the breakup of 
these groups after the Second World War. The Allies determined who had 
access to patented technology, and spreading trade secrets was one 
strategy for ameliorating narcotic shortages. The governmental support for 
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synthetic development was underpinned by the silver bullet of narcotic 
control: an analgesic which did not lead to abuse or addiction. In their quest 
for this, manufacturers searched for the perfect, non-addictive, narcotic that 
did not need raw opium. The number of substances skyrocketed, bringing 
entirely new challenges to the LoN and UN.  
Third, as vital war materials, raw opium and morphine sulphate became 
valuable. This was a deterritorialising affect: it led to new possibilities for the 
US and changes in the international system. Narcotics were a hard currency 
underwritten by the United States; ratifications for new drug treaties were 
primarily bought with it. Harry Anslinger became the de-facto chair of this 
federal narcotic reserve, as an opiophile, he was well attuned to the 
commercial capacities of narcotics. He knew the value of large supplies of 
opium and pursued a quiet, but effective policy of procurement during and 
after the Second World War. The US’s geopolitical subjectivity changed. It 
became the world’s biggest narcotic lender and played a dangerous game: 
without its own poppy crops to rely on, it was vulnerable to changes in the 
price of raw opium and the whims of its own creditors, the producer nations 
from which it sourced narcotics. It worked closely with producer nations, 
specifically Iran and Turkey, to make sure their supplies did not flow to the 
Communists. Stockpiling narcotics paid off at the end of the Second World 
War, as Anslinger secured promises from the British, the Dutch, and the 
French that they would close their opium monopolies. This was a clear 
victory for the prohibitionists; it codified the assemblage by cementing a legal 
and symbolic division between medicinal and illegitimate use. It switched the 
international focus to the illegitimate trade and production of raw opium. 
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The third question I sought to answer was  
How did the same materiality confound attempts to know and 
determine narcotics?  
Establishing a claim over the chemistry of a substance was an important part 
of the diplomatic process. These claims were anti-political; that is, they 
attempted to shut down the possibility for debate and disagreement, not just 
over a substance’s origin, but in wider debates about the appropriateness of 
supply control as the UN’s dominant approach to drug regulation. Claims 
were not just made as to whether narcotics were dangerous or addictive. 
They were made about the geographical origin of a seizure. For the FBN, 
these were fundamentally claims about where responsibility lay for the 
diversion and trade in illegal narcotics. In the early days of the twentieth-
century, proxies such as packaging, ship itineraries, and basic diagnostic 
tests on the shape, colour, and texture of opium were used to infer location. 
By 1945, the US and UN had become interested in chronicling and catalogue 
the various opium’s of the world more rigorously. Chemists and diplomats 
misplaced their confidence in the replicability of a sample’s biochemistry.  
The ODP reflects the pinnacle of post-war hopes that the scientific method 
could help solve many of the problems of traditional diplomacy. The ODP 
never delivered on this front, primarily because the opium trade passed from 
national control to international criminals and cartels. Its failure was also due 
to the problem of conceptualising opium on paper, in the lab, and in the real 
world. The sheer number of confounding variables within an opium sample 
made determination impossible. Opium itself was an assemblage, a mix of 
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material, geographical, and political associations. The properties of a seizure 
were revealed by the ODP’s single unified method, but a variety of material, 
social, political, and economic processes hamstrung its progress. 
Determination did not provide the clarity and control advocates so greatly 
required. 
Materiality thus helps tell a more complicated, comprehensive story about 
the US quest for strict international drug control. Narcotics are commodities 
that become constitutive of the US geopolitical subjectivities. How the US 
portrayed narcotics, stored, and sold narcotics, as well as legislated against 
narcotics, had ramifications at the League and UN. Likewise, narcotics were 
multiple and contested. Harry Anslinger understood this. He knew a 
narcotic’s properties were less important than its capacity (importance as a 
war material, abuse potential).  
Much of the work at League and UN on narcotics was technical, rather than 
political. While debates on policy and legislation were thrashed out in the 
OAC and CND, other work on the geographical origin of narcotics were 
seemingly apolitical. Disagreements over what opium was, and what it could 
do, were to be resolved through recourse to evidence and the scientific 
method. However, disagreement and debate, while not formally political, 
impacted drug diplomacy. Prohibitionists wanted international law to close 
down the ambiguity of opium and its derivatives. Whether this was through 
determination, scheduling, or domestic legislation, prohibitionists were 
interested in fixing legal definitions of what opium and other narcotics were, 
rather than what it could become.  
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From these conclusions, I extrapolate two theoretical contributions to political 
geography. First, is to highlight assemblage theory’s value for circumventing 
binary, legalistic thinking. A focus on legal drugs is as of much interest as 
illegal drugs. Susan Reiss had undertaken an analysis of coca and US 
foreign policy, but my contribution is to tell this story for narcotics. Raw 
opium, prepared opium, morphine, and other derivatives play a part in 
constructing different geonarcotic subjectivities. Some studies on flows of 
energy2 have already been undertaken in geography. This approach could 
be usefully applied to other internationally regulated but legally traded 
substances; nuclear materials, weapons, and tantalum are obviously 
valuable commodities, but mundane flows of logs, furs, and copper have also 
played unexpected roles in national security throughout history.3  
Outside of the discipline, the study of prosaic items and their relevance to 
international trade is well established.4 Political geographers who are 
interested in legal flows can use assemblage theory to conceptualise the 
value of these objects in geopolitical contexts. It accounts for items which are 
contradictory and multiple. During the Second World War, Opium was in 
shortage in some places, but it also was abundant in China. It was 
simultaneously illegal and legal. Finally, it was regulated and unregulated. In 
other words, assemblage theory is useful for conceptualising the multiplicity 
of objects as they circulate through the international system.  
Second, I suggest scholars look outside of the international sphere to better 
understand how diplomacy progresses. A linear history of geopolitical 
commodities that focuses on the international scale will only get us so far. 
The international was by no means the arena in which the most important 
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narcotic decisions were made. While laws, treaties, and regulations were 
ratified in Geneva, Vienna and New York, there were other geographies of 
drug control that must be considered. Whether it was the rebellion of the 
farmers in California or the two trips taken by Elizabeth Washburn-Wright to 
the opium monopolies in the Far East, it makes less sense to think of drug 
diplomacy as an unfolding narrative at the international scale, and more 
sense to see it as an assemblage where different temporalities, materials, 
and discourses converge and conflict.  
Significant findings: method 
Assemblage provides those interested in drug diplomacy with an alternative 
way (both theoretically and methodologically), of explaining how geopolitics 
is experienced/enacted. We can use an archive to avoid a dominant 
conception of human agency (the so-called ‘gentlemen’s club’ of drug 
control).5 Instead, I look to agency as distributed and emergent from the 
assemblages. This has meant focussing on a variety of actors — human and 
non-human – who were linked through the diplomatic sites of drug control. 
On its own, this finding is no longer novel. I believe my specific approach has 
novel methodological value as it treats the archive as a repository of 
informed materials with agentic capacities. This can help scholars apply the 
ideas of new materialism to diplomacy. For researchers interested in 
commodities that circulate in the international sphere, the scientific and 
technical governance of objects reveals much about diplomatic practice.  
As Barry notes, certain methods become authoritative when doing research: 
his example is ethnography in the city through the Chicago school.6 In 
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diplomatic drug histories, the reports and testimonies of human diplomats are 
dominant. Within these testimonies, geopolitical subjectivities are taken for 
granted. Treating documents as informed and agentic helps scholars 
develop a transcendent empiricism where ‘the abstract [state, international 
system, LoN etc.] does not explain but must itself be explained’.7 In my case, 
the ODP, as an impartial, neutral programme, can be critiqued. Technical 
documents were agentic in that they were ostensibly indisputable. They 
made anti-political claims that were themselves contested by nations with 
different geopolitical agendas. The non-negotiable status, or supposed 
irrefutability, of organic chemistry, was used to bolster geopolitical claims 
about the most appropriate way to govern drug control at the source. For 
example, a scientific analysis of a seizure of opium made a claim that was 
designed to transcend politics: the proportion of carbon and dross in a 
sample is not open to political dispute. This is, I suspect, why the ODP has 
been neglected in other studies of drug diplomacy; It shuts down debate, 
rather than opening it up.  
For archival researchers, I argue that focusing on the scientific, technical 
aspects of regulation in international systems leads to new ways of thinking 
through diplomatic disputes. Assemblage theory helps researchers 
conceptualise these disputes broadly. A claim against a substance was 
never just political, scientific, or geopolitical. The variety of methods, a lack of 
samples, and confusion over the eventual goals of the ODP all weakened the 
claims that could it made. What is of interest to archival scholars of critical 
geopolitics is a document’s association with its referential object. As my 
study of the ODP shows, no amount of cataloguing is ever able to fully pin 
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down the materiality of opium. Instead, technical information about materials 
was subject to the same fallibility as the statements and claims of diplomats 
at the OAC and CND.  
Limitations of study 
In this study, I do not claim reliability (that it could be repeated and the same 
results would be found). The advantage of my approach is the theoretical 
approach it adopts in examining a well-trodden history. 
There are limitations that must be addressed. The study is unashamedly 
focused on the United States. I have spent little time analysing the 
perspectives of other nations, nor have I considered domestic political 
debates that contributed to international decisions (such as the closure of the 
British, Dutch and French opium monopolies). In doing so, I have risked 
giving too much power to the US in influencing world drug diplomacy, 
particularly in the context of their leverage through medicinal stockpiles. The 
threat of withdrawing supplies was never used against allies: it remained a 
virtual possibility that was never actualised but was nonetheless influential. It 
could well have been the case that nations would have established other 
supply routes if such a threat was acted upon. Developing an argument for 
this counterfactual argument, I believe, is of limited use. As I have shown, 
simply having the supplies of opium stored in Fort Knox was enough to win 
over other nations. It had real consequences in the world.8 Future work could 
examine the assemblages of different nations and their interactions with the 
international system. 
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Second, many of the sources I analysed were manipulated for political 
purposes. Numerous scholars believe the FBN exaggerated their reports. 
Other sources are incomplete and lacking key data (this is a particular 
problem with PCOB data). Inevitably, the figures that purport to show the 
scope of the world drug problem are, at best, estimates based on incomplete 
data. While this reduces the accuracy of my project, there is simply no other 
way to grasp the rough size and scope of the world drug trade. Furthermore, 
the figures I cite are not designed to accurately quantify the scope of the 
world drug problem, but rather the scope that was presented to the public. 
For my purposes, such figures are more interesting because of the 
geonarcotic claims they supported. Drug diplomats knew their data was 
weak; it did not stop them from making very real interventions in the world.  
Third, while the Library of Congress and National Archive holdings are vast, 
they are by no means the only data sources that could have been consulted. 
Many of my PCOB findings did not come from the original archives, but from 
collections held by the Library that had been compiled by others. These 
inevitably exhibit selection bias. Nowhere is this clearer than with the Harry J. 
Anslinger files of Pennsylvania State University, many of which were 
compiled by the man himself throughout his tenure. My choice of archives 
means the documents cited here tend towards a prohibitory stance. While I 
have tried to ameliorate this with a wider search using online databases of 
newspapers, UNODC online archives, and other scholarly work, there is 
danger my account of geonarcotic discourse plays down alternative and 
critical accounts of the time period I analysed. Where I found conflicting 
accounts of drug control, I have done my best to highlight them (as is the 
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case with the Lindesmith papers and poppy growers of California). My 
findings are therefore useful insofar as they offer fresh insights into the 
workings of drug diplomacy, but they should not be interpreted as a new, 
definitive history of drug control in the twentieth-century.  
In the 52 years of legislation examined here, the international drug 
machinery did much to curb and regulate the consumption and production of 
dangerous substances. In the early 1930s, there existed some 4000 tons of 
opium available for illicit uses. By 1968, that figure was 1200 tons.9 
Hopefully, as has been clear from this thesis, reducing this number was just 
one part of drug control. The other purpose of providing the world with 
access to analgesic medicine remains neglected in academic scholarship, 
despite its importance to both prohibition-based drug control and foreign 
policy. 
The control of the drug trade was lauded as a success compared to other 
international commodities and efforts at regulation. After all, the PCOB was 
never compelled to use its ‘nuclear option’ — to recommend the imposition of 
a narcotics embargo on a country where ‘excessive quantities of narcotic 
drugs have accumulated or which is in danger of becoming a centre of illicit 
traffic’.10 As Herbert May, ex-president of the PCOB, celebrated this point in 
1957, prohibition had still not been installed at the UN. It remained an ideal of 
the US drug mavens. State Department officials, other nations, and 
representatives from the United Nations were less sanguine about prohibition 
becoming an international standard. Even with the passage of the 1961 
Single Convention, debates about what a drug was, who could trade and 
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take them, as well as who could sell them, raged on. The twentieth-century 
drug control assemblage was constantly becoming, just as it is today.
1 Boggs, C. (2015). ‘Drugs, Power, and Politics: Narco Wars, Big Pharma, and the Subversion of 
Democracy’; Friman, H.R. (1996). ‘Narcodiplomacy: exporting the US war on drugs’. 
2 Dalby, S. (2009). Security and environmental change. Polity Press, Cambridge; Barry, A. (2013). 
‘Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline’; Le Billon, P. (2001). ‘The political ecology of war: 
natural resources and armed conflicts’. 
3 See Le Billon, P. (2004). The geopolitical economy of ‘resource wars’. Geopolitics, 9(1), 1-28 for 
examples of cobalt, logging, copper and nuclear material, and Marsden, S., & Galois, R. (1995). The 
Tsimshian, the Hudson's Bay Company, and the geopolitics of the Northwest coast fur trade, 1787–
1840. The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe canadien, 39(2), 169-183 for a historical study of the 
value of fur. 
4 Salter, M. (ed.) ‘Making Things International 1’; Salter, M. (ed.) ‘Making Things International 2’. 
5 Bruun, K., Pan, L. & Rexed, I. (1975). The gentlemen’s club: international control of drugs and 
alcohol (Vol. 9). University of Chicago Press Chicago, IL. 
6 Barry, A. (2001). ‘Political Machines’. 
7 Coleman, R. (2013). ‘Deleuze and research methodologies’. p.13. 
8 Deleuze, G. (1988). ‘Bergsonism’. 
9 ‘A forty-years' chronicle of international narcotics control’, Bulletin on Narcotics, 1968, 2: 1-4. 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1968-01-
01_2_page002.html. 
10 May, H. (1957). Bulletin on Narcotics, 1 https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/bulletin/bulletin_1957-01-01_2_page002.html. 
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Appendix  
Example of coding document 
NARA: The Boggs Committee  
Box 46 
Photo Page/subject Quote/subject Etic/inductive Emic/Deductive Notes 
7996 June 10 1940: 
Elton Shaw, 
anti-narcotics 
warrior 
Shaw operates a 
nudist camp near 
Floris, Virginia, 
which was 
recently the 
subject of an 
article in the 
Washington Post 
Anslinger was 
good at 
knowing his 
enemies and 
what they got 
up to, this guy 
was 
particularly 
dangerous as 
he wrote a 
book entitled 
“drug addicts 
are human 
beings”. A 
bigger 
problem was 
the World 
Narcotics 
Research 
Foundation, 
the society 
set up by 
Shaw 
 Not so 
useful 
7999 May 9th 1940. 
Shaw to 
Elanor 
Roosevelt, 
We believe that 
when the truth is 
known, one of the 
worst scandals in 
the history of the 
US will unfold. 
Will you continue 
your 
investigation? 
What was it 
that 
Roosevelt 
was 
investigating?  
 Shaw 
wanted a 
legal 
monopoly, 
and also an 
investigation 
into the FBN 
8002 March 29th 
1940 
The incident 
Shaw felt so 
aggrieved by was 
a couple of 
narcotics agents 
entering a 
peaceful 
assembly in 
Michigan. This 
letter to their 
congressman was 
written by his 
wife. 
This has been 
done for no other 
A bill was 
tabled in the 
House, H. J 
Res 103 was 
introduced by 
Congressman 
Coffee of 
Washington 
and made it 
to the 
Interstate and 
Foreign 
Commerce 
Committee of 
the House.  
 Useful 
information 
for debates 
over science 
of addiction. 
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reason than that 
we differ from Mr 
Anslinger 
concerning some 
points of the 
narcotics problem 
and on which he 
is determined to 
suppress an 
public discussion. 
In this 
connection, it is 
significant that 
our views are in 
complete 
Harmony with the 
five great 
organisations 
working in this 
field, our own 
WORLD 
NARCOTICS 
RESEARCH 
FOUNDATION, 
THE AMERICAN 
WHITE CROSS 
ASSOCIATION 
ON DRUG 
ADDICTIONS, 
THE 
ANTI_NARCOTIC 
LEAGUE, THE 
INTERNATIONAL 
WHITE CROSS 
ANTI NARCOTIC 
ASSOCIATION 
and the INTER-
STATE 
NARCOTICS 
ASSEMBLY. All 
are a unit in 
programme, all 
agree that the 
Anslinger 
programme is in 
violation of law, 
inhuman, 
diabolical and the 
most egregious 
and reprehensible 
in our modern life.  
8005 March 5th 
1940 
Elton Shaw went 
to the FBN and 
asked them a 
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series of 
questions. 
8008 October 21 
1941 
We have a letter 
about a series of 
articles from La 
Roe, a medical 
doctor who had 
letters published 
in Hearst 
newspapers but 
they were taken 
out when they 
were found to ‘be 
contrary to Hearst 
policies. ‘As is 
sometimes the 
case, some of 
these fanatics sell 
themselves to an 
editor who is not 
thoroughly 
familiar with the 
policies and it 
takes some time 
to correct the 
situation 
 This is a nice 
example of 
public 
dialogue on 
narcotics 
being 
managed, the 
letter is to a 
Judge 
Michelsen, 
from 
Anslinger on 
Roe, who felt 
he was out to 
obtain funds., 
it goes on to 
talk about 
how La Roe 
was 
cancelled 
from talking 
to the WCTU, 
this was 
another 
organisation 
Anslinger was 
close to.  
 La Roe was 
a doctor who 
worked 
against 
Anslinger 
8010 Anslinger to 
Mrs Williams 
Dick 
Sparberg, 
September 
1941 
This letter is 
interesting for two 
reasons, we have 
the geonarcotic 
discourse, 
element, but also 
the growth of 
poppy which 
Anslinger 
mentions. ‘ We 
are having a 
great deal of 
activity in regard 
to the production 
of seed and we 
wish to control it 
before the poppy 
growth becomes 
as prevalent as 
marihuana. 
Poppy seed is 
used as a 
decoration on 
bread rolls only. I 
cannot see the 
necessity of 
This poppy 
seed bun 
problem is a 
big problem  
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growing 
thousands of 
acres of poppies 
just to decorate 
buns. 
8011 Manning, 
district 
supervisor, to 
Anslinger, 
September 22 
1941 
To say the least, I 
am a little bit 
surprised that the 
Hearst papers 
would publish 
such a story as 
this without first 
taking it up with 
you or some 
other official of 
our service 
This is clear 
link to 
Anslinger and 
Hearst, and 
was all about 
Dr La Roe. 
  
Photo Page Quote Etic/inductive Emic/Deductive  
8012 Anslinger to 
Mr Bielaski, 
September 
20th 1940 
It is remarkable 
what an 
interesting 
discussion can be 
had when one is 
hampered by 
neither 
information nor 
facts 
Anslinger 
scathingly 
referring to La 
Roe 
  
8013 Anslinger to 
Kolb 
His attitude has 
always been that 
there is a sinister 
attempt to silence 
him 
   
8015 La Roe While admitting, 
therefore, the 
sheer necessity 
for proper 
enforcement of 
the penological 
provisions of the 
present laws, or 
of later and better 
ones, it is my 
contention that 
there is also a 
medical aspect to 
this problem, and 
that enforcement 
personnel are not 
fitted by their 
training, or their 
points of view, to 
administer this 
aspect of it. My 
contention is that 
drug addiction is 
This is 
interesting, 
Anslinger and 
La Roe did 
not disagree 
on much, but 
this one vital 
point 
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a disease, and 
being a disease it 
should be 
handled as a 
medical problem, 
by medical men 
and women, with 
proper training in 
medicine, 
psychology, 
psychiatry and 
sociology.  
8017 Anslinger to 
Kolb, 
November 1st 
1939 
In an article which 
appeared in the 
Brooklyn Daily 
Eagle of January 
11, 1939, Dr La 
Roe claimed that 
Japan was 
smuggling drugs 
into this country 
to prepare the 
United States for 
the slaughter she 
plans here 10 to 
20 years from 
now. He also 
stated that the 
drug peddlers 
were 
concentrating on 
youth, high 
school students 
and young 
workers”. He 
predicted that it 
would be 
completely 
impossible to 
recruit a 
physically fit army 
if narcotic 
addiction 
continues to 
increase at the 
present rate. He 
said official 
figures were far 
too low and that 
the number of 
addicts in the 
country ranged 
up to 4, 000,000. 
He estimated in 
the year 1938 
Was it that La 
Roe was 
being too 
dramatic for 
Anslinger, 
making the 
drug problem 
too worrying? 
This appeal 
to the 
exaggerated 
nature of his 
stats is 
clearly 
interesting, as 
this is a 
charge 
levelled at 
Anslinger 
today.  
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Japan produced 
at least 
100,000,000 new 
addicts in China. 
The above will 
give you an 
analysis of Dr La 
Roe 
8026 February 22nd 
1939 
 Many of 
these articles 
are Anslinger 
advising 
people to 
avoid Dr La 
Roe and his 
organisation, 
as he 
‘handles the 
truth rather 
carelessly’ 
  
8028 November 
14th 1938 
La Roe to 
Anslinger, they 
wrote one 
another! 
Concerning the 
parallel lines of 
our activities, the 
more I think of it, 
the less reason I 
see for any 
friction. It seems 
that each effort 
ought to 
supplement the 
other as far as 
possible. Yours 
so well done 
considering the 
small force 
   
8028 Blanco to La 
Roe 
It seems La Roe 
was brought to 
Anslinger’s 
attention by 
Blanco 
  Blanco was 
a conduit for 
Anslinger? 
8031 Will S, Wood, 
Acting 
Commissioner 
Information on La 
Roe’s society 
formation, and his 
problems with its 
irresponsible use 
of arithmetic  
   
8034 John Wyeth 
and Brother 
Inc (who are 
they?) writing 
It seems many 
people were 
worried by La 
Roe and wrote to 
  Highlights 
the scope of 
the problem, 
and perhaps 
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to Anslinger 
November 
1937 
Anslinger for 
assurance, they 
were a 
pharmaceutical 
lobby, perhaps 
worried it would 
hurt sales, or lead 
to more restrictive 
laws  
the FBN’s 
eagerness 
to respond? 
8035 Anslinger to 
La Roe 
Anslinger began 
to ask La Roe 
about his 
statistics in the 
Washington 
Sunday Star, 
November 14, 
1937 (next image 
8036). LA Roes 
quote on Japan’s 
military campaign 
in North China as 
“the first victory in 
the world history 
won with a 
narcotic needle” 
I think that 
Anslinger was 
probably 
worried about 
competing 
knowledge 
claims. He 
was 
disagreeing 
with Anslinger 
on 
marihuana,  
 Nice link to 
weaponised 
opium 
8038 Anslinger to 
La Roe 
Cooperation prior 
to the letter after 
this one 
   
8042 La Roe to 
Cordell Hull, 
Secretary of 
State 
La Roe was 
Hobson’s 
physician.  
  Is there 
more 
information 
about the 
extent to 
which 
Hobson, La 
Roe and 
Anslinger 
knew one 
another? 
8046 Feb 24th 
1936, this is 
Anslinger’s 
address over 
NBC 
Anslinger and 
Hobson had a 
great 
relationship 
Some good 
quotes. ‘Opium 
has greater 
potentialities for 
good and evil 
than any other 
drug known to 
mankind. As to 
benevolent use 
there can be no 
question; but it is 
the malignant 
misuse I wish to 
emphasise today; 
and the necessity 
Anslinger and 
the Janus 
face of opium  
 
Anslinger on 
importance of 
public 
knowledge.  
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for the public at 
large to study the 
narcotic problem.  
 
The habit-forming 
tendencies and 
the physical injury 
and moral 
degradation 
which inevitably 
follow the 
continued use of 
opiates must be 
exposed to the 
tribunal of public 
opinion if we are 
to make more 
rapid progress in 
solving this world 
menace.’  
 
 
 
 
